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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis is an attempt to address the politics of generational gaps within Muslim 
Brotherhood Movement in Egypt since mid 1980s till 2011. It sheds light on patterns of 
generational interactions, issues of concern, and their impact on the future trajectory of the 
Movement. It conceptually employs the Generational Unit Model, drawn largely from the work 
of Karl Mannheim. In doing so, the study applies focused semi-structured interviews with the 
movement’s affiliated members from antagonistic generational units. The study addresses the 
socioeconomic and political context that shape the consciousness of two generational waves 
within the movement. It descriptively addresses the nature of generational relationship between 
some of the 1970s generation, young Brothers, and the movement’s leadership. It denotes 
reasons behind the establishment of new political organizations including The Center party (Al 
Wasat), The Egyptian Current Party (Al Tayar al Masry), and The Renaissance Party (Al Nahda 
Party). The study highlights different perceptions and schools of thought shared by Brothers 
towards social reality, and tools of reforming the movement and the Egyptian political system. 
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CHAPTER I: A BACKGROUND 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 “Each generation imagines itself to be more intelligent than the one that went before it, 
and wiser than the one that comes after it” George Orwell. 
Generally, the continuity of any movement is assured by enduring the commitment to that 
movement's ideology and principles, but as the recruitment process moves on, newcomers may 
share different inspirations and perceptions of social reality, which result in that movement’s 
change
1
, renewal or decay and dissolution. The same is applied to the impact of emerging 
generational waves and schools of thought on the movement’s course and trajectory. This thesis 
seeks to tackle this phenomenon of movements’ change, from a generational perspective based 
on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s experience.  
Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Al Ikhwan al Muslmin, is one of the powerful Islamic mass 
movements; it proved a strong capacity to mobilize people and develop popular appeal among 
Egyptians from all walks of life. Debates and exchange of ideas via media and newspapers for 
the last decade, throughout a liberal façade assured by Mubarak’s regime and post revolutionary 
era, put many problematic issues, including Shari’a application, democracy, Copts and women’s 
rights in front of the movement.
2
These heated issues, in addition to other internal dynamics, 
brought MB’s generational gaps to the surface pushing for an academic interest to analyze the 
phenomenon's roots, reasons, patterns, and influences.  
                                                          
1Nancy Whitter, “ Political Generations, Micro Cohorts, and the Transformation of Social Movements”,  American Sociology 
Review 62, no 5 (1997), http://www.jstore.org/stable/2657359 (accessed September 3, 2011)  
2
 Mubarak’s regime allowed for certain liberal measures, though strict political control was maintained (a state of competitive 
authoritarianism); see literature on authoritarianism in the Middle East in Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, “Waiting for 
Godot: Regime Change without Democratization in the Middle East”,  International Political Science Review 25 (2004) :4. 
Stephen King, “Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa”, Political Science Quarterly 122 (2007): 3,  
Ellen Lust, “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East”, Journal of Democracy 20 (2009): 3.   
2 
 
The history of Muslim Brotherhood has been shaped by emerging distinct intellectual 
trends intertwined by significant political events in Egypt. Generational disputes date back to late 
1930s, and continued with different degrees till this moment. 
 As per Khalil Al Anani’s classification, MB witnessed four successive generations: a) 
the first generation is the “Old Guard” or the veteran generation, referring to those who were in 
the movement during the 1950s and 1960s and held the upper ranks in the movement, b) the 
second generation is the “pragmatists”, who joined the movement during the 1970s, c) the third 
generation, are the “neo-traditionalists”, who have been running most administrative issues since 
the 1990s, and played a major role in maintaining the movement’s secrecy and underground 
structure against Mubarak’s coercion, and finally d) the fourth generation consists of young 
members in their 20s and 30s.  
  While both of the old guard and the neo-traditionalist are ideologically and religiously 
conservative, the fourth young generation is ideologically more critical and open. Exactly like 
the third generation of pragmatists, the fourth generation tried to integrate the movement in the 
political and civil life, and transcended their third immediate predecessors by providing a modern 
Islamic discourse to the movement.   
 Apparently, Al Anani’s classification seems to be, however important, simplistic 
because he depended on age intervals which set breaks between each age group. Associated with 
this classification another setback, which is the discontinuity of ideas in the groups. Logical 
wise, the young age groups are not assumed to receive, interpret or process the intellectual 
springboards which bed-rocked the movement’s way in the same conceptions as the founders or 
the old aged group’s member. Anani’s categories can be best considered as a time-line for the 
membership characteristics’ evolution of the movement.   
3 
 
 This thesis adopts more anatomical perspective to explore intellectual variations within 
each age group and how such inter-group variation contributes to the overall generational gap 
along the historicity of the movement. Building upon Al Anani’s age intervals, I intend to stratify 
the intellectual tides and eddies, continuity and discontinuity, respectively, in the movement. For 
analytical purposes, generational unit will represent the main conceptual framework, which is 
developed, as per the literature review, to examine the intersection between vertical time-line 
analysis and horizontal intellectual evolution of the movement. To clarify the concept, the figure 
below has two axes: the horizontal represents two dichotomies of age group (Youth-18 to 40- 
and the Elders above 40) and the vertical axe represents the two dominant thought-lines since the 
movement’s birth (Outbist and reformists).  
 
     Figure 1. Different Generational Units within the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood’s movement represents an umbrella for different intellectual 
trends and religious schools, ranging from religious liberalism to Salafism.
3
There are mainly five 
major Islamic trends, or schools: Hassan al Banna, Qutbist, Salafist, al Azhar, and post Islamist. 
These schools conflated with two main trends in the movement’s structure: the Reformist and the 
Organizational stream.
4
  
Al Banna’s school advocated a holistic gradual approach for reform, which is bottom- up, 
based on integration with all segments of the society. He was influenced by Muhammed Abdu’s 
project of reform, and Rashid Reda who represented more Salafist trend. Al Banna strongly 
perceived Islam as a total system that meets people’s spiritual and material demands, and 
transcends space and time. Islam has an answer for humanity’s problems, and is superior to all 
human made ideologies. He empirically crystallized the Azharite enlightened school and 
Spiritual Sufism in the movement’s structure.5He acknowledged the value of mysticism, though 
                                                          
3
 Hossam Tamam, “Azmet al Ikhwan, Nahayet al Ta’ayoush al Dakhaly, S’aoud al Tanzeem wa Tawghout Nahou al Salafia” 
[The Muslim Brotherhood’s Crisis: the Rising Organizational Stream and Tendency Towards Salafism], Al Shorouk, October, 
2009. 
4
The security apparatus had been established in the early 1940s at Muktam Hills in Cairo. This date has been stated by many 
authors, though according to Omar al Talmasany, the security apparatus had been created in 1936. See Omar al Talmasany’s 
autobiography in Ibrahim Ka’aoud,  Omar al Talmasany shahdan a‟la al a‟asr: Al Ikwan al Muslimeen fe darat al hakika al 
ghaba [Omar al Talmasany Witness on Age: Muslim Brotherhood in the Circle of Missing Reality] (Cairo: Al Mokhtar Al 
Islami, 1985), 63. For Mahmoud Abd al Halim, it had been established in  1940 when Al Banna invited Salih Ashmawi, Hussain 
kamal al Dein, Hamed Sharet, Abd al Aziz Ahmad, and Mahmoud Abd al Halim to discuss the issue, Mahmoud  Abd al Halim, 
Al Khwan al Muslmun Ahdas San‟at al Tarikh Rouya men al Dakhel [Muslim Brotherhood Events Made History: A Vision from 
Inside], First Vol 1 (1928-1948), (Cairo, Dar al Da’awa, 1979), 258-259. It had been known among Muslim Brothers by the 
Special Section (Al Nizam al Khasa), and among outsiders as the Secret Apparatus (Al Jihaz al Sirri). A number of military 
officers joined the apparatus, and some of them became part of the Free Officers Movement later on. The security apparatus was 
created to fight British and Zionists troops. Ibid, 30-33, and see also Youssef H. Aboul Enien,” Al –Ikhwan Al Muslimeen: The 
Muslim Brotherhood”, Military Review, July- August (2003): 28. The apparatus had been dissolved in 1954 after a failed attempt 
to assassinate Gamal Abd al Nasser. Members of the apparatus share the culture of obedience (sam’a wa’l ta’a), secrecy, and less 
integrated in the society. This culture affected members’ perceptions and political choices. Al Banna, actually, defined three 
stages of loyalty and obedience: 1) Acquaintance which is mainly for general activities that do not necessarily require obedience 
to leaders, 2) Formation is for jihad activities and it requires strict obedience, 3) Execution of jihad where absolute obedience is 
necessary.  Obedience is correlated with confidence in leaders’ decisions, and disciplinary measures against members’ violations. 
Disciplinary procedures include warning, fining, suspension, and dismissal. Richard Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 300-301. 
5 Tarik al Bishry, Al Malameh al A‟ma Fikr al Syasy al Islamy fe al Tarikh al Mo‟aser[Features of Islamic Political Thought in 
Contemproary History] (Cairo: Dar al Shorouk, 2005), 23-24.   
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he was against isolated spirituality. The sort of spirituality, Al Banna called for, is a social active 
spirituality.  
Al Banna defined MB as an Islamic Movement (Haraka Islamiya) which has a mission of 
active engagement in the public life. He described his movement as a Salafi call, a Sunni 
approach, a Sufi truth, a political institution, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural society, 
an economic organization, and a social idea. He stressed the universal nature of Islam and 
blurred boundaries between religion, politics, and social life. His vision of reform relies upon 
education, learning, and Jihad. Al Banna defined three linear stages of reform: individual (self), 
family, society, and state. Changes in each of those areas should be gradual and peaceful, based 
on education, and derived from Islamic traditions. He admired Muhammed Abdu and Rashid 
Reda’s experience in “Dar Al Da’wa and Irshad” school, and how this school represented a 
kernel for an Islamic educational project that protects the ummah identity.
6
  
Al Banna, following his Azharite Sheikhs, adopted an open-minded interpretation of 
shari’a application, and tried to avoid controversial issues that would divide the ummah. He said 
“let us cooperate on those things on which we can agree and be lenient in those on which we 
cannot”7. He asserted the flexibility of Islam, and recalled how legist shaf’i gave different rulings 
to similar cases due to different contexts.
8
He encouraged Sayyid Sabik to write his volumes 
about Islamic schools of jurisprudence to open the way for different understandings of Islam; he 
did not ask his followers to follow special Islamic schools of jurisprudence. Al Banna gave high 
priority for the unity of ummah, and this justifies why he was against parties and Sufi orders as 
signs of factionalism and disunity. His focus was mainly on general guidelines and principles 
                                                          
6 Ibrahim al Bayoumy Ghanem, Al Fikr al Sayasy Imam Hassan al Banna [The Political Thought of Hassan al Banna](Cairo: Dar 
al Tawze’a wa al Nashr al Islamya, 1992), 327-330  
7Quoted in Mitchell, 217.  
8Ibid, 237. 
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and avoided going for details. Al Banna’s justification was that details would lead to different 
schools, schisms, and conflicting interpretations and his movement is not mature yet to go for 
this phase.
9
 
The Azharite School includes many religious figures who were affiliated to the 
movement or were in good relations with it. This school is not confined to members with 
Azharite backgrounds (Sheikhs), but rather the adherents of the enlightened Azharite school of 
thought with different professional civil backgrounds and religious education. The school 
includes Sayyid Sabik, Muhammed al Ghazaly, Hassan al Baqouri,Yusuf al Karadawy, Hassan al 
Houdaiby, Abd al Qader Awda, Omar al Talmasany, Farid abd al Khaliq, and other members. 
The Azharite School represents the reformist trend that emerged at the late nineteenth century 
and bedrocked the way for religious renewal and ijtihad.
10
It is also known as the Islamic project 
of the center (Wasataya), or mainstream Islam. The school has intellectual lineages with other 
current Egyptian scholars, including mainly Tarik al Bishry, Fahmy Huwaidy, Yusuf al 
Karadawy, Selim al Awa, Muhammed al Ghazzaly, and Ahmed Kamal Abou al Magd. Raymond 
Baker, in his profound book Islam Without Fear, descriptively analyzes the intellectual 
contributions of those scholars. This group of intellectuals represents a trend known in literature 
as neo Islamist, who provide modern solutions for current political challenges in Egypt, 
including Copts and women’s political rights. For instance, Yusuf al Karadawy draws an analogy 
between party politics and Islamic schools of jurisprudence (madhahib). El Bishry, Al A’wa, 
and Fahmy Huwaidy address the notion of citizenship and advocated full political rights for 
                                                          
9 Yusuf al Karadawy, Al Ikhwan al Muslmun 70 A‟aman fe Al D‟awa wa Tarbia wa al Jihad [Muslim Brotherhood 70 Years in 
D’awa, Education, and Jihad](Cairo: Wahba Book Store, 1999), 119. 
10
  The Egyptian historian Tarik al Bishry described this reform movement as the second traditional renewal movement in the 
Muslim world. The mission of this movement was to preserve the Muslim creed against westernization challenges, Al Bishry, 10-
11. 
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Christians Their manifesto was published in 1991 entitled “A Contemporary Islamic Vision 
“which elaborated the intellectual base of Islamic order.11Intellectual contributions of this school 
represent the source of reference for the 1970s generation and the Wasat Party. 
The Qutbist trend is associated with Sayyid Qutb’s scholarly works.12Qutb was arrested 
in 1954 and spent fifteen years in prison under brutal torture. Under such circumstances, he 
managed to finish his most influential literary works: Fe Zilal al Quran (In the Shade of Quran), 
and M’alim Fe al Tariq ( Milestones). Qutb’s writings established the philosophical base for 
Islamic militancy during the 1970s and 1980s.
13
Qutb and other Brothers were engaged in heated 
discussions over his writings and interpretations. Some of the Brothers adopted Qutb’s ideas of 
Hakimiyyah (Sovereignty) and Jahiliyya (Ignorance) marking the start of a Qutbian/ Takfir trend. 
Qutb was influenced by the Abu A’la al Maududi concept of Hakimiyyat Allah14 and Al Nadwi’s 
conception of Jahiliyya. For Qutb Shahada (Muslim Profession of Faith) and Tawhid (Oneness) 
do not only have theological meaning but also a commitment to bring God’s Sovereignty into 
action. According to Qutb, tawhid has three dimensions: firstly, submission to God’s 
Sovereignty and not to anyone else (Hakimiyya), secondly, revolution against tyranny, and 
thirdly, the belief that giving up freedom and being subordinate to others is a crime. Tawhid, in 
this way, is a positive declaration for action, rather than a negative theological philosophy. Al 
„ubudiyya (worship) demands Muslims to recognize God as the only and ultimate legislator. All 
laws and legislations are stemmed from what is revealed by God. Qutb justified that by the 
                                                          
11 Raymond William Baker, Islam Without Fear Egypt and the New Islamist (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003),10.   
12 Qutb was appointed as the Cultural Advisor of  the movement after  the 1952 revolution and he assumed a seat in the Guidance 
Office.  He was the Head of the Propaganda Section, and the editor of Al Ikhwan al Muslmin weekly newspaper. He had diverse 
intellectual contributions which include poetry, autobiography, and literary criticism, Barbra Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: 
Hassan Al Hudaybi and Ideology (UK: Routledge Studies in Political Islam, 2009), 50-51.  
13 Rozek, Joseph D, “ Sayyid Qutb: An historical and Contextual Analysis of Jihadist Theory”, (MA Thesis, Grand Valley State 
University, 2008), 68-69.  
14 According to Mawdudi, hakimiyyah of Allah is the opposite to Man authority, rabaniyyah (divinity) is the odd of man 
servitude, and wahdaniyyah is against relying on other sources of knowledge for legislation, Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical 
Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Lebanosn: American University of Beirut, 
2006), 151.  
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Quranic verse “wa man lam yahkoum bi-ma anzal allah fa-ulaika hummu al Kafroun”, whoever 
does not judge by what Allah revealed, such are infidels. Based on this interpretation, modern 
state systems and legislations are illegitimate; they reflect the state of jahiliyya. Jahiliyya is not a 
historical period (pre Islam period), but rather a status that transcends space and time; it is 
associated with the presence of other sovereign human-made authorities. True Muslim society 
should reflect absolute submission to God’s sovereignty, and legislations (Al hokum wa al amr la 
Allah). There is nothing called half-Islamic society and half Jahiliyya society; according to Qutb, 
absolute submission is the criterion, and true believers should not accept compromises, or 
patching up. A small group of true believers or vanguard (Tali’a) of Islamists is in charge of 
accomplishing this task, through an Islamic method (minhaj). Qutb determined thirteen years to 
get the task done and he referred to three stages in this regard. The first stage is minhaj and it 
includes the profession of faith and submission to God’s sovereignty. The second stage is 
ubudiyya which entails seeking knowledge to apply God’s laws. People will start to join 
members of the vanguard, who may still weak to be engaged in any kind of confrontation with 
the Jihaliyya society. Thus, Qutub advocated withdrawal (hijra) from the society in order to 
launch the third phase, which is Jihad; the actual confrontation with Jahiliyya rule.
15Tali’a/ 
members of the vanguard, in their struggle, are inspired by the goal of bringing justice and 
shari’a into action. However, true Muslim society should firstly be established before applying 
Islamic jurisprudence. Shari’a should not be forced on people; people should firstly demand it.  
Al Banna and Qutb share together a linear perception towards Islamic revivalism, though 
they differ regarding the content and tools. Jihad, for Qutb, is not defensive but rather a proactive 
struggle to establish an Islamic state. It has two dimensions: 1) “serious realism” which entails 
d’awa against incorrect beliefs and concepts of Jahiliyya, 2) “active realism” including material 
                                                          
15 Zollner, 54-60.  
9 
 
preparations for jihad. Jihad is also a continuous movement that may take faces like writing, 
teaching, and self-discipline. The last feature of jihad is the regulation of relations between 
Muslims and non-Muslim societies.
16
It should be noted that Qutb’s writings did not explicitly 
call for the use of violence against society and rulers; militant groups followed a reductionist 
reading for Qutb’s ideas, giving priority to violence rather than education.17 
The body of the Brothers’ movement repudiated the idea of violent jihad adopted by 
militant movements; nevertheless, Qutb’s ideas conditioned the discourse and consciousness of 
the 1965 group who later dominated MB’s upper ranks. The idea of vanguard (unique Quranic 
Generation in Qutb’s words) that is distinct, or emotionally detached from the society, strong 
Islamic leadership (qiyada), and preserving the solidarity of the group, reflects the essence of the 
organizational trend that is currently running the movement. The Qutbian stream is presented by 
the 1965 group including Muhammed Badie, the Supreme General, Mahmoud Ezzat, and Gom’a 
Amin.
18
The 1965 group did not have the chance to meet Hassan al Banna, and truly understand 
MB’s ideology and reform discourse. They provided their own interpretation to Hassan al 
                                                          
16 Moussalli, 203-212.   
17 According to Farid Abd al Khali, Qutb was not violent and he did not call for terrorism. His writings have many faces; in other 
words it can be interpreted differently. Thus, I asked Hassan al Houdaiby not to publish Qutb’s book. An interview with Farid 
Abd al Kahliq by the author, Cairo, Egypt, December 12, 2011.  
18 Between 1957 and 1958, young members of the Brothers established a new formation of the movement outside prisons.  The 
group was named by the regime as Nizam 1965(Organization  of 1965). Founders of the 1965 group were Abd al Fatah Ismail, 
Muhammed Abd al Fatah Shrief, Ahmad Abd al-Majid , Awad abd al Mot’al Aly, Fathy Rafa’i, Sabry Arafa al Komy, Aly 
Ashmawy, Amin Shahin, and Mubark abd al A’zem.  Goals of the group were firstly to step down Nasser regime and assassinate 
him; later one, they narrowed their goals to consolidating bonds among the movement’s members. Members of the Guidance 
council at that time were skeptical about the group and afraid of the consequences if Nasser’s regime detected  it. Sayyid Qutb 
agreed to be the group’s spirtiual guide; he was in charge of the intellectual formation of the group.  The educational curriculums 
of this group included Qutb writings, Abul al- A’la al Maududi, Ibn Kathir, Ibn Hanbal, and Ibn Taymiyya.  The group was 
detected in 1965, and Qutb was hanged with Muhammed Hawash, and Abd al Fatah Ismail. The dectection of the group did not 
end the presence of the Qutbist stream in the movement.  Some of the 1965 organization were released in 1971 and assumed high 
administrative ranks in the movement. For details about 1965 organization, see: Ahmad Abd al-Majid, Al Ikhwan wa Abd al 
Nasser.. Al Kasa Kamla l Tanzeem 1965 [Muslim Brotherhood and Abd al Nasser …the Detailed Story of 1965 Organization], 
http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81_%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A3_%D8%AA%D9%86
%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85_1965 (accessed December 14, 2011), Muhammed al Saroury, Al Ikhwan al Muslmin Tanzeem 
1965…Al Zal zal wa Al Sahwa, 
http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%A7%
D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85_%281965
%29_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%84_..._%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A
D%D9%88%D8%A9_...._%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%8A, 
( accessed December 14, 2011). Barba Zollner, “Prison Talk: the Muslim Brotherhood’s  Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s Persecution, 1945 to 1971”, Int. J. Middle East Stud 39 (1998), 419-421.   
10 
 
Banna’s diaries, and their philosophy was established on detachment and confrontation with state 
and society. The group started to penetrate the movement by the 1970s, whilst Hassan al Banna’s 
students and other Azharite members remained at the margin or were excluded.
19
 
The Qutbist school is contrary to Al Banna’s trend promoted societal withdrawal and 
confrontation.
20
Al Banna did not ask for patching up status quo with Islamic values; but also was 
against total destruction of the old system. His way is based more on compromises and 
coexistence; changes should be gradual through d’awa and education over long periods. He 
believed that the role could be played by state authorities in reform is salient compared with 
individual initiatives. He advocated from- within reform approach, and accepted parliamentary 
participation as a way to emphasize the peaceful nature of his movement, and to be involved in 
institutional reform. Al Banna participated in parliamentary elections in 1942, 1945, and planned 
to participate in the 1950 elections.
21The peaceful approach of the movement, under Al Banna’s 
leadership, was indicated in his refusal to the Shabab Muhammed group, and Ahmed Raf’at’s 
perception towards the role of the movement and means of reform. Al Banna also renounced 
violent activities by the security apparatus in 1949.  
The Wahabist waves found their way to the Brothers by the 1970s. Many members had to 
flee the country to escape Nasser’s brutality. Saudi Arabia was the main destination for many of 
them, especially for those released, later on, during Sadat’s era with no jobs, and financial 
support. The Brothers played a significant role in the modernization project of Saudi Arabia, and 
they were influenced by the Wahabist environment there. They also participated in a number of 
institutions that have a Salafist base, like The International Seminar of Islamic Youth.  However, 
this new version of Salafism is different from Hassan’s al Banna’s Salafist call. The latter 
                                                          
19 An interview with an MB’s member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, December 7, 2011.  
20 Al Bishry, 23.  
21 Ghanem, 382-388.  
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avoided dogmatic controversies, and called for rational interpretations and understanding of 
Quran and Sunna. Some of Al Banna’s students played music, wrote poetry, and smoked. Their 
wives and sisters were modestly dressed. They operated in an open intellectual environment 
consisting of liberals, nationalists, and Azharites; this openness influenced early members’ 
perceptions and attitudes towards the (other). This was not the case in the 1970s, the state 
abolished religious courts and stretched its control over Al Azhar, and endowment (awqaf). The 
richness of intellectual life was undermined due to state control over newspapers, magazines, 
theaters and other cultural institutions. Journalists, preachers, and intellectuals became 
employees for the state. This strong control interrupted the flow of genuine, and critical 
intellectual ideas.
22
This paved the way for Wahabism to spread, relying heavily on the Gulf 
financial support. The Salafist writings became embedded in the Brothers’ curriculums during 
Nasser’s prison era in order to establish strong bonds of solidarity and spread the culture of 
patience among prisoners. The first edition of the “Basics of the Salafist Approach” book written 
by Mostafa Helmy was published by Dar al D’awa House which was owned by Brothers during 
the 1970s. Dar al Da’wa Magazine started to include controversial issues, such as the 
transgression of building churches, the necessity of applying shari’a laws, and the sinfulness of 
music and singing in its subsequent issues. The burqa became apparent among many Sisters, and 
many Brothers acquired beards. Some Salafist sheikhs in the movement became prominent in TV 
channels like Safwat Hegazy, and Ragheb al Sergany.
23
Sheik Muhmmed Hussein Eissa, who 
was the head of the movement’s office in Alexandria, wrote more than forty books on fiqh 
(Jurisprudence) and other social issues. He contributed to the movement’s educational 
                                                          
22 Asef Bayet,  Making Islam Democratic Social Movements and the Post Islamist Turn (California, Stanford University Press, 
2003), 80-81.  
23 Religious lectures and TV programs of Salafist Sheikhs have been widely circulated on Facebook groups affiliated with MB 
and visited by thousands of its members like “ Nabd Ikhwan” ( Ikhwan Pulse), and “ Anta A’yal Ikhwangy” (You are Ikhwan) 
groups.  
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curriculums by adding some Salafist components to them. The Salafist trend is apparent among 
young members, especially those with rural roots.
24
This was enhanced by the increasing number 
of mosques and welfare associations controlled by the Ansar al Suna Salafist movement. It 
should be noted that the current Salafist trend among Brothers reflects a conservative mode of 
thought rather than a scientific intellectual school. This conservatism appears from time to time 
over issues, like women’s and Copts’ political rights.  
The Post Islamist trend is a response to the failure of political Islam. According to Asef  
Bayet, it represents both condition and project. Conditions of the emergence of this trend are 
justified by internal contradictions and societal pressures against Islamists’ discourse. Post 
Islamist has the project of rationalizing/ modernizing Islam in social, economic, and political 
domains. In this sense, it is neither an anti Islamic nor a secular project, but rather a different 
cultural alternative to modernity.25This trend seeks to accommodate democratization, pluralism, 
women, and minorities’ rights with modern religious discourse. In this way, it advocates a 
secular state that protects and coexists with religion in the public sphere. The post Islamist trend 
does not use religion in political mobilization or political controversies.
26
Adherents of this trend 
believe that people’s free choice is the higher source of reference, and societal religiosity should 
be preserved and encouraged. The Al Tayar al Masry newly established political party represents 
this trend.  
                                                          
24
 Hossam Tamam, “The Salafization of the Muslim Brothers: The Erosion of the Fundamental Hypothesis and the Rising of 
Salafism within the Muslim Brotherhood: The Paths and the Repercussions of Change”, Futuristic 
Studies Unit (Bibliotheca Alexandrina), 2011. 
25 Asef Bayet,  Making Islam Democratic Social Movements and the Post Islamist Turn (California, Stanford University Press, 
2003),11. According to Salwa Ismail, Post Islamism entails the individualization of religious practices, and differentiation 
between citizen and believer,  Salwa Ismail, Rethinking Islamist politics : culture, the state and Islamism ( London, Tauris, 
2003), 161. 
26 Ismail Al Alexandrani, “Post Islamist from Theory to Organization”, (Unpublished Paper for Arab Alternatives Studies Center, 
2011).  
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Those preceding intellectual trends resulted in disputing perceptions towards the 
movement, political regime, other political forces, and political reform among the MB’s 
members. They summarize much of the reasons of difference among MB’s different generational 
groups. 
In reference to the Muslim Brotherhood’s history, there are four main generational gaps, 
reflecting blurred patterns, and issues of concern. The establishment of Ahmed Raf’at’s group in 
1939 and the secession of the Muhammed Youth group (shabab Muhammed) at the same year 
marked the first generational gap. Ahmed Rafa’at was a young educated member in the 
movement, who refused Al Banna’s approach and offered another interpretation to the 
relationship with the political regime and non religious segments of the society. Rafa’at criticized 
Al Banna for his way of addressing the government and the palace. He thought the movement 
should be more radical and adopt violent ways regarding issues of morlaity and women’s dress 
codes, rather than focusing on religious and spiritual peaceful messages. For the Palestinian 
cause, he thought that the Brothers’efforts should not stop at the level of propaganda, but rather 
the direct involvement in fights against Zionist groups was to be a priority. Rafa’at succeeded in 
attracting a number of adherents, especially from young newly affiliated members. Al Banna and 
other members refused some of Rafa’at’s radical ideas, especially those related to women, and 
advocated a gradual approach regarding the Palestinian cause, and their relationship with the 
government. Al Banna, based on Mahmoud Abd al Halim’s plan27, managed to isolate Rafa’at 
and his group and proved the invalidity of their ideas. After six months the group was dissolved 
and some of its members joined the Brothers later regretting their actions. Raf’at refused to re-
join back and he traveled to Palestine where he was mistakenly killed by resistance groups there.  
                                                          
27  Mahmoud Abd al Halim was one of the early members in the Muslim Brotherhood Foundation Committee, and he became 
later  the first Executive Head of the Secret Apparatus in the early 1940s.  
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Shabab Muhammed group was also established by young newly affiliated members
28
 
who rejected some of the movement’s internal mechanisms of decision making process (shoura 
principle). They believed most decisions were taken only by Al Banna, and that shura was not 
really applied . The group also adopted a radical perception towards the existing political system, 
and other political forces. They peacefully withdrew from the movement, and continued to exist  
independently till the death of  the last group’s head  Muhammed Attia Khamis in the 1980s.29Al 
Banna’s reaction towards Shabab Muahmmed Group was not aggressive, rather he congratualted 
them for the establishment of their group. 
 Under severe torture during Nasser’s era, the second generational dispute found its way 
with the emergence of the Qutbian trend. Some young Brothers adopted Qutb’s ideas of 
Hakimiyyah. 1967 witnessed a split between two groups: the Qutbian radical group including: 
Shukry Mustafa and other young members, and old members led by Al Houdaiby. In a reaction 
to the young  group’ interpretations of Qutb’s writings, Al Houdaiby wrote his book Du‟at la 
Quda in 1969, and other seven public letters denouncing Takfir approach/ post Qutbian trends, 
and use of violence against the political system.
30
Shukry Mustafa withdrew from the movement, 
and established his own group al-Jama‟at al-Takfir w‟al-Hijrah.31The same for Muhammad 
Abdel Salam Farag, who established Tanzim al Jihad, and wrote his ideas in a book entitled “al-
                                                          
28 The group was firstly formed by Mahmoud Abou Zaid Osman  (owner of Al Nazir Magazine), Mohamed al Mahalouy 
(lawyer), and Hassan Yousef ( member in Masr al Fata Movement).  
29 Mahmoud  Abd al Halim, Al Khwan al Muslmun Ahdas San‟at al Tarikh Rouya men al Dakhel [The Muslim Brotherhood 
Events Made History: A Vision from Inside], First Vol 1 (1928-1948), (Cairo, Dar al Da’awa, 1979), http://al-
mostafa.info/data/arabic/depot3/gap.php?file=005833.pdf ( accessed October 14, 2011).  
30 Ibid, 412.  
31 Daniel B. Fisher, “ Revolt in Egypt: Explaining the Jihad in Egypt in 1980s-1990s” (MA Thesis, Georgetown University, 
2009), 5. It should be noted that, Shukry joined MB at the same year of his detention; he did not have the chance to understand 
and absorb MB’s ideology, and teachings. Gilles Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam (London: Saqi Books, 2005), 72-74.  
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Farida al-Ghaiba”(The Neglected Duty), which provided a base for other militant jihadist 
movements.
32
 
 The third generational gap was between the 1970s generation of student movements’ 
leaders, who firstly joined the group in 1974, and the old guard. Al Talmasany, the Supreme 
Guide at that time, was able to bridge the gap between the two groups. By his death, tensions 
emerged, especially when Mustafa Mashhour, a former member of the security apparatus, 
became the Supreme Guide after Hamid Abou Al Nasr. Discontent reached its peak with the 
resignation of A’sam Sultan, Abou al A’la Madi, and other 26 members who established the Al 
Wasat  political party in 1996.
33The dispute showed up again with expelling Abd al Mon’iem 
Abou al Fotouh, because of his nomination for presidency in 2011, and resignations of many 
1970s members including Tharwat al Kharabwy (2001), Mukhtar Nouh (2001), Ibrhaim al 
Z’afarany (2011), and Haithm abou Khalil (2011). 
The concurrent generational schism was sparked by the 2005 parliamentary elections, 
and is between young affiliated members, and the MB’s high and middle administrative ranks. 
Young members rebel in their blogs against the rhetoric and organizational make up of the 
movement; revealing some of the movement’s secrets and internal dynamics.34The old guard 
seems unable to inspire youth and adopt their suggestions and strategies; the conflict continues 
due to the lack of institutional channels through which youth can express their opinions and play 
a role in the decision making process.
35
Tensions became acute when some of the young 
                                                          
32
  Charles R. Davidson, “ Political Violence in Egypt: A Case Study of the Islamist Insurgency 1992-1197” (PhD diss, The 
Fletcher School of Diplomacy, 2006), 121.  
33Abd al Rahim A’li, Al Ikhwan al Muslimen Azmet Taiar al Tagded [Muslim Brotherhood: the Crisis of the Renewal Trend] 
(Cairo: Al Mahrousa Center, 2004), 119-125.  
34 For Muslim Brotherhood  bloggers see, Khalil Al A’nani, “ Brotherhood Bloggers A New Generation Voices Dissent”, Online 
Islam (2007),  www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/186.pdf (accessed, October 2, 2011). 
35
 Khalil Al-A’nani, “The Young Brotherhood in Search of a New Path”, Ibid.  
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members formed  their own parties, including Al Tayar al Masry Party and the Justice Party (Al 
A’dl), and refused to join the newly formed party of Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom and Justice 
Party FJP) Al Hourya w al A‟dala. Young members keep publishing their critique on the 
movement’s performance, and religious and political rhetoric.  
Actually, the preceding generational gaps do not exist in separate historical packages, for 
instance, the generational interactions with the 1970s generation overlaps with the concurrent 
generational dispute, providing it with guidelines and inspirations. They share similar concerns, 
arguments, modes of thoughts, and tools of action. It should be noted that there is no blank space 
in mind where new ideas come to the young, or forerunners without any influence of old modes 
of thought. There is rarely an automatic progression of ideas.
36
Thus, any historical classification 
for this ongoing generational conflict should not undermine the continuity between consequent 
generational waves on one hand, and on the other hand, the role of cultural, intellectual schools, 
and political changes in social movement’s ideology and tactics transformation should not be 
overrated. This way of analysis opens a window for analyzing the movement’s future trajectory 
based on historical experiences, distinctive trends and schools, rather than providing a snapshot 
analysis associated with short term quantitative studies. The study employs the Generational 
Model which provides good description to details of generations’ interaction in relation to the 
sociopolitical context. It highlights the stratified nature of political generations and level of 
analysis, represented in inter and intra- generational conflicts.  
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The study traces generational gaps in Muslim Brotherhood since mid 1980s till 2011. It 
seeks to understand why, how, and over what these gaps emerge. It addresses differences and 
                                                          
36George Rude, Ideology and Popular Protest (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 22.  
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similarities among generational disputes, and their impact on the trajectory of the movement. 
Based on that, the study seeks to answer the following questions: 
 Why did those generational gaps emerge? 
 What are the main issues over which disputes come out? 
 What are the major similarities and differences among consequent emerging 
generational disputes? (Continuity and discontinuity in the movement 
generational history). 
 What is the impact of these generational gaps on the future trajectory of the 
movement?  
1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Generational Unit Model 
The study is conceptually designed around the Generational Unit Model, which 
encompasses central sub conceptions in generation studies: Interior Time, Age accumulation, 
Age Elimination, contemporaneity of the contemporaneous, Generations as Actuality, 
Generational Units, Political Generation, Intra and Inter generational conflicts. In this part I shall 
elaborate further on each of those concepts throughout historical approach, and then conclude 
briefly on ways of resolving generational conflicts. 
The notion of generation is at the heart of the study of sociology and other neighbor 
disciplines. It is one of the key sociological concepts through its explicit or implicit presence in 
studies of social change, value transmission, social mobility, and cultural integration.
37
 Origins 
of the notion date back to the Old Testament and Greek poetry. Greeks addressed life stages and 
were aware of its specific characteristics, and their influence on political life. Plato and 
                                                          
37 David Kertzer, “ Generation as a Sociological Problem”, Annual Review of Sociology 9: (1983), 143.   
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Herodotus perceived generations as an opportunity for political change, and transmission of 
values.
38
 Aristotle, also, said, “they overdo everything”39.    
Conceptual analysis of the notion reflects an intersection between two major schools: 
Positivism, and Historical Romanticism. While the former views it from a biological perspective 
to the history of mankind, the latter perceives generations as social historical product.
40
A 
systematic academic study, by both schools, started at the nineteenth century. Attempts, at that 
time, were mainly to understand conflicts between generations, life stages, and the development 
of youth’s orientations and attitudes. Tolstoy, Mann, Flaubert, and other novelist used the 
concept of generation in their literary works. Hume, Comte, Lock, Mill, J. Dormel, Ferrari, 
Pinder, and O. Lorenz used the notion in reflection to different intellectual interests.  
Dilthey provided social analysis to the notion in his volumes about history and human 
science in the late 1860s.
41
For him, generation refers to a bound between individuals, established 
upon shared events and transformations. The work of Dilthey received a momentum later on in 
1920s. The period from early 1920s to 1933 had been dominated by German contributions, 
including mainly:   Francois Mentre, Jose Ortega Y Casset, Wilhelm Pinder, Hanz Muller, karl 
Mannheim, Alfred Lorenz, Friedrich Kummer, Richard Alewyn, and Julius Petersen, and Walter 
Scheidt.
42
  
At the Beginning of 1920, particularity 1923, Jose Ortega y published his profound book 
“The Modern Theme” followed by his work on“Man and Crisis”, in both he asserted the 
                                                          
38 Ricahard G. Braungart, Marget M. Braungart, “ Life Course and Generational Politics”, Ann Rev. Sociol 12: (1986), 206-207.  
39 Details about the Greek origins of the notion is addressed in Laura L. Nash, “ Concepts of Existence: Greek Origins of 
Generational Thought”, American Academy of Arts & Science 107: (1978). 
40 Hans Jaegaer, “ Generations in History: Reflections on a Controversial Concept”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 3 : (1977), 255.  
41
 In his first  volume entitled Introduction to the Human Sciences, Dilthey asserted the importance of multidisciplinary approach 
to the study of history, andd he perceived individuals as historical products, see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Wilhelm 
Dilthey”, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dilthey/#2 (accessed September 30, 2011).  
42 Jaeger, 277.  
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importance of intellectual life and ideas in shaping generations. He, also, concluded that a 
harmony between generations results in an Age of Accumulation. Disagreement or a conflict 
reflects an Age of Elimination, in which each generation is trying to eliminate its counter 
dominance.
43I shall relate this idea to complement Mannheim’s work on generational units 
notion in the following parts. 
Around the same time, Karl Mannheim introduced the most comprehensive sociological 
study to the notion of generation in his essay “The Problem of Generations”. The Problem of 
Generations was part of his insightful contribution to the” Sociology of Knowledge”, and 
continuity to his book “Ideology and Utopia”. Mannheim built his analysis on a critique to both 
predominant schools: Positivism and Historical Romanticism. The positivist formulation, mainly, 
presented in the work of Comte, Hume, Cournot, J. Dormel, Ferrari, and O. Lorenz , and to an 
extent Mentre. Positivist reduced the problem of generation to quantitative (biological) factors, 
primarily, life span, and life stages. Their perception is based upon a uni linear conception for 
human progress.  
Based on the positivist analysis, the boundaries of generations are arbitrary determined 
through quantitative measures. This approach is problematic; how boundaries can be drawn, 
given an endless continuum of generations.
44
A quantitative treatment is unjust to social reality, 
since distinct generations emerge at the same time, and they are not inevitably going to witness 
sudden changes after thirty or twenty five years.
45In Mannheim’s words:”... they are constant and 
therefore always present in any situation, the particular features of a given process of 
                                                          
43 Richard G. Braungart, “ Historical Generations and Youth Movements: A Theoretical Perspective”, in Richard E. Ratcliff, 
Louis Kriesberg, eds, vol 6 ( London: JAI Press Inc, 1984), 104. 
44 Alan B. Spitzer, “ The Historical Problem of Generations”, the American Historical Review 78, no 5 (1973),  
 http://www.jstor.org/stable/1854096 .(accessed September 3, 2011).  
45 Marvin Rintala, “ A Generation in Politics: A Definition”, The Review of Politics 25, no 4 (1963), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1405847 (accessed September 29, 2011).   
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modification cannot be explained by reference to them”46, what is more important for Mannheim 
is “whether a new generation style emerges every year, every thirty, every hundreds years or 
whether it emerges rhythmically at all, depends entirely on the trigger action of the social 
cultural processes”47. 
On the other hand, Historical Romanticism which dominated the German mind was 
inspired by the work of Dilthey. For Romanticists, the social time (qualitative) is distinct from 
natural time (quantitative), and doesn't necessarily match with it. This is phrased in the concept 
of interior time, developed by Dilthey and employed, also, by Mannheim. According to this 
notion, the chronological succession of generations is not that much significant, compared with 
the experience lived by each generation. Time, in this sense, is a subjectively experienced 
one.
48
In this sense, Mannheim set the differnce between the biological and social time.
49
  
To crystallize the notion of social time, Mannheim refereed to Pinder’s idea of the 
contemporaneity of the contemporaneous.
50
It means that different generations can live at the 
same time, since each has its quiet different experiences. Each of those generational units 
develops and builds its entelechy. Pinder’s idea is a challenge to the concept of the Spirit of Time 
“Zeitgesit”, which assumes homogenous spirit for each epoch.51 
Based on the notion of interior time, the idea of Contemporaneity of the 
Contemporaneous, and Marx’s notion of class position, Mannheim built his own theoretical 
analysis to the problem of generations. Generation is not a concrete group the sense of 
community “Geminschaftsgebidle” such as a family or a tribe where each affiliated member has 
                                                          
46 Ibid, 312.  
47 Mannheim, 310.  
48 Mannheim, 282.  
49 Jane Pilcher, “ Mannheim’s Sociology of Generation: an Undervalued Legacy”, 
http://leicester.academia.edu/JanePilcher/Papers/244971/Mannheims_Sociology_of_Generations_An_Undervalued_Legacy 
(accessed September 3, 2011).  
50 Mannheim, 283.  
51Ibid, 284.  
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knowledge about the other. It is not also an association group “Gesellschaftsgebilde”that formed 
by deliberate act, but it is rather based on social location or position.  
In a resemblance to Marx, Mannheim introduced the idea of social location “Lagerung”. 
Individuals’ positions are defined by certain structures, and social rhythm. According to Marx, 
class position is defined by economic and power structure in the society. Generational location, 
in this sense, is based on both the biological existence and experience associated with each 
location. Each generation has its positive and negative delimitation. Positive refers to the 
exposure to certain modes of thought, experiences, and feelings; and negative, on the other hand, 
is the state of being excluded from those modes of thought, experiences, and feelings.
52
  
Generation is not a homogenous unit. It involves the existence of more than one historical 
and social sub units. This is what Mannheim introduced in his idea about Generations as 
Actuality. Different and antagonistic Generational units may exist within the same actual 
generation. A bond between sub units exists through the emergence of formative and 
interpretive principles that link separate individuals together, without face-to-face connection. It 
is not necessarily that, youth is associated with progressive attitudes, and older by conservative 
ones. Such inevitable attachment is unjust to social reality. It is also true that, attitudes of young 
generation may be developed by ideas of isolated members of the old generation, who is called 
forerunners.
53
Thus, the age accumulation, or elimination, based Ortega y’s work, would always 
emerge at the same time relying on the existence of antagonistic generational units.  
Generally, literature on generation uses the notion in different senses, which can be 
summarized as follows: firstly: generation as Kinship descent. It is employed mainly by 
anthropologist to examine kinship relations and transformation along generations. Secondly: 
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generation as a cohort. It is used more by demographers, and refers to chronological succession 
of people. In other words, group of people who are born around the same time. Thirdly: political 
generation. It mainly refers to the existence of unique consciousness, motivating a group of 
people to take certain action, or being adherents of certain ideas.
54
This study focuses only the 
notion of political generation. 
The work of both scholars, Ortega and Mannheim, influenced the emerging notion of 
Political generation in the 1930s, which was employed, later on, in studies of student and youth 
movements in Europe during the 1960s.
55
 
  Marvin’s Rintala, in her important article “Generations: Political Generations” published 
in the international encyclopedia of the social sciences, defined political generation as “a group 
of individuals who have undergone the same basic historical experiences during their formative 
years”.56The uniqueness of each generation is based upon historical events that play role in the 
formation of each generation.  
            Braungart used the Generational Unit Model in his analysis to youth movement, and he 
primarily draws his analysis from Mannheim and Rintala’s work.  The Generational Unit Model 
combines elements from both the historical and generational perspectives to the study of youth 
movements. The generational perspective involves conflict between generations over controlling 
or changing reality, and the historical perspective focuses upon external factors that shape and 
surround this conflict, such as social, political, and cultural changes. The chronological 
succession of generations would not inevitably shape relations between generations, but rather 
surrounding circumstances, modes of thought, and the development of generational 
                                                          
54 Kertzer, 127. Ricahard G. Braungart, Marget M. Braungart, 207-217. Carl H. A. Dassbach, “Long Waves and Historical 
Generation: A World System Approach”, http://www.longwavepress.com/longwave_social_cycles/oladcha.htm (accessed August 
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consciousness. Generational consciousness is the key factor for shaping inter generational and 
intra generational conflicts.  
Inter generational conflict refers to tension between two different generations or age 
groups. It has two processes: the deauthorization of the old generation domination, and the 
authorization of young generation’s style. It finds its way into existence through a gap between 
the young’s aspirations and the old’s achievements, or when a discontinuity in authority 
emerges. This kind of conflict ends by different ways; firstly: problems fade away or resolved 
through institutional reforms, secondly: any of the competing partners loses their leadership, 
mobilization, or solidarity, thirdly: unexpected cooperation emerges between both sides, 
fourthly: the old generation opts their young counter one or crushes it, finally: youth movement 
topples the old leadership. In the case of MB, the old guard (organizational trend) still has a 
control over the movement, and no indicators for cooperation in the horizon.  
The intra generational conflict is inspired by the preceding one. Old generation, 
consciously or unconsciously, has an influence on youth, resulting in conflicting sub units within 
the same actual generation. Sub units usually compete over the legitimacy of values, and goals. 
In a similar way to intergenerational conflict, intra generational tensions are resolved through 
agreement over controversial issues, the victory of one over the other, lack of resources, 
leadership and solidarity to keep the struggle on.
57
  
In conclusion, the concept of generation (Political Generation) applied combines political 
experience, and modes of thought shared by different age group. It refers to how different age 
groups share common values, attitudes, consciousness, and imagination towards the political 
authority and social reality, which is due to witnessing certain events, such as wars, 
revolutions,…etc, or following special intellectual school. 
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1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study applies in-depth semi-structured interviews
58
 with MB’s affiliated and ex- 
members who belong to different generational units and age groups, during the period from 
November 2011-March 2012. 
The study uses selective autobiographies, blogs’ content, Facebook groups and published 
books written by those members, in addition to other interviews conducted by other 
scholars.
59
These selective diversified resources are used to overcome the dearth of scholarly 
work and published materials about the movement’s internal dynamics, and different perceptions 
within the movement. Informants were chosen based on their age groups, special experience and 
occupation in the movement, and the extent to which each of them was a key player in certain 
events and circumstances.   
A number of preliminary interviews were conducted, in order to explore the field study, 
with Abd al Rahman Ayyash (MB’s blogger), Farid Abdel Khaliq (one of the early members of 
MB, and member of the Founding Committee of the movement), Ismail Alexandrani (young 
researcher), and other three MB’s members. I also had some spontaneous unstructured 
conversations with friends who are affiliated with the movement or who have strong friendship 
and family ties with other affiliated members. This intensified my understanding of MB’s 
internal dynamics, history, and perceiptions. It also helped in opening up contact with some of 
my informants and facilitated the process of communication. Furtherrmore, the relatively open 
revolutionary context in Egypt encouraged many informants, especially ex- affiliated ones, to 
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 Semi unstructured interviews are flexible types which include open- ended questions, and flexible sequence of questions based 
on participants’ responses.  The interviewer can ask for more elaborations, justifications, and adjust his way of asking from one 
informant to another, see Robyn Longhurst, “ Semi- Structured Interviews and Focus Groups”, in Key Methods in Geography , 
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freely express their opinion, stories, experiences, and perceptions towards certain figures and 
their mentors within the movement. Interviews and field work notes were in Arabic, and then 
translated to English. The use of Arabic language facilitated communication with informants and 
encouraged them to elaborate their points of view without any language barriers. 
One of the limitations of this study will be that some informants, from ideologically 
conservative units, were not encouraged to share their views and perceptions about the 
movement’s internal crises, and they sought to assert the internal coherence and harmony of the 
movement. One way to overcome this problem was to conduct those interviews after 
interviewing other dissatisfied members; this allowed for narrative inquiry about some events, 
and shared stories in the movement, which some conservative affiliated members would avoid to 
mention. Another limitation was the involvement of many key informants in political events, 
elections, and parliamentary sessions; the researcher did not have the chance to meet some of 
them during the time allocated for thesis writing. Thus, two interviews were conducted via 
telephone calls and one through emails. 
Interviews’ questions were modified and restructured according to informants’ positions 
and lived experiences within the movement. They are conducted on the basis of oral informed 
consent, and a copy of the study will be sent to informants after its completion. Names of well-
known figures and members are mentioned, as part of “elite interviews”. Other members’ names 
and positions are anonymous. I made this point clearly at the beginning of all interviews. Elite 
informants are political figures, founders of political parties, or key MB’s affiliated calibers 
whose names are circulated in newspapers, media channels, and other scholarly researches.  
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Interviews’ participants: 
 Name Age Gender Affiliation to MB 
1 Abd al Rahman Ayyash 22 M MB blogger and 
ex- member who 
split in 2011 after 
the revolution. 
2 Abd al Moniem Abou al 
Fotouh 
61 M Ex- Guidance 
Office member, 
who is dismissed 
in 2011. 
3 Farid abd al Khaliq 97 M Early member of 
the Founding 
Committee of MB. 
4 Ibrahim al Z’afarany 60 M Ex- Shura Council 
member, who 
resigned in 2011. 
5 Ismail al Alexandrani 28 M Young Researcher. 
6 Magdy S’aad 43 M MB blogger and 
current affiliated 
member. 
7 Muhammed al Kassas 31 M Ex- active caliber 
in MB students’ 
section, who is 
dismissed in 2011. 
Founder of 
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Egyptian Current 
Party. 
8 Muhammed Shams 23 M Ex- associate 
member, who is 
dismissed in 2011. 
Founder of 
Egyptian Current 
Party. 
9 Anonymous 45 M Affiliated active 
member. 
10 Anonymous 23 M Current affiliated 
member. 
11 Anonymous 33 M Current affiliated 
member. 
12 Anonymous 21 F Current affiliated 
member. 
13 Anonymous 33 F Current affiliated 
member and FJP 
member. 
14 Anonymous 50 F Current affiliated 
member, who is in 
charge of the 
Educational 
section in the MB. 
15 Anonymous  49 M Current  duties- 
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paying member.  
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The study is divided into two main chapters: The first chapter covers the 1970s 
generational interaction, and the second addresses the concurrent generational gap. Each of the 
two chapters is divided into two major sections: the first section addresses the socioeconomic 
and political context that shapes the consciousness of those two generations. The second part 
descriptively focuses on reasons of generational disputes, and issues that indicate generational 
gaps, and different perceptions between members of the movement. Then, the study ends with 
overall concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER II: THE 1970s GENERATIONAL GAP 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The backbone of the MB’s third generational wave is 1970s university student activists. 
This generation is known as “Wasat”, “1970s”, “young princes”, or “the second founding 
generation”. The Wasat and the 1970s generation are used interchangeably, though there are 
implicit semantic meanings beyond them. The use of 1970s generation emphasizes the role of 
1967 defeat and Saddat’s era in shaping the consciousness of this generational group. Al Wasat 
has an Islamic ideological implications, as it refers to the midpoint between two extremes, or 
what is known as the golden mean. It also denotes a description for this generational group as a 
bridge or an intermediate generation between the MB’s old guard and young members. In the 
case of Muslim Brothers, the notion refers to those influential 1970s members who withdrew 
from the movement since the mid 1990s.
60
 
The 1970s generation has a long experience in political activities, civil society, and 
professional syndicates. They developed skills of communication with the public and diverse 
ideological groups. They expressed a high level of pragmatism and flexibility. Most of them 
have professional and organizational skills, and are inclined to rebel against the political system 
and coordinate with other competing political groups.
61
These characteristics put them in 
confrontation with some hard-line calibers, particularly 1965 organization members whose 
consciousness was shaped by Wahabism, and Qutb’s ideas about Islamic vanguard, and 
emotional detachment from the Jahilyya society. The culture of the secret apparatus was 
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generally characterized by absolute obedience, secrecy, solitude, and spying on potential enemies 
and competitors.
62
Thus, an expected intellectual gap between both groups was indispensable.  
This chapter analyzes the socioeconomic and political context that shaped the 
consciousness and political experience of the 1970s generation. It descriptively addresses the 
nature of generational relationship between some of the 1970s generation and the movement’s 
leadership since mid 1980s. It denotes reasons behind the establishment of Al Wasat Party, and 
political differentiation between its discourse and the MB’s political discourse. It also indicates 
reasons behind dismissals, and resignations of some 1970s figures.  
2.2 SURROUNDING CONTEXT 
The 1967 defeat was a shock for most Egyptians and Arabs, and a strong hit for the 
Egyptian leadership. Nasser lost some of his public appeal, and many young adherents of 
Marxism started to revisit their ideology and beliefs. Some of them found Islam a way to 
overcome this defeat, as the religious component was either missed or oppressed under Nasser’s 
regime. Sadat assumed power in 1971, and contrary to Nasser’s approach, he presented a 
different political profile as the faithful democratic president. All Islamist prisoners were 
released in 1971, in an attempt to gain their support and counter leftist forces who resented 
Sadat’s rule and demonstrated for two days against him in 1972.   
According to Talmasany, Brothers were so cautious and skeptical about Sadat’s policies; 
as he was involved in military trials against Brothers under Nasser’s rule. Thus, Brothers did not 
fully support him; they were more neutral and ready to witness changes in his policies towards 
Islamists.
63
Muslim Brothers enjoyed high level of political tolerance at the early years of Sadat’s 
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rule. By 1976, the Da’awa Magazine, the MB’s official newspaper, was republished again, and 
the movement was able to act freely with limited restrictions. Islamist groups grow in presence at 
university campuses. Al Gama’a al Islamya was the most influential group among them. Young 
students who were deeply depressed after 1967 defeat found their way to the group. In 1977 al 
Gam’a al Islamya won all student elections, and Islamists started to spread their dominance in 
factories, where leftists used to have influence.
64
 
Tensions between Islamists and the regime emerged after signing Camp David Treaty in 
1978 and the Peace Agreement in 1979. Muslim Brotherhood and Al Gam’a al Islamya 
constituted a strong opposition coalition against Saddat’s relations with Israel and United States. 
They also rebelled against liberal economic policies followed since 1974 and shaped the 
Egyptian socioeconomic landscape till now.  
Sadat’s regime attracted foreign investments and declared the law of Open Door policy. 
The open door policy failed in achieving its goals; few foreign investments were generated, and 
most of them concentrated in unproductive sectors like banking, tourism, and the service sector. 
In 1977, the Egyptian government signed the first agreement with IMF for one year to get 105 
million of SDRs. In 1978 another agreement has been signed to get 600 million SDRs but Egypt 
did not get all this amount of money till 1981. Few social segments benefited from these liberal 
policies and loans; Egyptians suffered from high inflation rates that resulted in 1977 riot against 
high prices and deteriorating living standards.
65
By the 1980s the rate of growth was negative and 
fell below the population growth. The deficit of the balance of payment increased with high 
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inflation rate, and external debt. Egypt was unable to meet its obligations with foreign creditors 
in 1985, and by 1988 western countries put more restrictions on the lending process. As a result, 
the Egyptian government, under Mubarak’s rule, signed an agreement with the IMF in 1987 to 
reschedule its debt at the Paris Club. The government was unable to fulfill its obligations 
according to this agreement, and the treatment failed by late 1987. Because of continuous 
western pressures, in May 1991 the government signed a treaty with the IMF, and in November a 
Structural Adjustment Loan from the WB was received. The government became responsible for 
implementing all the recommendations of the Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP), 
including privatization, free trade policies, and restrictions on employment policies. The private 
sector was unable to absorb the increasing surplus of labour, and unemployment continued to 
soar. The competiveness of domestic industry was also undermined due to free trade 
policies.66These economic deteriorating conditions went hand in hand with the penetration of 
consumerism culture and the emergence of acute gaps between social classes. This economic 
context encouraged Islamists to provide social and economic services to gain the support of 
certain economic classes.  
Back in 1981, sectarian strife emerged between Muslims and Christians. According to 
Talmasany, sectarian conflict was made by the regime itself to get rid of its opposition and to 
turn public attention from the Peace Treaty with Israel. In reaction, Sadat accused the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Al Gama’a al Islamiya of this sectarian strife, excluded some opposition figures 
from the parliament, introduced new restrictions on opposition newspapers, and attacked Da’awa 
Magazine office. After a meeting with Menachem Begin in 1981, 1536 members from different 
political forces, and religious groups were sent to prisons in June 1981. Sadat’s harsh policies 
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against Islamists, liberal economic policies, and relations with Israeli and United States resulted 
in his assassination on the same year.67 
For the MB’s context, the movement was fragile in 1971, with symbolic leadership. 
There was an urgent need to restructure the movement and establish strong nodes between its 
scattered cells in different governorates. By 1973, Mustafa Mashhour, and Kamal al Sananery 
started to approach young students who were active in university campuses under the umbrella of 
Al Gama‟a al Islamiya Movement. In 1974, new fresh blood went through the movement’s 
arteries. A group of young active members of Al Gama‟a al Islamiya, known later by the 1970s 
generation “geyal el sab’anat” or young princes, joined the group and played a major role in 
consolidating its internal structure. Among those members were Abd al Mon’iem Abou al 
Fotouh, Khairt al Shater, Essam al A’rian, Abou al A’laa Madi, A’ssam Sultan, Helmi Al Gazar, 
Gamal Heshmat, Khalid Daoud, Hamid al Dafrauy, Ibrahim al Za’farany, and others. Joining the 
movement caused a spilt inside Al Gama’a al Islamiya, as many affiliated members of Al 
Gama’a al Islamiya were against the peaceful gradual ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
its relationship with the existing political system. During 1979 and 1980 tensions emerged 
between who joined the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist- jihadist trend in Al Gama’a, 
including mainly: Karam Zohdy, Osama Hafez, Nagih Ibrhaim, A’asem Abd al Maged, A’sam 
Darbala in Upper Egypt, Muhammed Islmail, Ahmed Farid in Alexandria, and Osama Abd al 
A’zem, and Abdullah Sa’ad in Cairo.68  
  Sadat’s epoch was significant in the movement history; it marked the start of an 
agreement on denouncing violence and adopting peaceful political measures, especially after the 
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1981 prisons experience.
69This tendency has been consolidated under Mubarak’s regime; 
Mubarak’s first term was mild, based on a policy of non-confrontation with moderate Islamic 
groups in order to counter Islamic violent groups. Brothers were released in 1982, and got a 
permission to work and publish the D’awa magazine. The regime over looked the political 
presence of the movement till late 1980s.
70
In the early 1980s, the movement’s priority was to 
reconstruct its administrative system at the domestic and international level. Ahmed al Malt was 
in charge of this task in collaboration with Abd al Moni’em abou al Fotouh. Al Malt’s group was 
called “Egypt office” to distinguish it from other regional offices for MB. Tasks of the group 
were to assure coordination between all administrative offices in Egypt, and to set clear 
organizational rules and regulations for the movement, which were already done in 1987. 
Mustafa Mashhour, Madi A’kef and Khairt al Shater were responsible for the international 
organization of the movement. The international organizational ties were restructured and new 
regulations were introduced in 1982.
71
 
According to Abou al Fotouh, clear ideological and organizational framework for the 
organization was designed in 1989. There was a consensus over two main principles: renouncing 
violence, and deploring hidden and underground secret activities.
72
The first principle was clearly 
into action by the mid 1980s, when the movement participated in the 1984 parliamentary election 
through an alliance with Al Wafd party. In year 1987, Brothers participated in a coalition with Al 
Ahrara and Socialist Labor Party in the parliamentary election. Parliamentary participation went 
hand in hand with professional syndicates’ competition. Active student in universities found their 
way to syndicates after graduation. By the early 1990s syndicates were dominated by Brothers, 
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or at least they were present in most syndicates’ councils.73Syndicates have been used as political 
forums to attract supporters from the educated middle class’s ranks. The second principle was 
confirmed in one of the movement’s documents that has been approved by the Guidance Office 
and sent to all movement’s administrative offices in 1987.74The movement’s bylaws and 
structure were finally crystallized under Mamoun al Houdaiby’s leadership in the 1990s.   
The blind eye policy of Mubarak’s regime changed since the early 1990s. This change 
has been associated with Egyptian participation in Gulf War, implementation of ERSAP, and 
radical Islamist insurgency, as 20,000 jihadist Egyptians came back from Afghanistan. Mamoun 
al Houdaiby designed MB’s bylaws under such state repression; this consciously manifested in 
the concentration of power in the hands of the Guidance Office, and the limited authorities of the 
Shura Council. 
Mubarak’s deliberalization policies started with renewing the emergency law, and 
introducing a new electoral law, in 1989, which cancelled party-lists in favor of the first pass the 
post method. Due to the new law, Brothers were not able to win any seats in 1990 elections and 
only one seat in 1995 elections. The government also introduced Law 4/1992 for civil society 
organizations. Law 4/1992 states that getting foreign fund without state’s permission merits 
military trials and punishment of seven to fifteen years without the possibility of an appeal. Law 
100/1993 for professional syndicates was another restriction, demanding minimum participation 
of 50% on the first round and 33% percent on the second round to have a valid membership. 
Since 1993, Brothers were unable to dominate syndicates; they moved from domination 
to participation (Mushraka la Moghalba) strategy. The head of the syndicate position was always 
left to figures accepted by the regime. The government accused the Board of the Doctors and the 
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Bar syndicates of financial corruption. It also issued executive orders that allowed the judiciary 
to intervene in syndicates elections in 1995. Some syndicates were put under the supervision of 
appointed administrators and others’ activities were suspended for years.75Since 1994 till 2011, 
hundreds of MB’s members were militarily tried and sentenced between three to five years. In 
1996, three founders of Al Wasat Party were arrested.
76
Most arrests targeted moderate middle 
cadres in the movement in order to stop cooperation with other political forces, and publicize the 
image of undemocratic MB.  
In such socioeconomic and political context that witnessed the control of dysfunctional 
and corrupt state institutions, a new kind of generational interaction emerged. Newly affiliated 
members of 1970s started to recognize the undemocratic nature of their movement, and its 
failure to produce conciliatory discourse with other political forces. The MB 1970s members’ 
experience in syndicates witnessed number of failures and mismanagement; this encouraged 
them to think about new ways of interaction with state institutions. They also questioned the 
basic roles of the movement, and the decision- making process. 
2.3 DESCRIPTION 
Ideological Gap 
The consciousness of the 1970s generation has been shaped by the writings of Sheik 
Muhammed al Ghazly, Sheik Sayyid Sabek, Sheikh Bahy al Khouly, and Abou al A’la al 
Maududi. At the beginning of 1970s they were influenced by the discourse of two Salafist 
groups: Al Gam’aya al Shar’ia, and Ansar Al Sunna. By 1973, members of Al Gam’a al Islamiya 
were in contact with Sheikh Yusuf al Karadawy, and Al Ghazaly via summer campuses 
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organized by student union members. Abou al Fotouh asserted that “we were religiously 
conservative, and less open in our discourse when we joined MB; we were inclined to use 
violence, and hostile to different ideas. We might not join MB if Mustafa Mashhour and Kamal 
al Sananery, with religiously conservative discourse, did not address us compared with other old 
open members like Omar al Talmasany”77. In an interview with Abou al Fotouh, he concluded, 
“We believed in the use of violence and the only difference between us and Jihadist movements 
at the 1970s, was the timing of its usage. We did not accept some practices like shaving beard or 
listening to music. We discussed the issue of violence many times with Omar al Talmasany, and 
we were partially convinced by arguments about peaceful reform until the assassination of Sadat. 
The 1981 jail experience was crucial to recognize the undesired consequences of the use of 
violence on Islam, and Muslims. It gave us the opportunity to be engaged in dialogues with many 
old MB’s members like Omar al Talmasany, Gaber Rizk, Lashin Abou Shanb, and Yusuf Kamal, 
beside other Jihadist leaders”78. 
The ideological discourse of the 1970s members witnessed openness due to their 
participation in syndicates, and cooperation with other political forces. They were engaged in 
debates with some religiously conservative voices in the movement and were able to introduce 
open moderate opinions. In 1987, a controversy over nominating women in parliamentary 
election emerged when Sheikh Abd al Satar Fathullah Said refused nominating women on 
Brothers’ parliamentary list with the Labor Party in 1987. Mamoun al Houdaiby and Abou al 
Fotouh rejected Sheik Abd al Satar’s opinion and formed a committee of religious experts to 
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discuss the issue. The committee concluded that there are no religious barriers for women to be 
parliamentary candidates and play an active role in politics.
79
 
Omar al Talmasany open-minded personality and close relationship with young 1970s 
affiliated members was crucial in bridging the gap between some old hard-line and young 
members during 1980s. He initiated the idea of participating in professional syndicates in 1983, 
and establishing a political party in 1986 under the title of “Al Shoura Party”.   
According to Tharwat al Kharabawy’s autobiography, Al Talmasany appeased new 
members in order to ease the secret apparatus group’s control over the movement. Members of 
the secret apparatus and 1965 group were released in the 1970s, and dominated high 
administrative ranks since that time. Muhammed Bad’ie, Mahmoud Ezzat, Kamal al Sananery, 
A’rafa al Komy, and Mustafa Mashhour were among those prominent figures. Some of those 
members travelled abroad and mixed Qutb’s ideas with Salafism. In parallel, some open minded 
personalities who were close to Hassan al Banna were excluded including Farid Abd al Kaliq, 
Tawfik al Shawy, Mahmoud Abd al Halim, and Abd al Mot’al al Gabry. The secret apparatus 
team was religiously conservative, and they paid most of their attention to organizational 
discipline, whilst the 1970s members were civilly active in universities, and syndicates. The MB 
acted in these platforms as a political party, and their members acquired satisfactory level of 
political and professional skills, compared with their leaders.80  
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According to A’ssam Sultan, “The secret apparatus’ mentality was shaped by 
underground activities associated with secrecy and absolute obedience. Qutb’s writings about 
emotional detachment with Jahiliya society, and the tribulation phase in Nasser’s prisons formed 
their perception towards other competitors and the political regime. Whilst we were engaged in 
political activities with liberals, and leftist; members of the secret apparatus believed that 
democracy is against the sovereignty of God. They negatively perceived music and art, and 
identified other political competitors as enemies of Islam.  
For example, Sheikh Abd ullah al Khatib, the movement’s mufti and head of the 
educational section, issued a fatwa to stop a performance at the engineering syndicate played by 
some of the 1970s members. In addition, the engineering syndicate used to sponsor seminars, 
conferences, and public lectures for intellectuals. Mamoun al Houdaiby, in 1992, embarrassed 
some of our guests by saying that they do not enjoy any public support. As a result, guests left 
the lecture and the syndicate’s board decided not to invite any of the Brothers’ leaders.  In 1993, 
Mamoun al Houdaiby reprimanded me because I managed with a group of youth in the Bar 
syndicate a dialogue among diverse political forces, including leftists, Nasserist, Communists, 
Wafdist, and members of the National Democratic Party, Christians, Jihadists and Gam’a 
Islamya members, without his consent.   
Brothers’ leaders after the death of Omar al Talmasany were not interested in dialogues 
with other forces; their focus was mainly on widening the public base of the movement, rather 
than improving the intellectual quality of affiliated members. The gap between our political 
perception and theirs became acute when the Guidance Office refused to sign the “National 
Consensus” document with other political forces. As a result, some of the 1970s members in the 
Committee of Syndicates’ Coordination including Abou al A’la Mady, who was a member in the 
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movement’s Shura Council, signed it regardless of the leadership consent. These events proved 
to us, we could not continue in the movement and contribute to real change”81.  
For Abou al A’la Mady, the president of Al Wasat party, “I finally resigned in 1996. My 
group and I had the belief that no organization can keep working outside the existing political 
legal framework. This situation had undesired consequences such as the ambiguity of goals. For 
instance, the movement’s leaders did not provide clear answers for questions like Does we want 
to politically rule or not? Is MB a reformist religious movement or a political party?
82
 I believed 
that both types of organization could not exist in one body. This would be impossible at the 
practical level, and religion would be used to manipulate voters. You cannot provide services and 
have a religious discourse, whilst assure fair competition with other parties who do not enjoy the 
same privilege you have. 
Besides the ambiguity of goals, there is lack of transparency, and accountability 
measures. The lack of transparency had been always justified by security coercion. Thus, Al 
Wasat group decided to overcome this kind of secrecy and establish a political party; a legitimate 
legal political framework would assure transparency in managing financial resources, and 
internal fair elections. This would also allow the movement to abolish the control of the old 
guard, and its culture of secrecy.  
 Furthermore, The MB requires an intellectual renewal movement at three levels: History, 
practice, and ideology. At the historical level, the movement needs to revisit its major mistakes, 
and admit them, such as the establishment of the secret apparatus, and its violent activities in 
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Egypt
83, confrontation with Nasser’s regime, ways of choosing Supreme Guide in 1970s84, the 
way members of the secret apparatus controlled the movement and excluded old respected 
members, and why the movement wasted the opportunity of forming a political party during 
Sadat’s era. At the practical level, the movement should decide over its desired legal status and 
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problems. It was clear that Al Houdaiby did not have the same image of Al Banna in the eyes of some of followers. Al 
Houdaiby’s appointment was, seen as a violation to Brothers’ internal regulation; as he was not from the Consultative Assembly 
and did not get three quarters of vote. Conflicts since October 1951, after the official appointment of Houdaiby, proved personal 
antagonism between him and Al Sandi, Ashmawi and their supporters.  Al Houdaiby’s different perception towards the political 
role of the movement, and refusal of the existence of the secret apparatus, and the secrecy of its activities were among main 
reasons of such a conflict. He was unable to restructure the security apparatus, and to assure control over it, even after his 
appointment to Yusuf Tal’at as a head of the apparatus in 1953. Internal divisions continued and Gamal Abd al Nasser managed 
to make use of it in 1954. Richard Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 36-87. 
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 After the death of Hassan al Houdaiby, members of the 1965 organization managed a number of meetings and decided to have 
a secret Supreme Guidance for a short period of time. The name of the secret Guidance was not confirmed, but most likely he 
was Helmy abd al Hamid.  Later on, Al Talmasany was chosen. The secret apparatus group thought that Talmasany is a flexible 
man; he has good relation with all members, and will not be a strong obstacle against their ambitions. Osama al Ghazawy, quoted 
in Al Kharabawy, 22. Omar al Talmasany wanted to abolish the culture of secrecy; he addressed university students and 
encouraged them to be active in the civil and political sphere. He initiated the idea of establishing political party, and wanted to 
develop a legal framework for the movement. Al Talmasany’s reform approach was not welcomed by the 1965 group. They 
found their death an opportunity to shift the strategies of work within the movement. Mustafa Mashhour wanted to be the 
Supreme Guide after the death of Al Talmasany, but he accepted being the deputy of Nasr Abou Hamid due to seniority issue. 
Abou Hamid was sick old man, and Mashhour was actually in charge of managing the movement. During this period, the 1965 
group addressed other members of the group who flee the country because of Nasser’s repression. Those newly affiliated 
members penetrated the movement, and assumed diverse administrative positions. They were eyes for Mashhour’s leadership. 
Most of those members came from Gulf countries with Salafist backgrounds, or were from rural areas, especially from the 
Dakhliya Governorate where Mashhour was born. The penetration of those calibers led to the exclusion or the marginalization of 
some 1970s members. They also spayed on 1970s calibers who share revolutionary ideas regarding the role of MB, and its 
relationship with the political regime and other political forces. It should be noted that spying on others’ activities is part of the 
culture of the secret apparatus, and one of its considered legitimate activities. During Hassan al Banna’s era the apparatus used to 
spy over the activities of Masr al Fata movement. Al Sayed Abd al Satar al Malegy, Tagrobaty m‟aa al Ikhwan [My Experience 
with the Muslim Brotherhood] (Cairo: Al Zahra for Arab Media, 2009), 217-248.  
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activities. At the ideological level, the movement needs to consider its discourse on Copts and 
women’s rights, party politics, citizenship, and pluralism”85. 
For MB’s refusal to establish a political party during Sadat’s era, Mashhour said, “Sadat 
was not serious in his offer. He asked Omar al Talmasany to approach the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, meaning that Brothers would establish social association. This would limit MB’s 
activities and put restrictions on its actions”. For the movement’s perception on political 
pluralism, Mashhour concluded, “state’s control over party life should be abolished and political 
forces should enjoy more freedom. In this case, political parties can appeal against parties that do 
not respect the constitution”86. Initially, Mashhour’s statements about political pluralism 
indicated a high level of conservatism in the late 1908s and early 1990s; He insisted that all 
parties must have an Islamic ideological background. Due to societal pressures, this stance 
witnessed an ideological shift. In 1994, MB published a document entitled “the Shura and Party 
Politics” in which it accepted political pluralism, equality among Muslim and Christians. In the 
same year, another document about women’s rights has been published. The MB declared that it 
respects and encourages women’s active role in the political sphere. The movement also 
confirmed equality among Muslims and Christians in another notice entitled “Statement for 
People” in 1995. In 2004, a Reform Initiative has been drafted in which the MB clearly refused 
the idea of the theocratic state, and the use of violence.
87
 
A’ssam al A’rian admitted that the movement is in an urgent need for reform at diverse 
levels. At the educational level, current educational curriculums do not belong to the enlightened 
era of the 1930s and 1940s but rather to the tribulation era at the 1950s and 1960s. They enhance 
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86 Ibid, 154-158.  
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confrontation with adherents of different ideologies who are negatively depicted as enemies of 
the MB and Islam. The religious discourse of the movement is also conservative intolerant due to 
the influence of Salafism that penetrated MB since 1980s.
88
  
The discursive gap between the 1970s generation and the secret apparatus members 
reemerged in 2007 over the movement political party’s drafted program. In 2005, the movement 
declared its intension to establish a political party, but it never applied for it until 2011. The idea 
of establishing a political party remained debatable since the 1990s, when Abd al Mon’iem Abou 
al Fotouh initiated establishing a political party entitled “The Reform Party” in 1995. According 
to A’ssam al A’rian, “there were ongoing debates over establishing the party. Many questions 
were not resolved like the reaction of the state towards this initiative, and who is going to lead 
this party?”89  
The 2007 program was so debatable indicating disagreement and different interpretations 
among MB’s leaders. Controversial issues including women’s and Copts’ rights to run for 
presidency, the establishment of Religious Scholars Committee, and relationship with Israel were 
publically contested among MB’s members.  
The program does not give Copts and women the right to assume presidency. Abd al 
Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh, said, “we are not against having a Coptic or a female candidate for the 
presidency. We asked Sheikh Al Karadawy, and Ahmed al A’sal; they said there is no any 
religious restrictions to have a Coptic or a female president”90.For the Religious Scholars 
Committee, Abou al Fotouh said, “we want an elected committee of Azheriet Sheikhs who 
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89 A’ssam al A’rian qouted in Stacher, 76. According to Abd al Satar al Malegy, the Shura Council agreed in 1995 meeting to 
establish a political party for the movement, but Mashhour’s leadership did not welcome this proposal. They did not prefer any 
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90………, “ Abou al Fotouh Yahkey Kasat Prnameg al Ikhwan” [Abou al Fotouh Narrates the Story of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Party program], Islam online, 
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would choose the Azhar’s Sheikh and acts as consultancy body for the constitutional court, 
People Assembly on cases that have religious dimensions”. Abou al Fotouh justified debates 
over the program by the fact that it was not appropriately phrased and written. 
A contrasting perspective was simultaneously expressed by Mahmoud Ezzat over the 
same issues. Ezzat, ex-member of the 1965 group, said, “We would not accept nominating a 
woman or a Coptic for presidency (Al Walya al A’ma). There is a jurisprudential consensus over 
this issue. The Scholars Committee would be one of the tools to apply Shari’a according to the 
second article of the constitution.
91Its task is to assure that no laws are violating the shari’a 
through acting as consultancy body for the constitutional court, parliament, and the president”92. 
Muhammed Habib, the ex- first deputy of the Supreme Guidance, initiated the idea of the 
Scholars Committee as a way to enhance the autonomy of the Azhar. Habib justified his idea by 
the fact that the parliament already consults the Azhar in religious issue, and having an elected 
committee for that would promote more autonomy, as the committee would be in charge of 
choosing the Azhar Sheikh rather than being appointed by the state.  
Another contradiction was evident over Camp David Treaty. A’ssam al A’rian said, 
“Brothers would recognize Israel, and Camp Daivd would witness some changes”. In a response, 
Mahdi Akkef, the Supreme Guide at that time, said, “Brothers do not recognize Israel as a state 
and this is against MB’s beliefs”93. 
The status of women’s and Copts’ political rights to run for the presidential office did not 
change in the FJP discourse. The Guidance Office declared that they would not nominate or 
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support a female or Coptic candidate for this position, though the program does not explicitly 
refer to this stance. It rather confirms the notion of citizenship and equal rights for all citizens, 
regardless of their sex, color, and religion.
94
The program also adopted the open-minded 
interpretation on the Religious Scholars Committee. It will be a consultancy body for political 
institutions. The Religious Scholars Committee will be elected among the Islamic Research 
Academy, and Al Azhar Sheikh will be elected from its members.
95
  
It can be concluded that intellectual debates and media attention to MB’s political 
program pushed the movement to consider its opinions and modify some of them. This is simply 
a peace- offer to modern societal and political pressures, rather than an inner desire for 
democracy.   
Al Wasat Party 
 A’ssam Sultna mentioned, “We secretly started Al Wasat party’s preparations till we 
openly declared it in 1996. The response of MB’s leaders was aggressive. When Abou al A’la 
Mady was arrested in 1996 after the rejection of Political Party Committee (PPC) to Al Wasat’s 
official papers, the MB pressured me to give up Al Wasat’s initiative and join back the 
movement. Their methods included asking MB’s members to avoid talking with me and sending 
other figures to ask me not to appeal against the PPC’s rule. They also asked Selim al A’wa, Al 
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 Muslim Brotherhood had very reluctant position towards Coptic’s political rights. The movement supported a Coptic candidate 
in 2000 parliamentary election, but when A’ssam al A’rian was asked about that he said “we did not sponsor but we just 
supported him. There is a big difference”, qouted in Stacher, 73. 
The FJP program assertes that there is no discrimination between citizens on the basis of sex, religion and color in expressing 
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Wasat’s lawyer, not to appeal against the PPC. Al A’wa refused that, because he cannot take any 
decision without the consent of his prosecutor who was Abo al A’a Mady at that time. To send a 
clear message to the movement’s leaders, Dr Rafik Habia, one of the founders of the party and I 
asked Selim al A’wa to appeal on our behalf against this rule. Mustafa Mashhour invited me for 
a meeting to discuss the issue, and I was clear about my stance not to retreat establishing Al 
Wasat party. In this meeting, I asked him why he was rushed to be the next Supreme Guide after 
the death of Hamid Abou al Nasr, while his body was just buried.
96
Mashhour answered, “I was 
surprised by what Mamoun did this day”. My response to him was, so where were the 
administrative rules, and why they were not applied? Mashhour justified what happened by the 
fact that God chooses for the movement. My answer to him was Does God Choose only for the 
movement?! Did Mubarak, Saddam Hussein, and Bashar al Assad came against the will of 
God?!. Actually, God gives us the freedom to make our choices, and if you believe you assumed 
the leadership in wrong way, how can you relate that to God’s choice and will? I left the meeting 
and after few days, I submitted written resignation including reasons behind it. This was the first 
written resignation in the history of Brothers. After the resignation, Mustafa Mashhour asked me 
to withdraw my resignation but I refused. It was clear that there is a big gap between me and the 
movement’s leadership”97.  
In 1996, A’ssam Sultan, Abou al A’la Mady with other movement’s members decided to 
develop their own political legal framework. They established Al Wasat party on January 1996 
with other seventy-four members; sixty-two of them were from the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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According to, Sultan “the 1970s members were ideologically with us, but they were reluctant to 
join Al Wasat due to practical and administrative considerations at that time.
98
  
According to Abou al Fotouh, “Al Wasat founders rushed in applying for the PPC 
without the consent of the movement’s leadership. They were motivated by developing a legal 
framework to stop military trials for many MB’s members. Their initiative was useless during 
Mubarak’s regime, but I thought the movement should not take any aggressive measures against 
them. It could be better just to blame them for rushing to the PPC, and nothing more”99. 
The party was refused by the PPC, and half of the founding MB’s members joined back 
the movement. In reaction to this withdrawal, Al Wasat Petition was dismissed as the party did 
not have fifty founding members. In 1998, Al Wasat party was finally rejected by the PPC. Abou 
Ala Madi submitted another proposal for new party under the title of Hizb al Wasat al Masry 
(Egpt’s Center Party) with ninety- three founding members, among them two Copts and one 
female. However, it was rejected again. Since 1996, party founders applied four times to the 
PPC, but all their requests were refused. In 2000, the Ministry of Social Affairs accepted Al 
Wasat founders’ request to establish an NGO called Egypt for Culture and Dialogue (Masr Lil 
Thakafa wa al Hiwar). It comprised Al Wasat members and other intellectuals like Selim al 
A’wa, and Wahid abd al Maged. The NGO was the platform through which channels of 
communication among party’s members, intellectuals and youth kept opened.100    
Al Wasat’s initiative was challenged not only by the political regime but also by 
Brothers. The state relied heavily on the security approach with all Islamist regardless of their 
discourse. Moderates and extremists were in the same package. Khalil A’nani summarized three 
reasons for dismissing Al Wasat party’s requests, rather than co-opting it. Firstly, the Egyptian 
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system perceived Islamists as a threat to national security that should be eliminated by all means. 
Secondly, the regime was afraid that the newly formed party would be an umbrella for Brothers’ 
activities, who would join it, forming a strong alliance against the regime. Finally, the regime 
perceived Al Wasat as a potential strong opposition that would attract masses and other public 
figures.
101
  
The MB’s leadership stood against Al Wasat initiative. According to A’ssam Sultan, “the 
Supreme Guidance Office invited early founders of the party and pressured them to cancel their 
membership in the party. Some of those members did not stand against these pressures and 
cancelled their membership in 1996. In July 1996, Mokhtar Nouh, and Mamoun Moyasser, two 
lawyers of the movement, asked the Parties Court to reject Al Wasat’s request. They also 
accused us of being a proxy for US interest, because Rafik Habib, one of Al Wasat early 
founders, is the son of the Head of the Evangelical Sect in Egypt. Due to an intellectual 
disagreement, Habib withdrew from Al Wasat. After that, the MB’s leadership directly addressed 
him and he joined MB’s Party Program Writing Committee in 2007”.102 Rafik Habib is now the 
Deputy of the Freedom and Justice Party’s president. 
Unease relationship between the Al Wasat Party and the MB continued until now. Al 
Wasat Party accused the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of violating electoral laws which state 
that parties must stop their propaganda campaigns two days before the voting-day. In one of the 
TV programs, Sultan said, “Brotherhood is suffering from moral decay and should address this 
problem”103. 
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Al Wasat’s program has open discourse regarding the political rights of Copts and 
women. The party declared that it has no problem with nominating a female Coptic candidate for 
presidency. Party founders incorporated ideas of Selim al A’wa, Fahmy Huwaidy, Tarik al 
Bishry, and Muhammed Emara about citizenship, and shari’a application. The party’s program 
instills elements of Islam in western political structures.
104Al Wasat’ stance towards shari’a 
application is not different from the FJP’s current program; both accepted the second article of 
the Egyptian constitution and believe Islam provides guiding principles and details should be 
open for interpretations. Women’s role in Al Wasat is still not that much significant.105The 
inclusive democratic nature of Al Wasat is apparent at the level of membership that is open to all 
diverse segments of the society. This character is not applicable in Brothers’ context. For Abou 
al A’la Mady, “membership in the Muslim Brotherhood depends on your religion; all members 
should be Muslims, not only ordinary Muslims but religious ones”106.   
The Shura Council and the Guidance Office Elections 
Another crisis or a hidden dispute between the reformist and the organizational (Qutbian) 
stream emerged in 2008 under the leadership of Mahdi A’kef. The organizational stream led by 
Mahmoud Ezzat refused to promote A’ssam al A’rian for the Guidance Office’s membership 
after the death of Muhammed Halal. For Muhammed Habib, A’rian had the right to be 
automatically promoted for the Guidance Office because he was the least loser in the last 
complementary Office election. There are previous incidents for that with the promotion of 
Mahmoud Ezzat and Khairt al Shater after the death of Ibrahim Sharf and Ahmed al Malt in 
1995. Mahmoud Ezzat and other hard-line 15 members were against this legal interpretation. 
They justified their stance by the fact that the last election was a partial complementary one, and 
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five members of the Guidance office were in jail at the time of election. Thus, it would be better 
to conduct a new election for the whole Office.
107
Mahdi Akef, the Supreme Guide at that time, 
declared he was not going to stay in office for a second term. This was a sign of Akef’s 
dissatisfaction with the opposition against Al A’rian. In reaction to this declaration, some of the 
Shura Council’s members issued the idea of distributing a survey about the timing of the Shura 
Council election that would be in charge of electing the coming Guidance Office’s members and 
the Supreme Guide. According to Muhammed Habib, the survey was phrased in a sneaky way to 
rush for conducting elections before the end of A’kef’s term. Instead of having two options: to 
conduct the elections now, or to delay it till the end of the term; the survey had three options. 
The first one was to rush for conducting election, the second was to conduct it after six months, 
and the third was to hold it after one year. Voices for delaying elections were divided between 
the second two options, and the first one got the majority of vote. The Shura Council and the 
Guidance Office’s elections witnessed the victory of the organizational stream. Al A’rian who 
got only 40% of the vote in the last Guidance Office got 96% of votes in this election and finally 
assumed a place in the Guidance Office.
108Muhammed Badi’e was elected as the Supreme Guide 
in January 2010, with two Qutbian assistants: Mahmoud Ezzat, and Gom’a Amin. The newly 
elected Guidance Office practiced strict measures for promotion and discipline within the 
movement. This was described as “kidnapping” the movement by its conservative 
wing.
109
Actually, Muhammed Habib was expected to be the Supreme Guide, but he was not even 
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elected for the Guidance Office membership. The Supreme Guidance election was excessively 
contested and gained the public attention due to debates over its legality. 
Ibrahim al Z’afarany, one of the 1970s generation’s calibers and ex- member of the Shura 
Council in Alexandria, refused how the Current Supreme Guide was elected in 2010. Al 
Z’afarany, in collaboration with other MB’s legalists, lodged an appeal against election. He 
wrote a memo including violations to bylaws. Firstly, Al Z’afarany rejected the idea of 
conducting a survey over a legal issue. This would open the way to impose a certain opinion 
regardless of bylaws and written regulations. Secondly, there was no legal justification to change 
the time of Guidance Office election. Rushing for election before July 2010 did not allow enough 
time to assure fair elections. Everything was done in only two days. The database of voters, 
voting papers, timing, and all details were prepared without notifying the supervising electoral 
committee. This impulsive process did not give the chance for some calibers to be ready; at the 
end, they were excluded. Thirdly, the ex-Guidance Office changed the numerical composition of 
the Guidance Office. The Shura Council was supposed to elect only fourteen members from 
Egypt and two members from MB’s international branches. The voting papers let members 
choose 16 members, and a new article was added to keep the membership of members who were 
in jail at that time. This meant that twenty members were in the Guidance Office: eighteen from 
Egypt, and two from abroad. Fourthly, the election was a “passing- vote” type, meaning that the 
electoral committee should go to every member and get his vote. 86 members out of 105 
members in the Shura Council had the chance to vote, meaning that 19 members were excluded, 
which severely affected the result of election. Furthermore, the electoral supervisory committee 
did not declare the statistics of valid, invalid votes and absences.
110Al Z’farany concluded that 
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the last election was legally invalid, and must be repeated. It results in the domination of one 
trend over the movement. He also asked for the establishment of a small committee of 20 
members from the Shura Council to evaluate and supervise the performance of this Guidance 
Office. Mahdi A’kef underestimated the value of Al Z’afarany allegations and he said if anyone 
had evidences that the election was fraud; he should feel free to go to the court. Of course, this is 
non-sense because the MB has no legal status and is not under the legal supervision of state 
institutions. 
For Al Z’farany, the Brothers do not follow corrupt ways to change the result of any 
elections; however, leaders may influence results through implicitly supporting one candidate 
and defaming the reputation of another one, or spreading inflammatory information about his 
opinions. Reformist figures within the movement were publically engaged and busy in many 
civil activities; this gave the chance for certain organizational figures to spread their dominance 
within the movement, and establish bonds of support with other members from the Shura 
Council.
111
  
Hamid al Dafruy described the last election as fraud. He confirmed Al Z’afarany’s 
critique. Furthermore, Al Dafruy added that he had lodged an appeal against the result of the 
2005 election, and it was ignored. Hence, how can those, who were not fairly elected in 2005, 
monitor the 2009 election, and how can they judge over appeals against their legal legitimacy? 
There was not enough time to have a neutral committee to supervise elections, and as a result, Al 
Z’afarany, Gamal Heshmat, and Helmy al Gazar refused to be part of this committee. This 
undermined the creditability of the committee. In addition, members of this supervisory electoral 
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committee were at the same time candidates for the Guidance Office.
112
Al Dafruy wrote a memo 
with all these violations to Mahdi A’kef, and he suggested forming a committee of MB 
international leaders including Yusuf al Karadawy, Rashid al Ghanoushi, Faisal al Mulawy, and 
Kamal al Hilbawy to investigate the issue.
113
 
Abd al Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh, asserted, “The period 2008-2010 witnessed many 
violations to the movement’s bylaws. The organizational group had no interest in nominating Al 
A’rian for the Guidance Office. They raised this legal debate over his nomination, though there 
were no legal barriers for that. According to the movement’s bylaws, Al A’rian had the right to 
join the Office after the death of Muhammed Hilal without conducting new election. Mahdi 
A’kef rushed for the last Guidance Office and the Shura Council elections to make sure it was 
going to be under his supervision. The goal was to exclude Muhammed Habib, nothing more. 
The last election was not fair, and no one considered lodged appeals. Furthermore, three articles 
were added to the movement’s bylaws through the “passing-vote” approach. This is legally 
unacceptable; bylaws should not be modified through the “passing-vote” system. Muhammed 
Habib and I rejected this method and Habib submitted a memo for that. We believed there should 
be enough time for discussions and debates before approving new changes. I introduced the first 
new approved article before the last Guidance Bureau elections, but its content was distorted. I 
issued that those who spent more than 8 years in the membership of the Guidance Office should 
not be nominated again for the coming election and this article to be applied retroactively. I 
insisted that the article should be ex post facto law, and to make sure this is clear, I added the 
names of old members who should not run for the next election. The article was distorted and its 
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retroactive nature was disabled. They said that it is going to be applied for members of the 
Bureau starting from the coming elections, meaning that they can be nominated for two extra 
terms to meet the criterion of spending 8 years in office. The second article was to let members 
in jail enjoy the membership of the Guidance Office, nevertheless there is another article that 
states that members who would miss three meetings are expelled. The reason for adopting this 
article was to maintain the membership of Khairt al Shater who was in jail at that time. The third 
introduced article has a ruralization impact on the composition of the Shura Council. The 
percentage of each governorate’s presentation in the council has been modified in favor of rural 
ones. The number of Cairo’s representatives has been minimized, and representatives of other 
rural governorates like Mansoura, and Dakhlia were increased. This gives the chance for many 
disqualified conservative members who are detached from the politics of the city to be more 
present compared with other knowledgeable members who have a religiously and a politically 
open discourse. The motive behind these changes and violations was to exclude those who have 
different opinions and conflicting ideas. They used laws and values as a cloak for personal 
goals”114. 
Recent Dismissals and Resignations 
After the revolution, Al Z’afarany resigned in a reaction to ignoring his legal appeal 
against the result of the election and the movement’s stance from members who joined other 
political parties and not the FJP. He also rejected the way leaders of the FJP were chosen from 
the Shura Council of the MB.
115
Al Z’afarany with Muhammed Habib established the 
Renaissance (Al Nahda) Party after the revolution. The party has a very open discourse that goes 
                                                          
114 An interview with Abou al Fotouh by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 6, 2012.  
115 Al Z’afarany’s written resignation was published in Eman Abd al Mon’iem, “ Nas Astkalet Ibrahim al Z’afarany ba’ad 45 
sana Khadma fe al Ikhwan”[Al Z’afarany’s Resignation: After 45 Years Serving the Muslim Brotherhood] , Al Dostor Al Asly, 
April 2, 2011.  
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beyond ideological cleavages. It represents itself as the Egyptian version of the Renaissance 
Party in Tunisia. The membership of the party is based on two criteria: 1) A good reputation, 2) 
and a motivation to serve society.
116
Al Nahda Party is still an elitist one with no popular base. 
There are ongoing attempts to integrate it with Al Tayar al Masry or Al Wasat party, according 
to Al Z’afarany.117For Muhammed al Kassas, one of the founders of the Al Tayar al Masry, “Al 
Nahda Party is still reluctant to join either Al Wasat or us. They are still unable to decide over 
their ideological base”118. 
Haithm Abou Khalil, one of the movement’s leaders in Alexandria and the chairman of 
Victims’ Center of Human Rights, resigned from the movement few days after attending the 
MB’s youth conference on March 2011. Abou Khalil submitted a written resignation including 
eleven reasons. He stated that his resignation is a reaction to a hidden agreement between the 
movement and Omar Sulieman during January 25 revolution.
119
Based on this agreement, the 
movement will be allowed to establish its political party and in return, it will not support the 
revolution. Abou Khalil mentioned the names of MB’s members who attended the meeting as 
well as its timing. He also pointed out other issues like the fraudulent legal base of the last 
Supreme Guidance and the Shura Council’s elections, the movement’s arrangements with the 
                                                          
116
………, Onislam, “Ibrahim al Z’afarany: Al Khilafa al Islamya Fekra Wahmya”[Ibrahim al Z’afarany: The Islamic Caliphate is 
An Illusion],http://www.onislam.net/arabic/newsanalysis/analysis-opinions/islamic-world/135114-2011-11-15-11-01-09.html 
(accessed January 20, 2012). 
117 A telephone call with Ibrahim al Z’afarany by the author, Cairo, Egypt, January 14.  
118 An interview with Muhammed al Kassas by the author,  Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2012.  
119 The meeting was between S’aad al Katatny (the Head of the Parliament, and ex- Guidance Office’s member) and Muhammed 
Morsy (ex- Guidance Office’s member and Head of the FJP) , and Omar Sulieman. Then there was another public meeting with 
Sulieman on February 6, 2011 without the consent of the Shura Council. Abou al Fotouh deplored this second meeting in a video 
and stated that the movement till now did not understand it is a true revolution. Also, Abou al Fotouh did not know about the first 
secret meeting and he renounced it at the Shura meeting on February 10, 2011. Haitham Abou Khalil, “ Khairt al Shater al 
Moftara a’lihe wa al Moftiry A’lina”[Khairt al Shater, the Opressed, Who is Opressing Us], Facebook.com, March 21, 2012, 
http://www.facebook.com/notes/%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AB%D9%85-
%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84/%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%87-
%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%8A-
%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7-/331834273532477 (accessed March 21, 2012).   
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security apparatus over the 2005 parliamentary election
120
, and the rigid exclusive nature of the 
decision making process. Abou Khalil concluded that the movement is dismissing its Crème de 
la crème, and the promotion process is established on loyalty to MB rather than loyalty to the 
ummah (Muslim Community) and Egypt. The movement’s Guidance Office neither rejected nor 
commented on what Abou Khalil said.
121
Abou Khalil also criticized nominating Al Katatny to be 
the President of the People’s Assembly. He justified his critique by the fact that Al Katatny lacks 
any legal background compared with other MB’s members in the parliament like A’ssam al 
A’rian. This is was seen by Abou Khalil as an indicator of how promotion is established on 
loyalty rather than merit.  
Abou al Fotouh was expelled from the movement after his declaration to run for 
presidency.
122
The MB took aggressive measures against members who supported him. For 
instance, the movement conducted an investigation with 40 members from al Bhira governorates 
who attended and organized an Iftar for Abou al Fotouh in Ramdan. The Brothers’ 
administrative office in Al Bihra accused those members of violating the movement’s bylaws 
which stated not to support Abou al Fotouh. Among those members were Mustafa Raslan who is 
a board member in the FJP.
123Muhammed Bad’ie, the current Supreme Guide, justified the 
                                                          
120
 Mahdi Akef, Khairt al Shater, and Muhammed Habib agreed with the security bodies to nominate only 150 MB’s candidates 
and to leave certain electoral districts for the National Democratic Party. The goal of this deal was to ease international criticism 
on Mubarak’s regime, and in return avoid military trials of a number of MB’s members. The MB achieved victory in the first 
round, and the regime was threatened by their popularity. Al Shater was asked by security figures to convince some members to 
withdraw from elections. He ran negotiations with candidates without the consent of other MB’s members who refused such an 
action. Al Shater failed in fulfilling his promise and, in return, he was military tried after the Azhar student’s martial act in 2006, 
Ibid. Also, in 2009, A’kef confessed in one of his newspapers interviews the details of this deal. Al Malegy, 270-271.  
121 Sha’aban Hadia, “Istkalet Haithm abou Khalil men Gam’at al Ikhwam al Muslmin”[Haithm Abou Khalil’s Resignation from 
the Muslim Brotherhood], Al Youm al Sab‟a, March 31, 2011.  
122
 Abou al Fotouh said that “ running for presidency office does not violate the movement’s bylaws; I was ready to resign from 
MB. The movement’s stance against me would be justified if I belong to the FJP which is not the case”, ……., Al Jazeera.net, 
“Gam’at al Ikhwan Tafsel Abou al Fotouh”[Muslim Brotherhood Expelles Abou al Fotouh], 
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1D9B9356-7C77-41FC-8A11-BB5CCDC04CC8.htm (accessed January 20, 2012). 
123 ……., “ Al Ikhwan Touhel 40 men Kaydtha ll Tahkik Bsabab Iftar Abou al Fotouh”[Muslim Brotherhood Conducted 
Investigation with 40 Members Who Attended Abou al Fotouh’s Iftar], Al Shorouk, September 18, 2011.    
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movement’s stance towards Abou al Fotouh by saying that “Abou al Fotouh broke his pledge to 
God”, and we told him that the movement is ready to support him as a candidate for the Doctors’ 
Syndicate but he refused.
124
Khairt al Shater, the deputy of the Supreme Guide, said that “who is 
going to vote for Abo al Fotouh is sinful”. At that time, the MB’s leadership declared that it is 
better for the movement and Egypt not to nominate any of its members to this position.
125
The 
Guidance Office also announced it is going to dismiss any member who would vote for Abou al 
Fotouh or support his electoral campaign. Farid Abd al Khaliq concluded that he supported the 
movement’s decision not to nominate any MB’s figures for presidency; nevertheless, he believed 
what happened with Abou al Fotouh was harsh.
126
  
Later on, on March 2012, voices in the Shura Council called for nominating Khairt al 
Shater for presidency.
127
This was a contradictory stance to the MB’s early position. In reaction to 
this new stance, a number of MB’s young members organized a demonstration to express their 
dissatisfaction with this newly introduced idea and MB’s decision to expel Abou al Fotouh’s 
supporters.
128Mahdi A’kef commented on this demonstration by saying that it had no value and 
the movement acts according to settled rules and regulations. Mahmoud Hussain, the MB 
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 ………., Onislam, “ Abou al Fotouh Khalef A’hdou m’a Allah”[Abou al Fotouh Broke His Pledge to God], 
http://www.onislam.net/arabic/newsanalysis/special-folders-pages/new-egypt/egypt-after-the-january-25/134473-2011-09-21-10-
24-45.html (accessed January 20, 20120).   
125
 Muslim Brotherhood understands western sensitivity towards political Islam movements. However, MB is currently sharing 
power with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. MB has the majority in both parliamentary bodies; Brothers control most 
syndicates and are planning to have a strong say in the coming municipal elections. Also, the movement and FJP will also 
support a presidential candidate who has Islamic Background. Thus, MB is a key player in the current political formula, and not 
supporting presidential candidate is not a decisive element to ease western skepticism about the future of political Islam in Egypt. 
126 An interview with Farid Abd al Khaliq by the author, Cairo, Egypt, December 12, 2011.  
127 Ahmed Abd al Halim, “ Al Ikhwan Tamnah Forsa Akhera la Mashro’a al Shater Raysan”[Muslim Brotherhood Gives the Last 
Opportunity for Al Shater’s Presidential Nomination], Al Shorouk, March 20, 2012.  
128 Hamdi Dabash and others, “ Shabab al Ikhwan Yankasmon hawl Tarshih Al Shater ll Rasa”[Muslim Brotherhood Youth are 
Divided Over Nominating Al Shater for Presidency], Al Masr al Youm, March 22, 2012.  
58 
 
Secretary General, said those protestors were no more than 15 persons and they did not belong to 
MB’s ranks.129  
On March 31, the MB’s Shura Council declared its nomination for Khairt al Shater. The 
decision was not publically welcomed because the movement leadership, including Muhammed 
Bad’ie (the Supreme Guide), Khairt al Shater (the MB’s presidential candidate) and Mahmoud 
Ghozlan (Guidance Office’s member), broke its pledge.130The decision of nomination was 
declared by the Guidance Office, and this was actually against the result of voting in the FJP that 
refused the suggestion of nominating Khairt al Shater.
131
This let some activists sarcastically 
describe the MB’s Shura Council as the political wing of the FJP and not vice versa.132The MB’s 
decision to nominate Al Shater was a reaction to the SCAF refusal to withdraw the confidence 
from Al Ganzoury’s government.133The nature of relationship between the military establishment 
and MB is not clear yet. There are different interpretations for the nomination of Al Shater and 
whether it is the start of an antagonistic relationship or if the nomination was based on certain 
political arrangement.
134
The MB did not apologize for its decision of expelling Abou al Fotouh, 
                                                          
129 Muhammed Ismail, and Muhammed Hajj, “ Shabab al Ikhwan Yonazmon Wakfa Amam Al Irshad” [Muslim Brotherhood 
Organized Demonstration infront of the Guidance Office], Al Youm al Sab‟a, March 21, 2012.  
130 Doha al Gendy, “A’am men al Wa’ad al Ikhwany: Lan Nokadem Morshahan ll Rasa”[A year after Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Pledge: We are not Going to Nominate Anyone for Presidence], Al Shorouk, April 2, 2012.  
131 81% of FJP Board Committee refused nominating Al Shater. Muhammed Morsy, the FJP president, declared that the party’s 
opinion is consultancy. Abd al Halim,  March 20, 2012. 
132 See the debate over MB and party politics in chapter II.  
133
 The MB’s statement criticized the SCAF threat to appeal against the constitutionality of the last parliamentary election, and 
the performance of Ganzoury’s government. The statement has been published on Ikhwan on Line Website, March 24, 2012, 
http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?SecID=212&ArtID=104341(accessed April 3, 2012). In reaction to this notice, 
the SCAF published another statement in which it clearly refused MB’s allegations and implicitly referred to 1954 events. This 
was considered as the start of a rising tidal of hostility between both sides.   
134
 Hany al Wazery, “ Kamal al Hilbawy: Sabry Nafaz m’aa al Gam’a wa Tarshih al Shater ba el Atfak m’aa al A’skary”[Kamal 
al Hilbawy: I am Impatient with Muslim Brotherhood and Nominating Al Shater was Based on Arrangements with the Military 
Institution] , Al Masry al Youm, April 1, 2012. It is evident that the MB leadership’s dispute with Abou al Fotouh was not only 
due to violations of regulations and bylaws. Abou al Fotouh expressed out ideas about the legality of the movement, and 
necessity of transparency regarding decision- making mechanisms and financial records. Abou al Fotouh was also against 
establishing a political party for MB. Those ideas let MB’s leadership thinks that Abou al Fotouh is not loyal enough to the 
movement, and may take decisions that are against its interest. Mohy al Zayt, who is a member in MB’s Shura Council, 
concluded that Abou al Fotouh believes MB has no legal status; Thus, He may put Brothers in prisons as Nasser. Mohy al Zayt, 
“Lamaza lam Yd’am al Ikhwan Ayan men al Morashhen al Islamyeen”[Why Brothers did not Support Any of the Islamic 
Candidates], YouTube .com, April 9, 2012,  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=peZY1D0vmBU (accessed April 18, 2012). 
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and did not approach him for nomination.
135
The MB decision of nominating Al Shater increased 
the level of dissent within the movement; a number of old, middle age and young members 
resigned. Other political forces, who found that MB is trying to monopolize power through 
assuring majority in the parliament, and the Founding Committee of Constitution’s Writing, and 
nominating a president, negatively received the decision.
136
The decision raised questions about 
double standards towards members; Al Shater who agreed on dismissing Abou al Fotouh was 
nominated to be MB’s presidential candidate. The Shura Council handled three meetings to 
discuss the issue and voting over nominating one of the MB’s members was repeated to push for 
nominating Al Shater. The Council also rushed for its last meeting with no declared reasons for 
that. In addition, the new position reflects the role played by businessmen in the movement. Al 
Shater, MB’s millionaire, will run MB’s political project in resemblance to the role of NDP 
businessmen in Egypt’s political life.137On April 17, the Presidential Electoral Committee 
excluded Al Shater from the presidential race. In reaction to that, the movement nominated the 
FJP’s president Muhammed Morsy. Morsy has humble political experience compared with other 
MB’s figures. He was appointed in the Guidance Office, and his political experience just started 
with his nomination to be the head of the MB’s parliamentary group in 2000. Haithm Abou 
Khalik described Morsy’s nomination as the blurred shadow of Al Shater. He also added that it is 
the same scenario of Valdmire Putin and Demirty Medvedev in Russia.
138
 
                                                          
135 David K. Kirkpatrick, “Islamist Group Breaks Pledge to Stay Out of Race in Egypt”, New York Times, March 31, 2012.  
136 The constitutional Assembly, that is in charge of drafting the constitution, has been criticized by liberal, secular, and other 
moderate Islamist voices for the lack adequate criteria of representation, and the domination of Islamists. It seems that the MB 
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Wane, “Muslim Brotherhood Officials Aim to Promote Moderate Image in Washington Visit”, The Washington Post, April 4, 
2012.  
 137 see research conclusion, page 137-138.  
138 Haithm Abou Khalil, “ Merci a’la Morsy”[Thank You for Nominating Morsy], April 16, 2012, FaceBook.com,  
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
The generational interaction between the 1970s generation and the MB’s leadership 
raises a number of crucial issues about the future of political Islam in Egypt. The first issue is the 
relationship between the religious discourse and politics. The MB is a dogmatic movement with 
a reform project derived from Islam as a system of knowledge. Both generational units in the 
movement do not advocate a secular perspective for politics, but the use of religion is presented 
differently in their discourses. The MB’s leadership uses religion to justify its stances and 
maintain its solidarity. The MB’s leadership draws an analogy between Islam and the Muslim 
ummah, and the movement’s decisions. Prophet traditions about allegiance and obedience have 
been used to criticize rebellious members. Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him) said: “One 
who found in his Amir (leader) something which he disliked should hold his patience, for one 
who separated from the main body of the Muslims even to the extent of a hand-span and then he 
died; he would belong to the days of Jahiliyyah”. This hadith was mainly for war leaders, not for 
other Islamic groups’ leaderships, however, MB’s leaders kept using it to give a compulsory 
flavor to their orders. Actually, this discourse contradicts with Hassan al Banna’s traditions 
which viewed MB as a Muslim community among other faithful groups and its interpretations of 
Islam is not the only valid truthful one. Thus, those who are adopting different point of view 
should not perceived as enemies or a potential threat to the Muslim d’awa, and should not be 
perceived as ones living in Jahiliyyah. 
The relationship between the MB’s dogmatic religious discourse and political activities is 
very critical regarding the future trajectory of the movement. Al Wasat party founders and the 
newly resigned 1970s members advocated a separation between the movement’s socioreligious  
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grassroots organization and party politics. Al Z’afarany and Aboul al Fotouh criticized the 
organic relationship between the MB and the FJP. It is better for the movement to be involved in 
politics as a pressure group for diverse political parties. Attaching the movement to certain 
political party would undermine the movement’s missionary activities and reform goals. Hassan 
al Banna advocated a similar approach; he supported Al Wafd party at the beginning, and later 
on he turned MB’s support to the National Party.139  
The difference between the MB and the wasat generation’s discourse at the political and 
organizational level is not yet apparent. MB publicizes itself as a moderate political force that 
respects laws and human rights. The only clear difference between its political program and Al 
Wasat party is women’s and Copts’ right to run for presidency. It also should be noted that Al 
Wasat spent 15 years to get a legal approval. During this period, founders had the chance to draft 
detailed socioeconomic and political program compared with other newly established 
parties.
140
However, still what truly differentiates Al Wasat party is its split from the MB’s 
administrative realm, and statements of Al Wasat figures regarding certain political incidents. Al 
Wasat introduced itself as an Ikhwan- alternative or an anti Ikhwan, rather than a unique Islamic 
project.
141
The FJP program incorporates concepts of democracy, pluralism, and human rights. 
The concept of Shura has been written beside the concept of democracy, between brackets, as if 
they are synonymous. The FJP did not yet clarify its intellectual position regarding these 
conceptions, but there still no obvious differences between them and Al Wasat’s political 
                                                          
139 An interview with Abou al Fotouh by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 6, 2012. Adel al Dargely, “ An Interview with Abou 
al Fotouh”, Al Masry al Youm, January 21, 2012.  
140 Details of Al Wasat program has been drafted and introduced in Rafik Habib, Awrak Hizb al Wasat [Al Wasat’s Party 
Papers](Cairo: 1996), 22-102. See also, Abou al A’la Mady, Rouyat Al Wasat [Al Wasat Party’s Vision](Cairo: Al Shorouk 
International, 2005), 63-68.  
141 Al Wasat figures’ harsh critique for the MB’s performance and internal dynamics undermined its popularity among many 
MB’s members, and made many of them hesitant to joing Al Wasat. An interview with Ismail al Alexandrani by the author, 
Cairo, Egypt, November 20, 2011. Muhammed Shams emphasized the same issue; he also criticized Al Wasat internal 
organization for being so traditional and bureaucratic. Al Wasat failed in attracting supporters along 15 years. This did not 
encourage many MB’s members to join it after the revolution. An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, 
February 7, 2012.  
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discourse. Al Nahda’s political project, on the other side, is still in the process of preparation 
without a strong presence in the political and public sphere.  
 It can be argued that Al Wasat is incapable of designing a solid democratic organization. 
On March 3, nine members of Al Wasat cadres resigned in reaction to the last internal election 
within the party. They described the first internal organization election as fraud. They also 
deplored the promotion process within the party for its reliance on loyalty to founders rather than 
merit criteria. Al Wasat’s members and parliamentary candidates’ opinions were ignored 
regarding electoral campaigns.
142
Despite this internal resent, the party conducted an internal 
election for which presidential candidate should the party support, and it was abided by its 
members’ preference.143Based on this internal democratic vote, the party shifted its strategy from 
supporting Selim al A’wa, the intellectual guidance or the God father of  Al Wasat, to Abd al 
Mon’iem abou al Fotouh who gained 63% of members’ vote. This position was surprising to 
many due to the influential role Al A’wa played in the early years of establishing Al Wasat. The 
FJP and Muslim Brotherhood, on the contrary, did not conduct such a vote in spite of internal 
dissent of nominating one of MB’s ranks to presidency. This indicates how Al Wasat managed a 
relatively democratic structure compared with MB.  
The MB is still unable to resolve the problematic nature of its relationship with the FJP. 
Spokesmen from the FJP and the Guidance Office emphasized a separate financial and 
administrative relationship between the movement and the party, nevertheless the political link 
between the two partners is apparent. MB’s members participated in electoral campaigns and the 
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MB’s banners were used to support the party. Young children affiliated to the movement’s 
religious activities were used as publicity for candidates.
144
On January 14, the Shura Council 
delegated the Guidance Office to coordinate with the FJP over managing the transitional 
process.
145
Young and resigned elder members perceived such an action with cynicism, as Board 
members and leaders of the FJP were chosen by the movement’s Shura Council rather than being 
elected by the party’s founders. Muhammed Morsy was nominated as the chairman, Al A’rian as 
the deputy and S’aad al Katatny became the Secretary General.146Al A’rain’s revolutionary 
attitudes were contained in the party structure, and despite his political experience, the party 
nominated Al Katatny to be the President of the Parliament.
147
  
Most of Al Wasat’s members criticized the dominance of secrecy and the culture of 
obedience within the movement. According to Sultan, the interest of the movement is at times 
prioritized over the interest of the nation and Islam itself. Al Z’afarany also asserted that loyalty 
should be to the state first not to the organization of the movement. The organization is part of 
the state and not vice versa.
148
   
In reaction to recent confrontations between the movement’s members and protestors 
heading towards the parliament, Hamid al Dafrauy criticized having a security cordon of young 
                                                          
144 Violations for the electoral law by the MB, how the movement’s resources were used by the FJP, and critique of ex and 
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May 4, 2011.  
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(accessed January 22, 2012). It should be noted that Al Katatny, Morsy, and Ghozlan are among members with close relationship 
with the Supreme Guide (Bad’ie), and his deputy (Khairt al Shater). 
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 ……….,Onislam, “Ibrahim al Z’afarany: Al Khilafa al Islamya Fekra Wahmya”[Ibrahim al Z’afarany: the Islamic Caliphate is 
an Illusion],http://www.onislam.net/arabic/newsanalysis/analysis-opinions/islamic-world/135114-2011-11-15-11-01-09.html 
(accessed January 20, 2012). 
64 
 
MB’s members around the parliament. He criticized the culture of absolute obedience in the 
movement and lack of self-critique.
149
In addition, he refused the movement’s statement about the 
issue, and he concluded that protestors were peaceful, did not attack the parliament, and MB’s 
members were not in the demonstration as one of the young Brothers said. For Al Dafrauy, this 
incident is an indicator for spreading the seeds of despotism in the movement, and lack of 
openness towards other forces. Tharwat al Kharabawy’s book, From the Heart of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, provided two reflective examples about the culture of obedience: 1) An 
investigation was conducted on Amr al Talawy, one of the MB’s leaders in Cairo, when he 
refused to obey the leadership’s order of voting for Mustafa Mashhour in one of the 1980s Shura 
Council election, 2) Fawzy al Gazar was dismissed from the MB because of  his wife’s critique 
of one of the political statements of Mustafa Mashhour.
150
  
In his autobiography, Abd al Satar al Malegy concluded that there were measures to 
exclude 1970s members who share open religious and political discourse. The 1970s members 
were excluded from running Student Sections in the MB, and were sent to work in Syndicates. 
The MB’s leadership recognized the salient role of the Student section in shaping rank and file 
members’ consciousness. Hence, there was urgent need to control this section by loyal members 
who share leadership’s modes of thought. The leadership started collecting information about all 
MB’s calibers and their intellectual and political orientation. This was discovered in 1992 after 
the security attack on Salasabil Electronics Company owned by Khairt al Shater, and Hassan 
Malek. This database was supposed to be used for categorizing members and assessing their 
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loyalty to Mustafa Mashhour’s leadership. In 1995, many of 1970s active syndicates’ calibers 
were military tried; MB’s leadership instrumentally used that to replace those members with 
other conservative calibers with a strong loyalty to leadership’s discourse. Appointments were 
based on loyalty rather than expertise. Those newly appointed members were in charge of 
financial and administrative mismanagement, which negatively affected MB’s image among 
syndicates’ members.151 
The January 25 Revolution brought many of al wasat generation’s concerns to the 
surface. The movement is pressured to legalize its status, and to provide regular records about its 
financial resources, and administrative dynamics, nevertheless, this is not achieved till this 
moment. Abou al Fotouh concluded that the major obstacle that is facing the movement is 
legality. There should be a legal framework for its activities. The movement leadership should 
accept the existing legal framework and being part of it; later on, they would have the right to 
advocate further changes within existing organizing laws.
152
The movement would not be able to 
justify any of its previous stances by security coercion or harassment. Women should be 
presented in upper administrative ranks; measures of accountability and promotion should be 
clearly set and applied. The exclusive nature of the decision-making process within the 
movement should be addressed, with more representation for youth and women. The Shura 
Council’s delegated authorities are still limited and heads of the MB’s administrative sections are 
not presented. Al Z’farany said that “there should be a separation of power within the movement. 
The Guidance Office authorities should be limited and there should be a body for legislation and 
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another for accountability.
153The last Guidance Office’s elections violated many bylaws and 
there are no channels to address electoral appeals and monitor elections by a neutral body.  
The FJP’s criteria of promotion and tools of ideological indoctrination are still confusing. 
The FJP came from the womb of the MB whose members and influential figures are the 
backbone of the party. Recruitment is based on the religiosity of members; 75% of MB’s 
members joined the movement only for religious purposes. The popular base of the FJP is 
attached to MB’s members, and other Muslim Egyptians; it is not clear how the FJP would be 
able to recruit Christians, what are the adopted tools of indoctrination, and would Christians be 
able to assume high ranks in the party?
154
It seems that the MB did not take the required measures 
over these issues. It is also unclear how the movement would assure consistency between its 
religious discourse, moral claims, and the FJP’s political agenda, and how it would react towards 
political pluralism within the party.
155
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Chapter III: THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD YOUTH AND THE 
CONCURRENT GENERATIONAL GAP 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
“They overdo everything”, Aristotle. 
The current generational gap between young Brothers and the movement’s leadership 
conflates to a significant extent with preceding generational interactions. They share common 
concerns, ideas, and perceptions towards the MB and political reform. Muslim Brotherhood 
youth refers to young members who are at their 20s and 30s. They do not present a homogenous 
or a monolithic generational unit, but rather diverse intellectual trends. Some of MB youth do not 
have clear political and ideological orientations; they share religious conservative discourse, and 
reflect high level of organizational discipline. Other young members are ideologically open, 
reflecting a post structural and ideological mode of thought established on diverse sources of 
knowledge.   
The ongoing generational interaction is more acute, revealing and criticizing many issues 
about the ideological makeup of the movement, internal structure, reasons of existence, and 
positions towards the state. This young generation has been in contact with liberals and leftists; 
they worked with human rights organizations, diverse NGOs, and recognized the importance of 
collaboration with other political voices. They are inclined to learn from various experiences 
especially the AKP’s experience in Turkey and the current open discourse of Al Nahda Party in 
Tunisia. Many of them are well educated and open to western ideologies and political 
experiences. The consciousness of many active young MB’s members has been shaped by 
writings of contemporary Muslim thinkers including Yusuf al Karadawy, Muhammed Emara, 
Rashid al Ghanoushi, Khales al Galby, Fahmy Huwaidy, Malek Ben Naby, Abd Allah al Nafisy, 
and Tarik al Bishry.  
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The intensity of communication over the internet, through Facebook, Twitter, and virtual 
groups, allowed them to share ideas, express feelings, navigate other ideologies, and coordinate 
with other political activists from different ideological walks. Young Brothers are calling for an 
open and flexible religious discourse that addresses the needs of modern society. They are 
demanding inclusive decision-making process, merit based standards of promotion, higher level 
of transparency about the movement’s administrative and financial internal dynamics.156   
The January 25 revolution was a critical point to manifests young generation’s 
dissatisfaction institutionally through the establishment of the Egyptian Current Party (Al Tayar 
al Masry). Mustafa al Naggar who was one of MB’s bloggers is currently one of the founders of 
the Justice Party (Al A’dl). Others joined civil apolitical initiatives, and kept declaring their 
disappointment with the movement’s political decisions after the revolution. 
The ongoing generational interaction between young members and MB’s leadership is 
introducing a broad map of issues ranging from educational curriculums to the movement’s 
political role and future structure. This chapter tries to highlight the map of issues over which 
this generational interaction is taking place. It sheds light on shared critique and ideas among 
young Brothers for the movement’s future discourse and structural reform. 
3.2 SURROUNDING CONTEXT  
The current generation suffered the most from the deliberlaization political policies of 
Mubarak’s regime. The economic context characterized by high cost of living due to indirect 
taxes, high prices of intermediate and consumers' goods, and high interest rate. Unemployment 
was estimated by 25-30% and poverty rate is about 40%.
157
The neo liberal policies of the state 
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resulted in the boom NGOs and charity associations as a compensation to well off segments. 
Islamists penetrated different societal levels through these socioeconomic activities that have a 
religious cloak.  
This active Islamic presence resulted in a high level of societal religiosity that apparently 
expressed itself in the public and economic sphere since the early 1990s. The number of private 
and state controlled mosques, and preachers increased. The market of religious publications, 
dress codes, cassettes, and leisure flourished as well. Religious symbols and expressions infused 
the public sphere through greetings, fashion, TV and radio programs, songs, and educational 
curriculums.
158
   
Actually, the conservative societal religiosity was the outcome of the failure of militant 
Islamism and security repression to moderate Islamists. Islamists shifted their project from the 
Islamization of the state to ethical commitment and global injustices. They shifted the strategy 
from “frontal attack” to the “war of positions”.159Personal piety was not only obvious among 
Muslims; Christians also showed a high level of religiosity. Religious cassettes, Christian 
symbols, and icons became apparent in the public sphere, and many Christians NGOs that 
provide services based on sectarian standards flourished.
160
   
The religious discourse became no more associated with Azhariet sheikhs since the late 
1990s. Young and middle age lay preachers with shaven beards and elegant suits became a main 
source of reference for many young Egyptians. Amr Khalid, Mo’az Mas’aoud, Mustafa Hosni, 
and Khalid al Gendy were among those well known religious and spiritual figures. The discourse 
of those preachers is designed to meet the needs of upper and middle class who seek for ethical 
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salvation without political obligations. A’mr Khalid161, the most known and beloved preacher for 
large segments of youth in Egypt, provided an open religious and spiritual discourse that focused 
on personal piety and societal activism. Khalid’s discourse conciliates power and wealth with 
religious piety.
162
In parallel, the Salafist discourse found its way to Egyptian publics through 
religious publications, TV conservative satellite channels like Al Nas (The People), and Al 
Hikma (The Wisdom) channel. The Salafist discourse is apparent among urban poor segments, 
whilst other poor and rural sectors are engaged in Sufi orders, and religious folk practices such as 
mulid.
163
Personal piety actively manifested itself in charity and socioeconomic activities that 
absorbed the energy and anxiety of many young people.  
The conservative religious tone is a reaction to intellectual stagnation. Enlightened 
Islamic ideas introduced by Tarik al Bishry, Selim al A’wa, and Yusuf al Karadawy remain at 
the margin shared by few intellectual circles. The intellectual life has been characterized by 
cultural nativism, and narrow-minded perspective of social reality. Journalism, artistic life, 
books’ production witnessed degeneration compared with the richness of the intellectual life 
during the 1930s. Intellectual discourse pointes out the lack of confidence and courage to modify 
and exchange ideas. Conspiracy theory is used as an explanatory framework for most failures 
and shortcomings. This cultural nativism uses the veil of authenticity to justify its discourse and 
attack on other cultures.
164
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Despite the anti- intellectualism spirit, Egypt witnessed a strong political and social 
activism since the late 1990s. The coordination between political forces for one cause started by 
the Egyptian Popular Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) in 2000, 
and later on the Egyptian Anti-Globalization Group and the National Campaign Against the War 
on Iraq, and the Committee of the Defense of Workers’ Right. New pressure and protest groups 
emerged within all institutions including the Popular Campaign for Change, the Youth for 
Change, the Women for Democracy, the Journalists for Change, the Workers for Change, the 
College Faculty for Change, the Street is Ours, the March 9 Movement, the National Alliance for 
Reform and Change, and other groups.
165
The most two important loose movements were Kifya 
(Enough) in 2004, and April 6
th
 in 2008. Kifya was a rage scream against the deteriorating 
economic conditions, police violations, corruption, and engineered succession of power to Gamal 
Mubarak. Both groups, Kifya and April 6
th
 organized a number of demonstrations asking people 
to overcome their fears and go to streets. April 6
th
 movement organized two major strikes in 
2008, and 2009. Members of those diversified pressure groups came from different ideological 
and political backgrounds.  
From March to May 2005, the MB organized a number of demonstrations against 
constitutional amendments
166
and emergence law. Later on, the movement gave up its critical 
discourse and demonstrations against the regime. There were different interpretations to this 
position; among those interpretations is a hidden agreement between the regime and the MB. 
According to this deal, MB would stop protesting, supporting other movements like Kifya, and 
in return MB’s prisioners would be released, and the government would introduce a number of 
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political reforms. Based on that, MB participated in the 2005 parliamentary election and was able 
for the first time in its history to assure 20% of parliamentary seats. It was clear that the MB’s 
leadership is ready to bargain and accept certain political compromises with the regime; even if 
this would be at the expenses of street political activism.
167
In addition, 2005 witnessed the 
establishment of the “Free/ Shadow Student Unions” in reaction to the fraud Students Unions’ 
elections in public universities.   
Furthermore, the public sphere witnessed the release of new mediums and channels, for 
expressing opinions, and circulating news, including independent newspapers like Al Masry al 
Youm in 2004, Al Dostur in 2005, and diverse private TV satellite channels. In parallel, there has 
been strong virtual activism through blogging activities, Facebook groups, You tube, and 
chatting rooms. These mediums provided spaces for sharing ideas, circulating news, and 
documenting state violations.
168
Facebook groups and You Tube have been used as tools of 
mobilization and documentation. The role of social media was undeniable during the January 25 
revolution.
169“We Are All  Khalid Said/ Kolana Khalid Said” Facebook group launched the first 
call for demonstrations on January 25. Young Brothers were active players in calling for 
demonstrations in collaboration with other political forces including April 6
th
, Kifya, National 
Association for Change, leftist Youth, young members of Al Ghad Party (The Tomorrow Party), 
and the Democratic Front Party, and The Christian Youth Front. Young politicized Brothers 
were in daily interactions with other political forces through their blogging activities, 
experiences with student unions, and involvement in many diverse pressure and protest groups. 
                                                          
167 Khalil A’nani, Al Ikhwan al Muslmin Shykhoka Tosar‟a al Zaman [The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt Against Time](Cairo: 
Al Shorouk International, 2007), 222-229.  
168 Marc Lynch, Ibid.  
169 Gamal Ghetas, and Khalid al A’mry, “Kaif San’a al Internet Thawrat 25 Yanair”[How did the Internet Make January 25 
Revolution], Logat al A’sr 123 (2011): 32.  
73 
 
Brothers’ coordination with other political forces was manifested during the revolution through 
the establishment of the Youth Revolution Coalition.
170
 
By the step down of Mubarak from power, new phase in the Egyptian history emerged. 
The Supreme Council of Armed Forces assumed power until the election of a new president. The 
post revolutionary scene witnessed the rising political power of Islamists, particularly MB and 
other Salafist Parties and groups. The FJP assured 47% of People Assembly seats and 60% in the 
second parliamentary body (The Shura Council).
171
The Al Wasat party assured only 10 seats. Al 
Tayar al Masry participated through independent candidates with other political parties, forming 
together “The Revolution Continues Coalition”. The Coalition achieved a victory of only nine 
seats, due to limited financial resources, shortage of man power, low profile for revolutionaries 
among Egyptian masses and defamation campaigns, and temporal suspension for electoral 
campaigns during Muhammed Mahmoud bloody confrontations.
172
  
The post revolutionary phase witnessed a number of bloody incidents between protestors, 
and the army and police forces. Bloody confrontations included Israeli embassy protest on 
September 12, 2011, Maspero on October 9, 2011, Mohammed Mahmoud Street on November 
2011, and February 2012, Al-Qasr El-Einy and the Cabinet on December 2011. Resent voices 
against military rule soared after these bloody events, virginity tests for 27 female protestors on 
March 2011, and the continuity of military trials for civilians until January 2012. The transitional 
phase pointed out a mix of political openness and repression. A fair parliamentary election was 
held, despite few violations regarding propaganda and electoral campaigns, and many forces 
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were able to establish their political parties including MB, and Salafists. Repression was 
indicated in attacks on peaceful protestors, military trials for civilians, slow approach for power 
transfer, defamation for certain political figures, media men, and political groups, intimidation  
of  human rights organizations.173 
The political scene has been characterized by the polarization between Islamists and other 
secular groups. This polarization expressed itself in the debate over the constitutional declaration 
on March 2011, current political calls for writing the constitution after the presidential election, 
and the political formation of the Constitutional Writing Committee. Most political forces resent 
current military rule with different degrees. The MB expressed conciliatory tone towards SCAF 
violations. The main strong Islamist protest was against the Supra Constitutional document 
planned by the prime minister deputy Al Selmy in February 2011. The document proposed 
special political and economic status for the military without being accountable to other state 
political bodies. Al Selmy’s document was an indicator for the bottom-line that Islamist would 
accept regarding the future status of the Army in the political game. However, MB and the FJP 
did not strongly criticize military trials, virginity tests, Maspero incident, and refused to 
participate in a number of protests since May 27, 2011.  
The dynamic political context since the late 1990s shaped the political consciousness of 
many young Brothers. Their political participation in the revolution and other political initiatives 
changed their perception towards the role of the MB, ideological make up and political stances. 
However, other young members’ consciousness was highly influenced by stagnate Salafist 
discourse in Egypt. They remained trapped in the cage of MB’s educational narrowed 
curriculums and socioreligious activities.  
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3.3 DESCRIPTION 
Muslim Brotherhood Bloggers 
Blogging activities were mostly dominated by liberal and leftist voices. In 2006, young 
Brothers joined the virtual space sparking new generational gap in MB’s history.  Brothers used 
this platform to reveal state’s human rights violations, and the military trials of the movement’s 
members. Later on, blogs turned into spaces for self-critique, and sharing ideas. The first MB 
blogging campaign addressed the trials of Al Azhar students who participated in martial act in 
2006. Young Brothers launched a website to support and spread information about their case 
called “Yala Talba” (Come On, Students). Later on, the website started to address students’ 
problems in general. This initiative encouraged other blogs to emerge like “Ensaa” (Forget), “I 
Am Ikhwan” (Ana Ikhwan) and “It Does Not matter” (Yalla Mesh Mohem). 
Brothers’ Blogging activities went through three stages: 1) Exploration; it was a response 
to the domination of blogging activities by leftist and liberals. It started with the blogs of “I am 
Ikhwan” by Abd al Mon’iem Mahmoud, “Whatever, It Does Not Matter” by Magdy S’aad. They 
addressed diverse issues about Egyptian politics, and MB’s internal dynamics, using Arabic 
language. This stage was salient in breaking stereotypes about Brothers as conservative cogs in 
the machine of Brotherhood. Brothers expressed an open religious and a postmodern culture. 
They shared their favorite movies, songs, and wrote freely about their personal life and dreams. 
2) Civil Resistance; it was mainly devoted to Brothers’ military trials in 2007. Among prominent 
blogs at this stage was “Forget” which provided news about military trials. Children of arrested 
Brothers’ leaders, Khairt al Shater, Anas Malek, and A’ssam al A’rian, launched their own blogs 
to support their fathers’ cause and spread news about their military trials. Brothers’ bloggers 
practiced online journalism, and were active in virtual forums, posting comments, and videos on 
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YouTube. 3) Self Criticism; it relied heavily on critical contributions by Mustafa al Naggar, 
Magdy S’ad, Mahmoud Abd al Mon’iem, Abd al Rahman Ayyash, Muhammed Hamza, and Abd 
al Rahman Rashwan on MB’s discourse and political positions.174Critical posts introduced a new 
culture to the MB’s community; many other members who preferred secrecy and developing 
internal channels of communication did not appreciate this new tradition.  
Bloggers’ critique addressed diverse issues. Mustafa al Naggar’s blog “Waves in a Sea of 
Change” criticized standards of promotion within the movement and how it relies on mentors’ 
approval rather than merit based standards. Al Naggar split from the MB in 2007. He was against 
arrangements between the movement and security apparatus before the 2005 parliamentary 
election. He pointed out that the promotion process is not established on personal qualities, 
experience, and skills; the movement does not adopt the democratic procedures of selection, and 
no one is allowed to run for a position through an electoral campaign or a well defined program. 
This is implicitly interpreted as seeking for personal gains. This culture is religiously justified by 
the prophet tradition: “By Allah, we do not appoint to this position one who asks for it nor 
anyone who is covetous for the same”. Based on that, no one nominates himself; all duty- paying 
members are candidates and voters at the same time. They write the name of the person they 
want to choose, and the one who gets the majority is elected even if he does not want to serve in 
this position. The major weakness of this system is that selection is never based on merit but 
rather on organizational discipline within the movement. Mentors of the educational section 
determine who are loyal to the movement and who are not, based on obedience to decisions. 
They can recommend someone who would gain the support of other members, whilst others are 
on the black list regardless of their qualifications. He criticized the idea of emotional detachment 
and Muslim vanguard that dominated MB’s educational discourse. For Al Naggar, MB’s 
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discourse is established on the idea of Ostaziat al A‟lam; they believe in their superiority to other 
paradigms and cultures. This prevents any kind of fruitful interaction with other ideologies and 
intellectual discourses. He concluded that the goal of dominating the world should change to 
coexistence and cooperation with other cultures.175 
Al Naggar’s blog documented all critical writings about the movement and published 
them on his blog. His insights addressed the dominance of emotional loyalty and culture of 
obedience. He refused mixing religious discourse with politics to achieve certain political gains 
at time of elections. He criticized nominating popular religious Sheikhs in the 2005 
parliamentary election with no prior political experience. He shed light on the exclusive nature of 
the decision making process, and how file and rank members are excluded from playing any 
active role.  
Abd al Rahman Mansour and Abd al Rahman Ayyash, two young MB’s active bloggers, 
also described the process of promotion as an outdated. Any MB’s member should get the 
approval of an elder member (mentor) to be nominated for a higher position. Nomination, here, 
is not established on merit but rather on loyalty to the leadership; rebellious members or those 
with different opinions most probably would be excluded.
176
   
The blog “Waves in the Sea of Change” published a brief research by Mos’ab Rageb 
about the 2010 Guidance Office elections. The study summarized legal violations and many 
shared critical ideas to the MB. I will use Rageb’s piece as a model to reflect many of those 
shared concerns.  
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Rageb’s brief paper documented MB leaders’ opinions about last elections and compared 
what exactly happened in elections with MB’s written bylaws. He summarized violations in the 
following: 1) rushing for elections before its actual time. Bylaws state that if the Supreme 
Guidance would leave office before the end of his period, the position will be handed over to his 
deputy until the actual time of election that was supposed to be in July 2010. Thus, there was no 
need to rush for election. This contradicts with insisting on respecting laws and regulations when 
there was a need to promote Al A’rian for the Guidance Office’s membership. A’ssam al A’rian 
asserted that any call to rush for election is considered as a violation to bylaws even if the Shura 
Council approved it, 2) According to article 9 there is no legal obligation to hold the Shura 
Council’s election directly before electing the Supreme Guidance. The Shura members are 
supposed to constitute the committee that is going to supervise election, so how in this case 
could they be potential candidates for the Office and supervisors for election simultaneously. 
Based on that, Rageb recommended establishing a separate committee with detailed structure 
and tasks, which would supervise elections and introduce opinions regarding submitted appeals. 
Those who are running for the Shura’s election should not take part in this committee, 3) there 
was no need for electing the whole Guidance Office. Ex-members were still in their positions 
and did not resign before the end of their period in July 2010, 4) Conducting a survey to know 
members’ opinions about legal issues is legally invalid; it opens the way for violating bylaws.  
Furthermore, Rageb concluded that the MB’s leadership is responsible for this preceding 
legal controversy. They did not publish bylaws to enlighten MB’s members until the end of the 
crisis. This resulted in a lot of confusion and did not allow members to develop a solid opinion 
about the issue. It was clear that there were efforts to exclude some members. The performance 
of Ikhwan Online clearly indicates how certain opinions within the movement are ignored. For 
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instance, Ikhwan Online did not publish Al A’rian’s popular article about the impact of security 
repression on the MB. The same happened with Abou al Fotouh’s published autobiography. 
Moreover, there are undocumented incidents about how the movement’s leadership excluded 
certain figures and limited their popularity among MB’s members. Examples for these incidents 
were unwritten orders to cancel Abou al Fotouh meetings with Brothers in Al Giza district. 
Inflammatory information about certain figures penetrated MB’s lower administrative levels. 
One of example of that information was about Al A’rian’s opinion regarding Camp David 
Accord, and how his opinion contradicts with the MB’s discourse. In addition, there was a notice 
that Muhammed Habib apologized for his opinion regarding the procedures of the last election, 
and this in fact did not happen.  
Rageb also criticized the MB’s approach of justifying all actions rather than admitting 
mistakes; which resulted in contradictory statements, and increased youth dissent. The MB’s 
perception towards media is unjust to the media landscape in Egypt. There is a shared negative 
stereotype among Brothers that perceives all media channels and figures as enemies of the 
movement. This pushed some members to isolation; they are detached from what is written about 
the movement and how the other perceives them. Some members do not even read what is 
published for their leaders in certain newspapers. They derive most of their information from 
Ikhwan On line that lacks professionalism and reflects a very biased image about the MB. Thus, 
it is not surprising that many members adopt a very naïve and narrow-minded perception to 
current reality of the MB. The MB’s educational section is in charge of the emergence of a 
parochial culture, and the lack of awareness among members. The section did not play its 
expected role in enriching the political consciousness of MB’s members; even religious 
knowledge was mainly derived from one or few shallow, easy-read educational books. The 
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Quran and prophet’s traditions have been superficially employed to justify actions of leadership 
against members who share different point of view. Many members who lack the interest in 
understanding the movement’s internal dynamics, and complexity of surrounding political and 
socioeconomic context supported the dominance of this sort of oversimplified discourse.  
The lack of openness and awareness about diverse opinions from outside the MB 
enhances the presence of blind trust and absolute obedience to leadership. Obedience to leaders 
is justified by the analogy of the father and son relationship. However, this kind of paternalism is 
not germane to social movements where members share equally all rights and obligations. 
Adding to that, trust and obedience should not be instrumentally used to neglect accountability 
and transparency. Trust and obedience are the tenth and ninth pillars of allegiance in the MB; 
however, the leadership should fulfill the other eight requirements to be obeyed by 
members.
177
Public critique should not be perceived as a threat; rather it is the base of corrective 
measures, and one of the ways of assuring sustainability. Rageb concluded that MB should 
overlook the discourse of tribulation, and always being the victim for the regime and its media 
channels. The educational section should design new curriculums that cherish diversity, and 
appreciate a new reading of the Egyptian social and political reality.
178
  
Magdy S’aad’s blog, It Does Not Matter, addressed three main issues: 1) the human side 
of MB that managed to break stereotypes about Brothers as superman, or aliens, 2) MB’s internal 
dynamics, activities, and membership, 3) self-critique including the cultural of obedience, the 
inappropriateness of “Islam is the solution” slogan, and the women minor role in the decision 
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making process”179. S’aad also criticized leaders for not supporting students against security 
repressions and harassment in Ain Shams and the Azhar University. Though S’aad is one of the 
known critical bloggers, he described some MB’s activists and bloggers as being arrogant and 
unable to communicate with other rank and file members who do not have the same level of 
political consciousness.
180
  
The leadership’s stance on the blogging phenomenon differed over time. At the 
beginning, the leadership underestimated the impact of these virtual activities on the movement’s 
solidarity and public image. By mid 2007, bloggers activities gained a momentum and media 
attention, and the leadership recognized their significance on the MB’s internal coherence. 
Muhammed Morsy, the Head of the Political Department in MB at the time, managed meetings 
with bloggers to discuss their critique. It was apparent that, the MB’s leadership became more 
cautious about its decisions and their influence on the movement’s young members.181Reformist 
MB’s leaders at that time believed that the movement should benefit from young members’ 
activism.
182Al Z’farany wrote on his blog that this trend should be encouraged. Abou al Fotouh 
also asserted that young Brothers should play an influential role in the decision-making process, 
and be presented in the movement’s bureaus. In addition, Mahdi Akef and A’sam al A’rian 
supported opening channels of dialogue with young bloggers. Al A’rian said that “they have the 
right to speak out even if they are going to challenge leaders. However, he continued saying “At 
the end, if they will stay with the group then they will have to accept what the majority 
wants!”183   
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January 25 Revolution and Brothers’ Political Performance 
The January 25 revolution broke the psychological barrier of fear, and secrecy. The MB 
witnessed a number of resignations and dismissals among its young members and bloggers 
whose dissatisfaction with the movement’s political performance continues to soar. Most 
politicized young Brothers participated in the first day of the revolution. The leadership did not 
refuse the participation of its members but its stance was not to be officially present. When the 
government accused the movement of political instability, the Guidance Office declared the 
participation of the movement on Friday January 28. The Brothers’ participation was a key 
element in giving momentum to the revolution and pressuring Mubarak to step down.  
According to Muhammed al Kassas, “MB’s youth were present on the first day of the 
revolution. We continued coordination with other political forces and developed what has been 
known as “The Youth Revolution Coalition”. We informed the Guidance Office about these 
updates. The Office did not mind because the leadership did not have enough information about 
what was going on. They asked us to take all required measures in this regard. The leadership 
was not yet convinced it was going to be a revolution and true change would happen. Members 
of the Coalition informed the Office of all events during the first 18 days of the revolution, and 
MB like other political forces participated. The coalition’s relationship with MB continued this 
way until February 11. Later on, there was a debate over preserving the status and presence of 
MB youth in the Coalition. After ongoing dialogues and debates with the Guidance Office, we 
agreed to be present in the Coalition even if the movement would not officially support its 
decisions. On April 1, the movement did not participate in one of the demonstrations, though 
they did not notify us or declare this stance. We agreed that even if the MB would not 
participate; they should not declare that. The dispute emerged over Friday May 27 protest. We 
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called for “Anti Corruption” demonstrations on May 27. There was a parallel call under the 
slogan of “The Constitution First”. The Coalition held a conference and we declared that we 
were not for the second call, and we thought this was an irrational demand. Despite our stance 
from the second call, we were attacked by the movement’s leadership that described the protest 
as an attempt to drive a wedge between the military and people. Then we were shocked, when 
the Secretary General of MB declared, on Saturday May 28, “we do not have any representatives 
in the Youth Revolution Coalition”184.  
Disappointment with the movement’s political performance became acute after the 
establishment of the FJP. The Shura Council, rather than party’s founders, chose board members 
and leaders of the FJP. Ahmed Abou Zekry, one of the participants in Brothers’ youth 
conference, said, “This is not the way civilized parties are established”. Muhammed Akel added, 
“I was shocked to know this announcement; this implies that MB’s leaders do not see the 
founding members as qualified enough”185. This was an indicator of maintaining an organic 
relationship between the movement and the FJP. Al A’rian justified this action by the fact that 
the party did not have enough time to make election; they were rushed to prepare for 
parliamentary electoral campaigns. He added that founder members of Al Wasat and the 
Democratic Front appointed themselves as the new leaders without elections; this election is 
temporal and FJP members can ask for another election later on.
186
In fact, this election did not 
take place till now. 
After the establishment of the FJP, another debate emerged over the slogan to use in 
parliamentary election. The Supreme Electoral Committee considered the slogan, “Islam is the 
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Solution” (Islam Hwa al Hal), as an unconstitutional one. The FJP refrained from using the 
slogan in its electoral campaigns, and replaced it with “We Have the Good for Egypt”. Young 
Brothers criticized the “Islam Hwa al Hal” slogan during the 2005 parliamentary election. 
Magdy S’aad was an advocate for developing another slogan. He suggested using the slogan of 
“Egypt for Egyptians”. For, Muahmmed al Kassas, “the slogan was appropriate during 1980s 
where Brothers needed to emphasize their ideological background. I was against perceiving this 
slogan as a sacred one; the movement easily changed it after the revolution. Hence, there was no 
need to appear so attached to it. In 2005, the student section in the movement innovated the 
slogan of “We Have the Good for Egypt”, and it has been used by some parliamentary 
candidates under the campaign of “Reformers””187. The rationale behind that was to build a 
wider coalition among other forces, and not be imprisoned in the cage of using religious slogans. 
On January 14, 2012, the Shura Council delegated the Guidance Office to coordinate 
with the FJP over managing the transitional period in Egypt.
188
Young members perceived such 
an action with cynicism, because FJP founders and leaders were already influential members in 
MB’s Shura Council. The movement’s Guidance Office members and party leaders kept 
announcing that there is a financial and administrative separation between the MB and the FJP, 
but direct observation to elections’ banners and campaigns proved how the FJP is using the 
movement’s resources, banners to publicize for itself. This reflects the inability of the movement 
to set clear lines between the movement’s socioreligious activities, financial resources, and its 
political party.  
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Another debatable issue is the MB’s lenient stance on the SCAF (Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces) human rights violations and slow approach of running the interim period. 
Muhammed Morsy declared the FJP’s respect of the time line issued by the SCAF for power 
transfer. The FJP and MB did not support political demands that asked the SCAF to leave power 
on April 2012, and write the constitution after the military withdrawal from the political 
scene.
189
In one of its statements, MB affirmed that the withdrawal of the SCAF would result in a 
vacuum of power and accused other political groups of pushing for chaos. The Supreme 
Guidance Office did not take strong actions against violent attacks on civilian Copts in Maspiro 
on November 9, 2011. There were also no critical voices from Brothers against virginity tests, 
and military trials for civilians. The strong criticism of the SCAF was when the Prime Minister 
Deputy, Ali al Selmy, introduced a Supra Constitutional document. They organized a protest 
against the document on Friday, November 11, 2011. The Guidance Office also refused to 
participate in demonstrations after Muhammed Mahmoud violent confrontations with the army 
and police forces. The leadership perceived these violent escalations as a conspiracy to hinder 
parliamentary election.
190
The Brothers refused to suspend their electoral campaigns in reaction to 
the killing of a number of civilians during these confrontations.
191
 
Young Brothers dissented from many of MB’s leaders and FJP members’ statements 
about the Supreme Armed Forces Council (SCAF), and the role of the military in the revolution. 
Mahmoud Ghozlan, a member in the Guidance Office and the MB’s spokesman, accepted giving 
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immunity to SCAF members. Ghozlan said that immunity would be through the consent of 
martyrs’ families after rewarding them.192Sobhy Saleh, the FJP parliamentary member, stated 
that the role of the military should be honored in the first anniversary of the revolution. He 
described that as an obligation in return for the military efforts and respect to the transitional 
constitutional declaration.
193The FJP and MB supported Al Ganzoury’s 
government.
194Muhammed Badi’e, the Supreme Deputy, described Ganzoury’s government as a 
good choice. He also added that the issue is not about Ganzoury or the name of the Prime 
Minister but rather the delegated authorities he enjoys.
195
Muhammed Morsy, the head of the FJP, 
said that the party had no problem with Al Ganzoury’s government and they were ready to 
cooperate with it.
196
The MB’s and the FJP’s support to Ganzoury’s government waned after the 
tragic massacre in Port Said that resulted in the death of over 70 football fans on February 2, 
2012. Khairt al Shater, the Supreme Guidance Deputy, declared the readiness of the FJP to form 
a coalition government with other political parties.
197
  
The Guidance Office refused to participate in the November 25, 2011 protest after 
Muhammed Mahmoud confrontations. Ikhwan Online, the official website of the movement, 
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called for another protest to support the Palestinian cause. Yussf al Karadawy who was supposed 
to participate in the Protest of Palestine refused to participate in it and renounced the MB’s 
stance on November demonstrations. The same scenario was repeated with the violent 
confrontations between protestors and the army outside the Cabinet, and again the MB refused to 
participate in any demonstrations against the SCAF.  There has also been criticism over the FJP 
political lists in elections. The FJP’s list for the Shura Council in Al Gharbia governorates had 
one of the ex National Democratic Party members.
198
  
There has been a strong criticism of MB website’s content and media coverage especially 
after the release of the FJP newspaper. Young Brothers expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the Ikhwan On line website. Some described the website as unprofessional, and 
biased. Magdy S’aad, and Arwa al Tawel criticized an article published on the website which 
described those who are calling for demonstrations as enemies seeking to prevent Islamists from 
being in power. The article accused the “Change Academy” and April 6th movement as tools for 
imperialism.199In reaction to the performance of Ikhwan On line, a group of young Brothers 
launched an initiative called “Ikhwan Off Line” as a media alternative to the MB’s website. The 
initiative criticized the website media coverage for demonstrations that did not witness Brothers’ 
participation.200Some young members criticized this initiative; they perceived it as a threat to 
internal solidarity and the public image of the movement. They advised founders of the initiative 
to send their critique to higher administrative levels to be considered. Founders actually 
expressed their dissatisfaction with Islam On line’s performance, and demanded changing its 
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editorial team, but all their demands were in vain.201Abd el Galil al Sharnoby, the Ex-chief 
Editor of the website, resigned on May 2011 as result of critique on the website’s coverage of 
Friday’s demonstrations. Al Sharbanoy described the website’s coverage by being the MB’s 
perspective rather than reality.  
Youth dissent with the movement’s stances was not only because of such macro issues, 
but the movement did not support some of its young members when they were accused of 
attacking the Israeli embassy in Egypt on October 2011. Ahmed Mahmoud Abd al Karim’s 
family, one of the movement’s members, asked the MB’s administrative office in Assiut to 
interfere and support his son. The movement refused to interfere because this would put it in 
confrontation with the SCAF.
202
The MB also did not support any of its previously affiliated 
members at the time of parliamentary elections. For instance, MB supported a Salafist candidate 
against Mustafa al Naggar in Nasr City district.
203
  
Young Brothers’ Conferences 
The gap between the inspirations of youth and leaders’ ideology was apparent in the first 
conference for young Brothers. The idea of the conference was firstly initiated by Muhammed 
Maher A’kl, Muhammed Nour el dein, and Muhammed Shams. For Shams, “the movement is 
suffering from organizational and ideological problems. The revolution marked the start of a new 
phase in the movement’s history. Thus, there was a need to consider all these problems and 
develop new proposals for reform. We found that many young members were dissatisfied with 
the movement’s discourse and performance; they had many ideas in mind and were ready to 
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pressure for that.
204
For instance, a group of young Brothers wanted to demonstrate in front of the 
Guidance Office. We thought a conference or a public platform would be a good channel to 
absorb and introduce some of those ideas. We had meetings with Mohy Hamid, Mahmoud Abou 
Zaid, and Al Katatny; also, Abd el Rahman al Bar and Muhammed Morsy attended these 
meetings from time to time. We suggested establishing a special committee for MB’s youth 
within the existing structure, which would have separate activities. This proposal was refused; 
nevertheless, we introduced examples for this proposal from the MB’s experience in other 
countries including Morocco, Malaysia, and United Kingdom. At the end of our meetings, they 
accepted the idea of a public conference. Our objective from the conference was not to complain 
against the movement, but rather to provide proposals for reform, and create a space or a 
platform for sharing ideas. It was supposed to be similar to hearing or feedback sessions. We also 
planned to have other events following the conference to discuss the movement’s ideology, 
broad goals, and MB’s intellectual heritage. Unfortunately, this did not happen. We started the 
conference’s preparations, and we held two workshops before it. One hundred and sixty 
members of the MB’s members attended them. The Guidance Office asked us to cooperate with 
MB’s members in the Coalition of Youth Revolution: Islam Lotfy, Muhammed al Kassas, and 
Ahmed Abdelgawad. The conference was designed around a political and administrative pillar. 
The political part discussed the movement’s political role and its relationship with post 
revolutionary party politics in Egypt. The second part focused on the internal structure and 
organization of the movement. We decided to hold the conference before establishing the FJP in 
order to discuss the pros and cons of establishing a political party. After preparing papers, the 
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Guidance Office refused to sponsor the conference; they were shocked by the content of some 
papers. Some papers had ideas about disintegrating the movement, and not establishing a 
political party. The Guidance Office asked us to cancel the conference, but we thought it was too 
late to take such a decision. Our initial plan for the conference was to make it public and invite 
some intellectuals, and other MB’s figures who were not on good terms with the current 
leadership. We wanted the conference to be an attempt for conciliation between the movement 
members, as what Al Talmasany did with dismissed members, mainly Al Ghazaly and Sayid 
Sabik, when he became the Supreme Guide. This did not happen as most intellectuals apologized 
for not attending and thought it would be better to stay away from ongoing disputes between 
MB’s members, so we had to apologize for not having Muahmmed Habib and Abou al Fotouh. 
This was in order not to let anyone think that the conference represents any front within the 
movement; it was just an exclusive platform for MB’s youth. The absence of the MB 
leadership’s support to the conference negatively affected its popularity, and undermined the 
possibility of running similar activities by MB’s youth. However, Helmy al Gazar, the MB 
leader in 6
th
 of October district, called for another Youth Conference”205.  
  The first Youth Conference issued twelve recommendations, among them: 1) 
reconsidering the movement’s decision about dismissing its members who joined other parties, 
and giving members the freedom to choose among different parties, 2) establishing a legal status 
for the movement, 3) founders of the MB’s  party should not be members in the Guidance 
Office, and one of them should be less than 35 years old, 3) assuring a separation between any 
established political party and the MB’s socioreligious activities, 4) opening direct dialogues 
among members of the movements at different levels in all governorates through seminars and 
public meetings, 5) establishing a special section for youth which would play a role in raising 
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youth awareness, and sponsoring conferences and debates, 6) establishing a committee for 
evaluation in each governorate to follow up measures of MB’s reform. The Conference also 
asked the movement to delay the procedures of establishing a political party, and open channels 
of dialogue over this issue.   
The conference sent a message that the legacy of secrecy is over and all issues should be 
open to discussion. Participants criticized the culture of secrecy, and called for transparency in 
the movement’s financial records and administrative dynamics. They also called for youth and 
Sisters’ participation in all administrative levels including the Guidance Bureau. There has been 
a call to revisit all educational curriculums within the movement; as there is a gap between the 
movement’s moral claims, educational curriculums, and its political actions. Members are told 
that refraining from the discourse of establishing an Islamic state and seeking the Muslim 
Caliphate is just a political maneuver, and not the true beliefs of the movement!   
Internal dynamics and structure of the movement were at the heart of the conference’s 
debates. Muhammed Nour introduced a preliminary idea about changing the structure of the 
movement in resemblance to holding companies. In this way, MB would turn into a network of 
pressure groups. The MB’s organizational structure would consist of different sections or 
branches with separate agendas. An administrative board would be in charge of coordination 
among these activities. For example, there would be a separate body for syndicates, another one 
for youth; each of them would act as a pressure group in their field of interest. This new 
hierarchy would assure a bottom-up approach in the decision-making process, and avoid the 
centralized current administrative system within the movement.
206
There were other 
recommendations to adopt a matrix and networking styles of management.   
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Furthermore, there was a criticism on the criteria of promotion within the movement, 
separation of power, and composition of the Shura Council. Participants asked for the 
presentation of the heads of administrative sections in the council, and guaranteeing transparency 
for all decisions.
207
  
The MB’s youth conference gained public attention, and the refusal of the Guidance 
Office to sponsor it put them in an embarrassing situation. It was interpreted by many as an 
internal schism, and the inability of the MB’s leadership to absorb young members’ critique and 
inspirations. In reaction to that, the MB’s administrative Office in 6th of October district called 
for another conference for MB’s youth in April 2011. The Guidance Office sponsored this 
conference and it was an attempt to overcome embarrassment that was associated with the first 
one. There was an intension to accuse the first conference’s organizers by violating their 
arrangements with the Guidance Office and that is why it refused to sponsor their initiative. This 
actually did not happen because most of those who organized the conference were from the first 
party organizers’ group. The conference emphasized the same recommendation as the first 
conference. Muhammed Morsy, the President of FJP and Ex- member in the Guidance Office, 
collected the names of participants to prepare a list of young rebellious members. The conference 
addressed the decision making process, the MB hierarchy, the culture of secrecy and the lack of 
transparency.
208
Some participants also called for a differentiation for the types of decisions 
within the movement. Meaning that, there are critical decisions that all MB’s members should 
participate in through referendums or surveys; other technical decisions can be directed by lower 
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administrative levels to give them more autonomy and freedom of action. The conference asked 
for female representation in all administrative levels.
209
 
Culture of Obedience and Self-Critique 
According to Magdy S’aad, “the MB benefited from the political openness after the 
revolution, nevertheless the leadership perceived it as a threat to its internal coherence and 
solidarity. The revolution resulted in a high level of self-critique, and threatened the culture of 
obedience, soldiery, and trust. For example, the leadership considered electing anyone who is not 
from its members as treason. MB’s members in the Youth Revolution Coalition were dismissed 
on May 2011. It is ironic that, some members were dismissed for clicking “like” on one of the 
Facebook groups initiating a protest which the movement did not participate in. This kind of 
authoritarianism is one of the obstacles that are facing the movement. The MB’s indoctrination 
process relies heavily on oral rote learning; there are not enough spaces for creativity. The 
movement acts the only truthful source of knowledge; and its opinions and stances are standards 
for evaluating others.
210
  
The culture of obedience is one of the critical issues that became so evident after the 
revolution. According to one of the members, “I was blamed by my mentor and by other 
members for criticizing some of the movement’s decisions. There was a follow up to my 
opinions on Facebook. I was afraid to tell my mentor and other MB’s members that I did not 
vote for the MB’s parliamentary candidate, in order not to accuse me of treason. There is a blind 
trust in the Guidance Office decisions, and many mentors keep justifying all decisions even if 
they are not totally convinced by that. Before the revolution, there was a possibility for any MB’s 
                                                          
209 A video on comments of conference participants: Moutamer Shabab al Ikhwan al Awal ba al Sades men October [The First 
Muslim Brotherhood Youth Conference in the Sixth of October District], Al Shorouk, April 2012, 
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member to join other political platforms, movements, or campaigns. I was a member in the 
National Association for Change, and I participated in some meetings and demonstrations 
organized by Kefya. After the revolution, there were strict orders not to join other parties or 
political initiatives that are not supported by the MB. If you kept criticizing the movement’s 
decisions, and did not abide by them, usually you would end up on the black list of your mentor. 
I think this is my status right now, as they do not delegate more tasks to me”211.  
The written resignation of Muhammed Saiid, who joined the movement in 1986 and 
became one of the middle calibers, pointed out how he was asked to give up some of his 
opinions on Facebook. The MB conducted an investigation with him over a year and he was 
proved innocent, though the result of the investigation was not declared and they asked him to 
give up some of his critical ideas in return for that.
212
  
Muhammed al Kassas and Magdy S’aad asserted that the movement employs the 
tribulation or the battle discourse to justify secrecy and obedience. The fear from an external 
enemy or a conspiracy that would disintegrate the movement has been always present in the 
justification of certain decisions. Before the revolution, the state and its media channels were 
blamed for everything. After the revolution, the movement is creating other illusive enemies for 
its solidarity. Those enemies are liberal and left trends, certain intellectuals and media figures.  
There were orders for rank and file members not to follow articles by some writers like Belal 
Fadl, and A’la al Aswany, and other intellectuals like Diaa Rashwan, and A’mar Ali Hassan. The 
FJP newspaper launched a campaign against “The Revolutionary Socialist Group” and accused 
                                                          
211 An interview with MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 13, 2012.  
212 Mohamed Saiid, “Astkalty al Mosabab men al Ikhwna al Muslmin”[Reasons of My Resignation from the Muslim 
Brotherhood], Facebook.com, March 9, 2012, http://www.facebook.com/notes/mohamed-
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them of calling for chaos on the first anniversary of the revolution.
213
Abd al Rhaman Ayyash 
concluded that dogmatic movements seek to create enemies to maintain their solidarity; current 
enemies for MB are dismissed, resigned members, and media channels. The fear from the impact 
of liberal and left ideas on MB’s youth is also confirmed by one of the female members who is in 
charge of the education section; she asserted that youth are inclined to adopt radical and 
revolutionary ideas that are spread under the influence of media, and this is negatively affecting 
the relationship of trust between them and the leadership.
214
  
The culture of obedience and trust in leaders’ political decisions is promoted by the lack 
of political awareness among many file and rank members. The movement recognized this 
problem after the 2005 parliamentary election; hence, the Political Awareness Committee was 
established in the same year; however, the work of the committee was not to enlighten members 
about MB’s internal dynamics, and history. The main task of the committee is to inform them 
about political issues, and the required tools to understand media implicit political messages. In 
2006, Fathy Shehab and A’ssam al A’rian published a book about political education entitled 
“Papers in Political Education”. The book included basic political concepts like political 
participation, political consciousness, civil society, and types of political regimes. Generally, the 
book provides a shallow overview of these concepts, and it ambiguously highlights the political 
project of MB. It is mainly divided into four parts. The first part is about Islamic rule; it employs 
Qutb’s concepts about “Al Hakimyya”, and Shari’a application, without any practical detailed 
description for tools of implementation. The second part emphasizes the necessity of unity 
among Arab and Muslim countries. The third part addresses women’s rights. It concludes that 
                                                          
213 An interview with Muhammed al Kassas by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2012. An interview with Magdy S’aad by 
the author, Cairo, Egypt, January 18, 2012. MB’s Facebook groups of “ Nabd Ikhwan”, and “ Anta A’yal Ikhwangy” published 
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women enjoy equal political and socioeconomic rights, except that they cannot assume 
presidency. The last part of the book provides a holistic reading about universal human rights, 
and equality among citizens to law. It also asserts that Christians cannot assume presidency, run 
armies, judge among Muslims regarding personal issues, and occupy any positions that are 
related to mobilizing public opinion. The book does not only provide a vague and brief vision to 
the political reform project of the MB; but Salafist conceptions and ideas are infused in its 
content. The book does not adopt many open intellectual ideas about pluralism, and minority 
rights; its emphasis on shari’a lacks practical programs.215  
According to one of the female members in the MB and FJP as well, “there is trust in the 
Guidance Office decisions because decisions are taken in a democratic way. They are not just 
orders from a certain leader, but rather decisions are the outcome of a democratic process. There 
are ways to channel opinions to the leadership of the movement. You can write a memo not only 
to your direct mentor but also for the Supreme Guide. Along my experience in MB, I did not face 
any problems in expressing my opinion and influencing some decisions. However, this was at the 
lower and middle administrative levels; I do believe it is hard for file and rank members to 
challenge or influence MB’s public crucial decisions, such as establishing a political party, or 
supporting a certain political stance. There are no clear channels for internal lobbying. This is 
one of the obstacles that should be addressed in the coming stage. There should be certain events 
or channels for members to express their critique and see how certain new ideas are shared by 
other members”216.  
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For one of the influential members within the MB who is currently working on the 
Renaissance project
217, “MB is one of the most democratic movements. I attended one of the 
Guidance Office meetings and there were equal chances for all members to express their own 
opinions. I witnessed heated debates among members; and there is rarely a consensus. At the 
end, the decision is the result of a majority vote. This is a true pragmatic democracy where there 
is no influential school of thought. It all depends on who has the vote. Members of MB should 
play a role in decision making through internal lobbying, but change is not easy; it would take 
time. Therefore, I was against holding the MB youth conference without the consent of the 
Guidance Office. Critique to the movement’s structure and performance should be through 
available channels and internal lobbying”218.   
He also asserted that it is true the promotion process is associated with age. The 
generational gap within the MB is obvious because most upper positions are occupied by elder 
members. After the revolution, there have been sure steps to present youth in high administrative 
levels through direct appointments. The Renaissance Project is mainly run by members who are 
less than 40.
219Magdy S’aad emphasized that age and seniority are a main criteria for promotion; 
but promotion also depends on how rebellious you are. Many members are excluded because of 
adopting different visions to social or political reality.
220
This shared attitude is implicitly stated 
in the answers of one of female middle age member who is responsible for activities of the 
educational section. Her focus was mainly on the solidarity and organizational coherence of the 
movement, even if this would not satisfy some members. She elaborated that giving internal 
                                                          
217 The Renaissance project is a holistic project of Egypt’s reform. Khairt al Shater, the Supreme’s Guide Deputy, is supervising 
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solidarity a priority encourages members to overcome many internal problems and 
dissatisfaction with the promotion process within the movement’s hierarchy. Members would be 
ready to give up some of their convictions and accept the majority vote with the 
movement.
221
For her, “the MB does not adopt democracy but rather shura; meaning that not all 
members have the right to vote and be involved in the decision making process but rather few 
selective qualified members who form together the Shura Council are in charge of that. Any 
member of MB is not supposed to ask for changing this principle or express his dissatisfaction 
with it, as long as he voluntarily accepted to be part of the movement. I do believe democracy 
would produce good and beneficial decisions; however, it has negative impact on the coherence 
and solidarity of the movement. It may pave the way for disintegrating the movement. However, 
it should be noted that, applying shura principle did not prevent MB’s leadership from 
conducting frequent surveys to absorb opinions of file and rank members regarding crucial issues 
like electoral programs. The electoral program of the Shura Council (second parliamentary body) 
was modified based on the results of one of those surveys”222.   
The democratic nature of the movement is contested by other members. The movement 
has a pyramid centralized hierarchy. Elections were carried only over high and middle 
administrative levels. After Parliamentary elections in 2005, all administrative levels were 
elected due to media pressures. Decisions of the Shura Council and the Guidance Office are 
obligatory for all lower levels.
223
The democratic nature of MB is not related to organizational 
design, or internal elections only but rather to the ability of members to introduce different 
                                                          
221 For instance, her opinion regarding nominating women for presidency contradicts with MB’s position on this issue, even 
though, she stated that I am ready to give up my opinion to avoid intellectual schism in the movement. she also added, MB’s 
intellectual position is the result of a majority vote and it reflects the opinion of one of the religious schools in Islam. Thus, it is 
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222 An interview with MB’s female member via email by the author, Cairo, Egypt, sent in February 28, 2012.  
223 Khalil al A’nani, “ Al Ikhwan al Muslmin fe Masr: Shaykoka Tosare’a al Zaman [The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt Against 
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opinions and rebel against the leadership’s decisions. It is also related to the nature of promotion 
criteria and standards.
224
 
 
Figure 2. The Muslim Brotherhood Hierarchy. 
For Muhammed Shams, “This hierarchical system is so centralized; most crucial 
decisions are taken by high administrative levels which are not elected by the majority of 
members. This kills creativity, and blocks channels of benefiting from members’ suggestions and 
ideas. If you have a creative proposal, it will die on its way to upper levels. The Shura Council 
did not have a joint meeting since 1995, and the Guidance Office practiced all authorities without 
being accountable to other bodies till 2008. The result of election and promotion to certain 
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100 
 
administrative levels are manipulated through supporting some members, making them more 
popular, and present in public conferences, whilst excluding others, or spreading wrong 
information about their performance and stances. Manipulating elections’ result was clear in the 
last two elections of the Guidance Office. In 2006, Al A’rian lost and got only 40% of votes, in 
the coming election he got 96% because there was a consensus to overcome the controversy that 
rose about nominating him. Muhammed Habib did not get the membership of the Shura Council 
in the last election, though he spent 24 years in the Guidance Office!”225 
According to a written a resignation of one of the MB’s members, published on his 
Facebook account, “I do not play a role in the decision making process. They justify that by 
indirect democracy, meaning I choose the member who would choose those who take decisions. 
Actually, I did not choose my mentor, and my mentor did not choose his head”226. 
For Abd al Rahman Ayyash, “the exclusive nature of the decision making process and the 
lack of bottom-up participatory tools pushed some young members to leave the MB, and join 
other political organizations after the revolution. In many cases, those young members did not 
have different ideas than their leaders; they just moved to other spaces that would absorb their 
personal qualities and skills”227. Others left the movement because they either have conservative 
religious ideas, or open liberal religious beliefs. Some also withdrew due to disagreement over 
certain political positions. Resignations and dismissals do not always reflect a different 
intellectual school of thought or a unique reform project, but rather different political and 
religious preferences.
228
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Muslim Brotherhood and Post Revolutionary Party Politics 
There has been a debate among Brothers over the legal framework of the movement and 
its connotation with party politics in Egypt. The young Brothers’ conference discussed different 
legal settings that the movement may adopt regarding party politics. Muhammed Shams 
presented four scenarios about this issue.  
The first scenario is to focus on missionary activities and support different political 
parties according to the moral claims and vision of the movement. The MB in this case would 
allow its members to join other parties according to their ideological preferences, and it would 
act like a pressure group. This would be in resemblance to the relationship between the Fethullah 
Gulen Movement and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. This scenario would assure 
full autonomy for the party in designing its political agenda, and would allow the movement to 
direct all its resources and capacity to missionary activities and societal reform.  
The second scenario is to have a political party as the political wing of the movement 
without financial and administrative dividing lines. This scenario would fail in achieving a 
division of labor between the party and the movement. This is actually the scenario that is 
currently adopted by MB.  
The third scenario is to support a political party that enjoys financial and administrative 
autonomy. This is similar to the relationship between the MB in Morocco and the Justice and 
Development Party. In this case, the movement would be responsible for the party’s actions, but 
not for its resources and other activities. The party is simply the political institutional 
manifestation of the movement’s beliefs. In this case, there is a high possibility to witness a 
schism between the party and the MB due to disagreements over certain political issues.  
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The fourth scenario is to turn the whole movement into a political party. This scenario 
was firstly proposed by Mamoun Al Hudaiby in the 1990s. In this case, the movement’s 
socioreligious  activities would be part of its political agenda and propaganda.  
 The last scenario is to disintegrate the movement and not to establish a political party; as 
what happened in Qatar. According to this scenario, the vision of the movement would penetrate 
different NGOs, syndicates and other institutions individually through affiliated members who 
believe in the reform project of the MB.
229
  
For Shams who introduced these scenarios, “I personally was against the second scenario. 
Establishing a political party for the movement would create a duality between MB’s moral 
claims and political actions. The Arab Israel conflict is a clear example of that; according to the 
MB’s ideology, Israel is not a legitimate state and we should support resistance by all means. 
This is different from the political stances of a political party that would accept a peace treaty 
with Israel. The movement’s discourse also expresses a strong belief in the role of the Islamic 
economy, though there is not an applicable project for that. The movement would develop this 
project along time. Therefore, there is no need to support a certain economic program for a 
political party; the movement can work with scholars on this vision, rather than being attached to 
special economic vision that contradicts with its original beliefs. I am wondering, how the 
movement would support and justify something that contradicts with its ideology and 
educational curriculums?  
There are also practical problems associated with establishing a political party. Among 
those problems is the problem of funding. Most members financially support the movement 
because of its reform project rather than the political agenda of its party. So, how would the 
                                                          
229 Muhammed Shams, “ Al Mashro’a al Syasy wa al Ada al Hazbia”[The Muslim Brotherhood’s Political Project and Party 
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movement be able to draw a line between financial resources for the party and the movement? 
The financial separation between the movement and the party’s resources is not clear till now, 
given the lack of transparency, and the absence of a legal framework for MB’s activities and 
financial records.  Furthermore, establishing a political party for the movement does not provide 
any objective ways to evaluate the popularity of the party. There were unwritten orders for 
members to join the party, even if they will not be active members. This reminds me of the fake 
popularity of the NDP; millions had membership, but it was a decorative one. The party in this 
way would not be able to rely on its internal resources and capacity. It will always rely on the 
power of the MB. This was clear when most calibers were from the MB. The FJP’s Board 
members were chosen from the Shura Council. Even the FJP’s hierarchy is similar to the MB’s 
104 
 
internal structure. It has a pyramid hierarchy.
 
Figure 3. The Freedom and Justice Party Hierarchy. 
Besides this hierarchy, the party has a Council of Elders whose members do not have any 
administrative tasks, and are elected by the High Board for four years. It also has a technical sub 
hierarchy in resemblance to MB. The technical hierarchy includes special sections for women, 
youth, and education.
230
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The MB is currently providing social services to serve the party political goals. Most 
efforts and resources are directed to political debates and problems rather than ethical and 
religious preaching.
231
In the long term, the movement’s organizational structure would not bear 
all these activities. It is acting as a political party, pressure group, social, and spiritual 
organization, all together, and compensating the deteriorating role of the state.  This active social 
and political role is problematic, given the fact that Brothers lack the culture of cooperating with 
other partners. A deep involvement in political activities would result in a moral vacuum or a 
moral bankruptcy. Based on this reading, I do believe the MB is heading towards the last 
scenario of turning into a political party. The leadership of the movement is actually recognizing 
this issue; however, they are not seeking for change. The organizational trend is dominating the 
movement’s leadership, and they do not have any problem with that. They focus only on internal 
solidarity and organizational expansion. The other possible scenario is to witness a schism 
between the FJP and the movement. There is a possibility that some FJP figures would lead a 
coup against the hegemony of MB’s leadership over the party’s agenda”232.   
Another proposal regarding MB’s political party was introduced by Muhammed Osman 
who was one of the previously affiliated members and current coordinator for Abou al Fotouh’s 
presidential campaign. Osman did not reject the idea of establishing a political party. He 
suggested that 30% of the party’s founders should not be from the MB. There should a special 
                                                          
231
 According to one young female members, “There were orders for us to join the FJP even if we are not going to be active 
members. There was an emphasis on increasing the number of  FJP’s members to be two millions. Since March 2011, most 
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quota for women’s representation in the founding committee.233Copts’ representation should not 
be less than 10%, and youth to be presented by over 30%.  
According to another MB’s member, “the movement should give its members the 
freedom to join other political parties. Restrictions on members’ free choices negatively affected 
the popularity of other political parties like Al Wasat or Al Nahda. Supporting political pluralism 
would enrich the political scene after the revolution, and we would have the chance to truly 
evaluate the performance of each party and its popularity. The leadership’s justification was how 
could we work at the social and socioreligious level with members who share different 
competing political vision? I was not convinced with this justification because there is nothing 
wrong with diversity within the same movement”234.  
The leadership has different perceptions regarding the establishment of a political party. 
“We carefully examined the post revolutionary political context. The utopian model was not to 
establish a political party and support other ones, but Egypt is facing a turning point in its 
history. There was a need for a strong political force to run the state. We did not find any other 
strong partners whom we can rely on during such a tough period. We did not make this 
generalization based on political programs or statements but rather based on our knowledge 
about certain political figures who are running existing or emerging political parties. This entails 
directing all our resources, and efforts to one strong political force. We kept in mind the 
parochial political culture in Egypt; voters do not vote for programs but for people they know. 
Thus, if there is one strong political party to gain all theses votes; this will give Islamists a word 
                                                          
233 According to a female member in the FJP and the movement, there are 900 women out of 7000 founders in the FJP. An 
interview with MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 14, 2012.  
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in the concurrent political game. Establishing a political party for the movement was no more 
than a tactic and we can change it later on”235, said by one MB’s member. 
The Guidance Office declared that the MB would not allow any of its members to join or 
establish other political parties. Young Brothers who formed the Al Tayar al Masry Party were 
dismissed from the movement, on July 14, 2011, because of this violation. Mos’ab al Gammal, 
Islam Lotfy and other dismissed members asked for a fair investigation before their dismissal, 
but this did not happen.
236
The dismissal decision was taken by the Supreme Guide. This was an 
exception, since all dismissal decisions should be taken by the Shura Council. Most dismissed 
young Brothers were active members in the student section, and closer to administrative and 
regional bodies. There was fear about their potential impact on other MB’s members.237 
Muhammed Shams asserted that MB’s leadership perceived them as a potential threat that should 
be eliminated before attracting other young members.
238
  
Muhammed al Kassas, Muhammed Shams, Islam Lotfy, Mos’ab Rageb, Mos’ab al 
Gammal, and other MB’s members established Al Tayar al Masry Party on May 2011. The party 
was a development for a political project that firstly expressed itself in a civil society initiative 
called “Free People” (Ahrar). The party still did not get an official approval from the PPC. Its 
planned program expresses very open discourse; Muahmmed al Kassas refuses to describe the 
party as an Islamic one; it is rather a centrist conservative party. Al Kassas said that adopting a 
religious base for the party would allow us to gain more supporters, but we refused to do so. We 
wanted to establish a different political project that overcomes ideological polarization, and 
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238 An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2011.   
108 
 
respects the Arab and Islamic cultural of the Egyptian society.
239
Shams concluded that the 
religious background of most Islamic parties in Egypt is very ambiguous. Advocating Islam’s 
higher principles and goals (Makasid al Shari’a) is shared by all parties including liberal ones. 
The major challenge is turning those broad goals into detailed policies and programs; there is 
still no unique Islamic contribution in this regard.
240The party’s discourse is an organizational 
manifestation for Al Bishry’s notion of National Mainstream that expresses the minimal level of 
consciousness among different national ideological groups. The membership of the party 
reaffirms this philosophy via the inclusion of members who belong to different ideological 
backgrounds, and the harmony between its political position and other revolutionary forces such 
as April 6
th
 Movement, and grass roots newly established movements including A’askar 
Kazboon, Makamlem, Salfio Costa, Shayfanko, and Ultras Football Groups. Al Tayer al Masry 
founders were motivated by overcoming the ideological polarization that emerged after the 
revolution between secular, loose grass roots political movements, and Islamist groups, 
especially after the establishment of the FJP, and the rigid political positions of Muslim 
Brotherhood from demonstrations since May 2011. The ideological background of party’s 
founders reflects a high level of ideological openness and complexity due to their prior 
experience in MB’s student section, human rights organizations, Youth revolution Coalition, the 
Union of Revolutionary Forces, and Baladna institution for civil society leadership. The Al Tayar 
al Masry program is designed around two main principles: associational democracy, and the 
establishment of a welfare state. The program is still unfinished project with no detailed practical 
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policies.
241
The party supported most demonstrations, and clearly resented the SCAF rule for the 
interim period. The lack of detailed program and participation in state decision-making bodies 
make it difficult to evaluate consistency in the party’s discourse and how unique its political and 
socioeconomic program, compared with other Islamists or secular groups. Till now, the party is a 
loose political platform for MB’s ex- members and other political activists.  
It was surprising that Al Wasat, Al Nahda, and Al Tayar al Masry did not form one 
coalition during parliamentary election. Al Tayar al Masry called for a dialogue between some 
left calibers, The Justice Party, the Youth Revolution Coalition, Al Wasat Party, Al Nahda Party, 
and other intellectuals to prepare for one strong electoral coalition. The dialogue was failed, and 
most parties did not join it. Al Tayar al Masry later on invited the Justice Party, Al Wasat, and Al 
Nahda to join the Revolution Continues Coalition. Al Wasat refused because the coalition 
includes one liberal Party (Masr al Houria/ Egypt Freedom), and another Leftist Party (The 
Socialist Coalition). The Justice Party justified its refusal by its strategy to nominate only young 
revolutionary politicians not other parties’ calibers. The absence of coordination among those 
newly established parties resulted in humble electoral gains.
242
 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Gender Ideology 
Magdy S’aad briefly highlights the limited role of women in the decision making process. 
He associated this minor role with a conservative religious perception shared by the movement’s 
leaders and the large majority of file and rank members. According to S’aad, “MB’s 
parliamentary male candidates, during 2000, and 2005 elections, were concerned about where 
should the female candidate set down in the parliamentary hall. They were asking should she sit 
                                                          
241 Unpublished version of the program was taken from one of the party’s members in the Committee of Program’s Writing.  
242 An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 7, 2012.  
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beside us or not, and how can she attend late meetings. This incident is very reflective on how a 
conservative religious discourse conditions MB’s members’ mentality”243.   
The role of women within the movement is highly contested after the revolution. Security 
repression was the main justification for women’s limited role, and lack of representation in the 
movement’s administrative bodies. The intellectual heritage of the movement indicates a 
conservative vision towards women’s political involvement. Hassan al Banna’s ideas about 
women’s role was elaborated in his article “Diary for the Muslim Woman” (Resalet al Mar’a al 
Muslima), published in 1940. Al Banna designed his perception around a biological and a sexual 
differentiation of roles. He advocated and prioritized the role of women in the private sphere. He 
was against women political participation as either a voter or a candidate. Political participation 
was seen as a deviation from women’s salient original role in the family.244Women’s true role is 
to be good mothers and wives. He was against calls to encourage women joining the Bar 
Association, Engineering School, and being employees in the state’s apparatus. He also 
concluded women’s work as teachers or doctors should be according to strict measures, and sex 
segregation. Early Brothers also believed political discussions and debates at home would create 
stress and tensions in the family; it is better for women to stay away from politics. There should 
be special curriculums for girls and women to meet their needs of being good wives and 
mothers.
245
 
Despite this conservative approach to women’s role, Al Banna established a special 
branch for Muslim Sisters. Sisters played a major role in spreading da’awa, and enhancing MB’s 
popularity. He invited Zeinab al Ghazaly, who was the founder of the Islamic Female Group 
(IFG), to integrate the IFG in MB’s structure and to be the head of the Sisters’ branch. The first 
                                                          
243 An iterview with Magdy S’aad by the author, Cairo, Egypt, January 1, 2012.  
244 Mariz Tadros, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Gender Agenda: Reformed or Reframed?”, IDS Bulletin 42 (2011): 90-93. 
245 Christina Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (California: The Hoover Institution, 1964), 167-171.  
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assignment to Ghazaly was actually a political one; Al Banna asked her to communicate with Al 
Nahas pasha, and overcome the misunderstanding that emerged between them. Al Ghazaly was 
politically active with the MB; she criticized Nasser’s policy in the Muslim Women Magazine, 
and played a key role with Sayyid Qutb’s sisters in establishing the 1965 group. As a result of 
this role, Al Ghazlay was persecuted and spent six years in jail. In spite of her active political 
role, Al Ghazaly asserted that the primary role of women is to be wives and mothers. They raise 
men of ummah, however, they have the right to be judges, state employees, or even prime 
ministers.
246
According to Jihan al Halfawy, the first MB’s parliamentary candidate, what 
happened to Al Ghazaly was the reason that forced MB’s leaders not to let women be so 
involved in politics.
247
The conservative perception that adherents of MB hold about the political 
role of women in the early decades of its establishment did not face strong societal pressures or 
critique; women were not active players in the political and public sphere with few exceptions at 
that time.   
This gender discourse witnessed a change due to societal pressures, and media focus on 
the MB’s internal dynamics, and human rights discourse. The first time the MB had a female 
parliamentary candidate, along its history, was in 2000. In 2005, the movement nominated 
Makarm al Deiry for Nasr City district. It should be noted that female candidates were the wives 
of known figures and calibers. Jihan al Halfawy is married to Ibrahim al Z’afarany, and Al Deiry 
was the widow of the MB’s secretary general Ibrahim Sharf. None of the file and rank members 
were nominated for that. Nominating a female member is determined according to a number of 
                                                          
246 Dena Rashed, “ Women’s Political Participation in the Eyes of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-Islami in 
Pakistan a Comparative Study”, (MA Thesis, American University, 2007), 50-56.  
247 Qouted in Dina Rashed, Ibid, 66.  
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criteria: 1) personality and qualifications of the candidate, 2) the presence of MB in this district 
compared with other competitors, 3) services she can provide to her district.
248
  
 Actually, the debate over supporting parliamentary female candidates was resolved in 
1987; nevertheless, the movement maintained its conservative stance regarding presidency or “al 
walya al kobra/ Imama”. This limited political role for women is accepted by MB’s females. 
Makarim al Deiry, a 2005 parliamentary candidate, concluded that not assuming the presidency 
office is in women’s interest. Heads of states are involved in decisions about wars, and details of 
bloody events. It would be better for women not to be exposed to such dangerous 
situations.
249
Thus, this gendered discourse should not be perceived as male dominated doctrine; 
it is rather embedded in the mentality of many members regardless of their gender. 
There is only one exceptional incident when Helmy al Gazar, the head of MB’s office in 
6
th
 of October district in 2010, nominated one of the MB’s Sisters to the membership of the 
administrative Office in 6
th
 of October. This action was not highly welcomed by the MB’s 
leadership, especially Khairt al Shater, the Supreme Guide’s Deputy, who has more of a Salafist 
attitude.
250
 
According to one of the female members, “Sisters are so active in the movement. They 
are involved in many activities ranging from charity to participation in political campaigns and 
elections. Sisters organized and participated in university campuses’ demonstrations. I was not 
convinced by security repression allegations that have been used to prevent women’s presence in 
lower and middle administrative levels. I thought there would not be strong threats; we still live 
                                                          
248 Ibid, 61.  
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Mariz Tadros, Ibid, 94. According to one of the female members, “Al Banna’ was open minded regarding women rights. 
Sisters within the movement enjoyed more rights compared with their current status. Sisters used to travel to other governorates 
to give sessions;they participated in the1948 war, and all issues related to Sisters within the movement were managed by them 
not by male leaders. Al Banna asked Zeinb al Ghazaly who was not from MB’s ranks to manage the Sisterhood section within the 
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MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 14, 2012.  
250 Unpublished lecture by Ibrahim al Houdaiby, American University in Egypt, October 24, 2011.  
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in a conservative society that respects women, and the security would not dare to harm them. I 
think women should play a more influential role in the decision making process. They should be 
presented in all administrative levels including the Shura Council and the Guidance Office. All 
Sisters’ activities should be run and administrated by women themselves not by men. I was 
provoked when all speakers in the Sisters’ conference, that was entitled “Women from 
Revolution to Renaissance” in July 201, were men. Sisters planned and prepared the agenda of 
the conference, and then they were not present on stage! We should speak for ourselves”251. 
Mustafa al Naggar also concluded that the MB’s justification of the fear from security repression 
is flawed. MB’s leaders allowed Sisters to actively participate in electoral campaigns; they 
distributed flyers, talked with people, went to homes to convince voters, and they supervised the 
voting process. They were exposed many times to security harassment during election times. 
Hence, Brothers made use of Sisters without giving them an adequate representation, and they 
were neither voters nor candidates for any position within the MB. A year has passed after the 
revolution without any crucial changes in the Sisters’ participation. Only 5 female candidates 
joined the parliament, because the FJP put female candidates at lower ranks in their electoral 
lists. Most of the chosen candidates were old females who are known for their organizational 
loyalty and discipline. Young critical and qualified Sisters were dismissed.
252
 
MB’s Sisters are active members in the public sphere; they participate in many charity 
and welfare associations. They were also active in the virtual space with a critical tone. MB’s 
males did not only dominate MB’s blogging activities; Arwa al Taweel, Aya A’laa, Somaya al 
Sayed, Assma Yassir, Assma and Somaya Al A’rian, Tansim Radwan and Aya al Fiky, and 
Shams al Dein are active female bloggers. They share their personal experiences, and comment 
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on the political dynamics in Egypt.
253
This virtual experience was not limited to a number of 
MB’s females who are well educated, open to other discourses, and belong to families of certain 
MB’s leaders. The majority of MB’s females are religiously conservative, and they participate 
only in political activities organized or supported by the MB. The majority of the MB’s females 
did not participate in the “Egypt’s Women” protest in December 2012 that was against army 
attacks and human rights violations against female protestors. Manal Abou al Hassan the Head of 
the Women’s Committee in the FJP criticized this demonstration and accused those who 
organized it of being tools for western agendas.
254
   
From a different perspective, one of the female members addressed the lack of political 
awareness among rank and file sisters. For her, “Female mentors and members are so traditional 
in their approach to socioreligious activities adopted by the movement. They are not open to new 
ideas. I tried many times within my family to introduce new ideas but most of my proposals were 
resisted. I think this was due to two reasons: 1) some mentors lack required qualifications to 
apply new ideas, 2) they lack courage to try something new, and are afraid of failure.  This is not 
limited to Sisters only; it is part of our current culture in Egypt. Sisters in campuses are still 
unable to benefit from the political openness of the revolution, and to develop different activities. 
In addition, blind trust and absolute obedience to leaders is so apparent among Sisters. This is 
justified by the lack of interest in understanding politics, and the exclusion from the decision 
making process within the movement. There are easy criteria and requirements for Sisters’ entry 
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to MB, compared with males.
255
This resulted in the admission of many unqualified Sisters who 
do not truly bear the culture and beliefs of MB. There are currently some indicators to enhance 
Sisters’ presence in MB’s organizational structure; though most taken steps are very slow”256.  
3.4 CONCLUSION 
The stratified nature of the MB’s young generation is apparent compared with the al 
wasat generation whose members were mostly involved in syndicates and diverse civil activities. 
The Salafist discourse conditioned the consciousness of many young members; and some of 
them lacked political awareness and experience of interaction with different ideological voices. 
According to one MB’s member, “the influence of the young generation is still limited. The 
phenomenon is so urban and only among the well educated politicized members. Many of young 
file and rank members are not affected by what is happening and their loyalty to the movement’s 
leadership is not diminishing. The coherence of the movement is assured, at least in the short 
run, but the movement is losing its Crème de la crème”257. For another young member, the 
influence of young members would be apparent after the end of the political interim period in 
Egypt. Many young members are in the gray area; they are justifying many of the leadership’s 
actions because of the current unstable political circumstances. Many of them are unsatisfied 
with the FJP’s performance in the parliament, the movement’s relationship with the SCAF, and 
their stance on presidential candidates”258. The psychological impact of the revolution on MB’s 
young members is salient in this regard; if the youth were able to make Mubarak step down, why 
cannot they force their leaders to take required measures for reforming the movement? 
                                                          
255 According to one of the female members, “The strict recruitment measures of Brothers compared with Sisters have been 
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258 An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, February 7, 2012.  
116 
 
The gap between young members and MB’s leadership has been widened due to MB’s 
political performance after the revolution. Whilst young members took the lead in organizing 
demonstrations and pressuring Mubarak to step down, leaders were not truly convinced a true 
political change was on its way. They accepted a meeting with Omar Sulieman, Mubarak’s ex-
deputy, and were not persuaded that more pressures would kick Ahmed Shafik out from the 
cabinet. The MB refused to participate in a number of demonstrations while its members were 
present in the streets and in daily face-to-face interactions with other political partners. The 
conciliatory tone with the SCAF made many members skeptical about leaders’ political 
intentions and the political future of Egypt. The leadership’s justification was always that MB is 
a reformist movement that adopts gradual measures, and revolution is against its ideology. 
According to one MB’s member, sudden changes break, and MB is not a revolutionary 
movement. Revolutionary changes do not fit the milieu of Egyptians, and we prefer maneuvering 
and gradual pressures with the regime.
259
Actually, Hassan al Banna’s writings were not clear in 
this regard. He described a revolution as a Fitna, and in other diaries he emphasized Greatest 
Jihad against the ruler if he did not apply required reforms. Al Banna’s conviction about 
revolution is ambiguous; it is unclear how the regime would apply radical reforms that the MB 
called for without a revolution or strong pressures, and would the MB support revolution if it 
will turn its claims into reality or not?
260
The linear gradual approach, that starts from individuals 
to the Muslim Caliphate, is used by many affiliated members and leaders to justify MB’s 
skeptical stance towards revolutionary changes. In other words, the stage of reforming the 
society is not yet done, so the movement should not rush for the state’s reform phase. It is 
surprising how some MB’s members have such strong belief in this linear approach of reform 
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that proved unjust to social reality, given the convoluted nature of development. The question 
here is how MB would be able to achieve the goals of revolution without pressuring the still 
existing old regime.  
The concurrent generational gap introduces a number of questions not only about the 
MB’s structure or methods but about reasons of existence as well. Should MB continue as a 
revivalist movement or a political party? Is it possible to dissolve the movement, and search for 
new channels of societal reform or not? It is evident that some young members are creative 
enough to provide answers for these questions and adopt certain ideas for reform.  
The answers of some informants in this chapter uncover many dimensions in regards to 
different interpretations for institutional democracy, gender, and political revolutionary 
tendencies within the MB. Whilst some members advocate introducing bottom- up approach for 
participation, and decentralization for MB’s structure; others believe in shura that is established 
upon an elitist approach of participation, and suppression for diversity. This narrow rigid 
perception towards participation is motivated by the goal of preserving solidarity and avoiding 
internal schisms, to the extent that one of the female members accepted giving up her opinion 
regarding women’s right of assuming presidency, and fearing undesired consequences of 
democracy.  
The gender conservative approach concerning women political roles and their limits is 
not an exclusive expression for male domination, but rather an embedded conservative and 
cultural discourse regarding women political rights and active social roles. 
The political revolutionary tendencies within MB are contested among young members; 
when some members are calling for radical stances against military rule, preserving the revivalist 
nature of MB; others are rationally justifying the leadership’s pragmatic relations with the SCAF, 
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and describing MB’s critical decisions such as establishing a political party, or supporting the 
demand of writing the constitution after the presidential elections as purely political tactics 
which the MB would change later on, regardless of their impact on the movement’s moral 
claims, and consistency in positions. Answers also indicate an intra generational gap that is 
inspired with preceding generations; the old generation sponsors and supports young groups who 
keep their ideas alive. They promote some young calibers, whilst exclude other circles. The 
leadership is incapable of responding to youth reform demands; rather than opening channels of 
dialogue, some young members were exposed to harsh disciplinary measures, and direct 
dismissals. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the most complicated movements, where many 
variables, areas of analysis, and perspectives conflate, and overlap. This sort of complexity 
includes organizational design, intellectual schools, cognitive maps of leaders and members, 
regime nature, and international dynamics. This thesis pays exclusive attention to internal 
dynamics within the movement and the impact of schools of thought on its ideology and 
trajectory. In this concluding part, I shall summarize how generational gaps manifested 
themselves (the Qutbist-Reformist Gap), over what these gaps emerged, and continuities and 
discontinuities between the two consequent generational waves (1970s and current generation).  
The Qutbist- Reformist Gap 
The generational interactions within Muslim Brotherhood flirted itself in the intellectual 
gap between the reformist and organizational (Qutbian) streams. It is evident that young and 
reformist members are still powerless to de-authorize the dominance of the current leadership 
and its discourse. Diversity within the MB is suppressed through organizational disciplinary 
measures against rebellious members. The Promotion to positions based on loyalty to leaders 
paved the way for opportunistic and hypocritical. The FJP lists, for instance, included members 
who expressed a high level of obedience to MB’s decisions, while members who expressed 
different opinions like Muhammed al Beltagy, or Gamal Heshmat are marginalized in the 
parliament compared with other candidates.
261
Actually the organizational stream consolidated its 
presence in MB over time since mid 1970s due to four major elements: a) the penetration of the 
rural culture, b) the rising tidal of Salafism, c) the lack of democratic mechanisms and a pyramid 
centralized structure, and d) State coercion. 
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Since the 1970s, the movement witnessed the exclusion of Al Banna’s close circles, and 
the penetration of Qutb’s ideas throughout the active presence of the 1965 group. The current 
leadership of the movement represents a mix of the religious conservative school of Salafism and 
the Qutbist trend. This intellectual mix undermines the revolutionary dimensions of Qutb’s ideas, 
and overrates other dimensions like emotional detachment, organizational coherence, tribulation, 
exclusive discourse, and conservative interpretations of Islam. The middle administrative cadres 
who joined the movement during 1980s are having more bureaucratic and organizational skills, 
rather than clear well-defined political orientations and preferences.
  
Hence, the MB’s middle and 
upper administrative ranks have been dominated by members who share a conservative socio-
political ideology, and pay most of their attention to organizational discipline.  
The Salafist discourse penetrated the movement's educational curriculums, and this has 
been associated with increasing rural influence. Historically, Hassan al Banna’s call addressed 
the young educated youth, Al Azharite students, and city employees who belong to the middle 
class or petty bourgeoisie. They bridged the gap between their rural roots and the secular 
westernized structure of the state. The goal of Al Banna was to establish a bridge between 
modernity and traditionalism. During 1974-1984 the MB attracted university students who later 
became key syndicate calibers and acquired skills throughout direct interaction with Marxists. At 
that time, the urban middle class nature of MB was preserved and flourished. The deteriorating 
economic conditions and Structural Adjustment policies since the early 1990s pushed many rural 
residents to cities, who found the MB a resort to preserve their traditional values. The MB 
penetrated rural areas and gained the appeal of rural immigrants who kept their rural values and 
modes of thought rather than adopting secular ideas of urban spaces. The movement enjoyed a 
high level of recruitment in rural governorates compared with urban districts, and in the Azhar 
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University compared with other civil governmental ones. The promotion process and middle 
administrative ranks are dominated by rural calibers who share Salafist discourse and 
conservative political orientations. In parallel, the movement lost its appeal among urban youth 
who stemmed their religious knowledge from diverse resources including lay preachers, TV 
religious channels, and other Salafist religious groups. Since 2008, the Guidance Office added a 
new article to increase the representation of rural governorates in the Shura Council. For 
instance, Al Dakhlia, Al Sharkiya and Al Gharbia have about 23 members which means they 
dominate one third of the Council’s membership. In contrast, Cairo and Alexandria have only 11 
members. Another article gave the Guidance Office the authority to appoint 20% of the Shura’s 
members, and be in charge of the Council in case it failed in conducting meetings. The Shura 
Council did not have meetings from 1995 till 2009, and most decisions were exclusively taken 
by the Guidance Office.
262
These measures allowed hard- line members, since Mustafa 
Mashhour’s leadership, to dominate the movement and recruit rural conservative calibers. They 
even maneuvered with rules through changing the residency of some rural cadres to urban areas. 
This happened with Muhammed Morsy, from Zagazig Governorate, who was nominated to the 
Guidance Office as an urban member after moving to Cairo.
263
Thus, it is apparent that a 
conservative wing is dominating based on different intellectual sources: religion (Salafism), 
politics (Qutb’s ideas), and culture (rural traditions).  
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This conservative intellectual structure infused MB through the exclusion of enlightened 
religious figures like Muhammed al Ghazaly, and Yusuf al Karadawy. The educational 
curriculums included Salafist elements, and superficial religious knowledge.
264
Mentors who are 
responsible for the educational section lack required religious knowledge and openness to guide 
young members and answer their critical questions. Family (Al Osrah) meetings turned into 
circles for socializing, chatting, and exchanging some simple religious teachings. Many young 
members know nothing about Al Banna’s diaries, religious sources of knowledge that formed his 
ideas, and his political decisions in the early decades of MB’s establishment. This shallow 
knowledge has been associated with religious and intellectual arrogance.
265
According to Al 
Nafisy, little attention was paid to curriculums of socialization, and critical thinking within 
political Islamic movements and the Muslim Brotherhood. The culture of socialization has been 
associated with a lack of creativity, impressionism, romanticism, laziness, and waiting for 
leaders’ decisions rather than taking the lead. Organizational discipline and survival turns out to 
be the ultimate goal, rather than the initial reform program. In this way, leadership determines 
the agenda of concern, and members pay attention and interact only with issues that have direct 
impact on the movement’s interest. They became emotionally and mentally attached to the 
movement’s agenda, rather than public concerns.266 
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 The penetration of rural culture and superficial understanding of Islam, due to the 
infusion of Wahabist ideas, emphasized the values of obedience, loyalty to leaders, and trust in 
elders compared with other values like critical thinking. Obedience, religiosity and seniority 
became the main standards of promotion.
267
  
The hierarchical design of MB is another element to refer to the democratic nature of the 
movement, and how one trend managed to control upper ranks. The pyramid structure of the 
movement was not a democratic one, even in the early years of its establishment. Hassan al 
Banna’s charming personality made him the center of all decisions; he was responsible for all 
details, and his personality as votary helped him in excluding all his rivals and attracting more 
followers. Al Banna presented himself in any disagreement with his rivals as the victim who is 
always ready to forgive culprits. Al Banna, instead of promoting diversity in his movement, 
established another principle which is “The Opinion of One is for All”268. Christina Harris 
described the influential and dominant role of Al Banna as “[He] was the Muslim Brotherhood in 
its early years”269. Al Nafisy also criticized Al Banna’s leadership style- that continued till the 
moment- for adopting the style of “The Great Man” who is gifted and above criticism. Salah 
Shady
270
 said, “after the death of Al Banna we missed direction and felt lost”; meaning that the 
destiny of the whole movement has been attached to only one man. As per Al Nafisy’s analysis, 
Al Banna did not recognize the impact of the one-man leadership style on the movement. This 
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reflexively expressed itself in conflicts that emerged over the leadership of the MB after his 
death.
271
  
Al Banna managed a number of public conferences which provided spaces for sharing 
ideas and discussions. Public conferences were rarely established later on.
272
Before the current 
bylaws of MB that were introduced in the 1990s, most decisions were taken based on a 
consensus to underscore high levels of solidarity and unity. Most decisions were taken from 
above by the Supreme Guidance and the Founding Committee.
273
The centralized vertical 
hierarchy of the MB concentrated all powers in the hands of the Guidance Office’s members, 
with limited authorities for the Shura Council and administrative sections.   
The exclusive nature of decision -making and the lack of internal popular democratic 
mechanisms were always justified by security repression. The Shura Council was unable to 
conduct any meetings since 1995 till 2008. The majority of members do not participate in critical 
decisions. The MB is currently in a critical situation for supporting a presidential candidate after 
the nomination of Abou al Fotouh, nevertheless, the movement did not think about conducting a 
survey to get members’ preferences and opinions about the issue. Elections at lower and 
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administrative levels did not take place till 2005, and were mainly in reaction to evoked criticism 
by media. The current bylaws do not include any sections about members’ right, channels of 
appeal against unfair or illegal decisions, and measures of resolving conflicts and investigations. 
All articles focus exclusively on members’ obligation and duties.274As noted in chapter three, 
some members praised the democratic nature of MB; apparently, most of those members are 
inclined to support an elitist-stable style of leadership. In other words, a group of qualified 
leaders (the Shura Council and Guidance Office members) knows better than other members 
(Rank and File) whose participation in critical would endanger MB’s solidarity. This implicitly 
refers to the semantic meaning of shura in the minds of some of the research’s informants.  
Regime despotism consumed much of MB’s energy, and turned its focus from strategic 
issues.
275
The Movement spent years in struggle with the state’s oppressive system, and involved 
in fierce debates with other political forces rather than developing concrete economic, and social 
programs, and political Islamic theory of governance. Hassan Hathout concluded that Islamic 
movements suffer from psychological problems of the despotic cage; they might not be able to 
get out of it even if they got their freedom. Rather than establishing free democratic polity, they 
might introduce their version of dictatorship.
276
  
The state security approach constrained the presence of any moderate Islamic discourse. 
It denied Al Wasat Party’s right in existence for years, and did not differentiate between 
moderate and extremist Islamists. This approach resulted in the elimination of any potential 
Islamic competitor for MB. In addition, military trials targeted moderate figures within MB, and 
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gave hard-line members the opportunity to consolidate their presence, and market their religious 
and political discourse to MB’s rank and file members. 
Torture, and unfair trials by the state played a role in enhancing this leadership style. Old 
members were perceived as heroes who made great sacrifices. This legacy of sacrifice and 
heroism promoted a culture of emotional mobilization to leaders’ decisions rather than an 
objective assessment to leaders’ performance. After spending years in jail and being detached 
from concurrent events, elder leaders assumed leadership, rather than handing administrative 
positions over to young involved members.
277
 
Furthermore, one of the major consequences of state coercion is promoting the culture of 
secrecy and lack of transparency, which negatively influenced the movement. The culture of 
Secrecy has many manifestations: Firstly, rank and file members were excluded from the 
decision making process, and channels of dialogues were eliminated. Secondly, many active 
roles by MB at the moral and socioeconomic level were restrained. Thirdly, criteria of 
recruitment lacked objective criteria of selection.
278
Secrecy also resulted in a case of emotional 
detachment and a shared attitude of intellectual arrogance; members feel they are superior and 
know more than others, in addition to putting the movement on fire lines with the government. 
The feeling of superiority was explicitly expressed by one of the MB’s informants when asked 
about the decision of establishing a political party; he concluded we did not find any other strong 
partners who would be able to run the transition period. This answer reflects a sort of a political 
overconfidence, and a lack of a collaborator discourse towards other political groups. 
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Generational Gaps: Over What? 
The political ideological frame of the MB was vague from the beginning. Al Banna 
provided a holistic description to the goals and nature of his movement as “a Salafi call, a Sunni 
approach, a Sufi truth, a political institution, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural society, 
an economic organization, and a social idea”. The ambiguity of goals allowed the movement to 
attract many followers who joined it for different purposes (75% for religious purposes). Harris 
concluded that Al Banna meant this ambiguity and smartly used it in his struggle with the 
political regime. He emphasized the religious nature of his movement in the presence of a strong 
prime minister and overrated the political dimension of his activity under the rule of weak 
government.
279
The ambiguity of goals for any institution, according to Tarik al Bishry, justifies 
and enhances the lack of accountability measures which is one of the reasons of debates between 
the reformist and the organizational stream.
280
 
Actually, the vague nature of the MB is one of its current dilemmas. The political 
dimension of the movement explains the controversy that took place between MB’s members 
regarding establishing a political party and whether it serves the original nature of the MB as a 
religious revivalist movement or not. Hassan al Banna himself might not be aware of the 
expected consequences of being heavily involved in politics. His movement flourished quickly, 
and it seems that his goal was to use political tools to introduce some reforms at the moral level 
such as forbidding prostitution and alcohol consumption. He regretted establishing the secret 
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section, and admitted that had he had the opportunity, he would have turned MB into a purely 
revivalist religious movement.
281Al Banna’s focus was mainly on ethics and morality; he did not 
provide a practical and a detailed program for MB about shari’a application and replacement of 
western rules. His economic reforms were limited to abolishing usury and collecting Zikhat. The 
vagueness of programs and lack of practical details has dominated MB discourse till this 
moment.
282
 
As noted in chapter three, deep involvement in politics after the revolution undermined 
the missionary dimensions of the movement, and a total shift to political party may be a possible 
scenario in the long run. Khalis al Galby critically addressed the relationship between Islamic 
revivalist movements and party politics. He described the political parties’ mentality as one of 
the disasters that negatively influences Islamic movements; party’s mentality adopts a number of 
opinions and resists others through delegitimizing them rather than opening constructive 
channels of dialogue. It is a one-dimensional way of thinking that justifies actions rather than 
admitting mistakes. This mentality suppresses creativity and critical thinking; it turns its calibers 
into executives rather than pioneers. Thus, creative members are most likely to split the 
movement, and migrate to other reform projects.
283
Critical members share together the feeling of 
cognitive dissonance with the movement’s discourse; alternatively, they start to have their 
salons, and meetings to share ideas.
284
Thus, it was not surprising that large numbers of Egyptian 
Current Party’s founders were from MB’s young active members; also, the 1970s active group 
joined Al Wasat party. Small circles and friendship ties turned later into political organizations.  
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The revolutionary dimension of the movement is another contested issue that widened the 
gap between the two streams. Al Banna had contradictory statements about revolution that 
require intellectual revision. The leadership’s stance on the SCAF is not actually surprising; Al 
Banna himself had some lenient stances on the palace, and royal governments that can be 
justified throughout the framework of pragmatism. Despite these positions, the solidarity of the 
MB was assured due to State persecution. The current revolutionary scene does not provide the 
movement with the defensive position it used to enjoy for decades against state repression. The 
movement now has many challenges at the intellectual, political, and economic level to face, and 
there is a critical public open eye on its activities and positions. Thus, assuring consistency 
among multiple roles, and providing creative solutions to the post revolutionary landscape in 
Egypt are decisive factors to judge the future trajectory of the movement and its ability to 
maintain internal solidarity, and gain public support.
285
  
Along with this line, the spiritual, organizational, and social networks inside dogmatic 
movements consolidate its solidarity bonds and make it difficult to end up its life course. MB’s 
educational and spiritual programs interfere in the daily details of its members. Brothers get 
married to MB’s Sisters, most of their friends belong to the movement, and some of their 
economic activities rely on the movement’s support. The movement's multiple activities provide 
members with a different state to live in. Belonging to the movement is an opportunity to get 
close to God, get married, and assure a social network. Some members are unwilling to lose all 
these spiritual and material privileges, even if they disagree with MB’s decisions and 
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discourse.
286
Songs, historical stories, festivals, and general meetings are among tools to establish 
emotional bonds.
287
  
Strong attachment to the movement’s discourse was emphasized in the third MB’s 
conference (1935). Al Banna introduced two crucial principles: The first principle states that 
every Muslim should believe that any weakness in the MB’s teachings is a reflection to the 
weakness of the correct Islamic idea itself. The second principle asserts that Brothers should 
support any institution that serves and shares the goals of the MB, and at the same time should 
give up any loyalty to other groups that have contradicting goals with the MB’s call, especially if 
MB’s leaders asked for that. In this sense, MB is not just a religious group that has its own 
interpretations to Islam but rather its only voice, and an institutional manifestation of the ideal 
model of Islam. These two principles contributed to a shared perception of superiority among 
MB’s adherents compared to other Islamic groups, and a conviction that MB’s project is the best, 
if not the only, path of reform. 
State repression and a legacy of tribulation enhanced the movement’s narrative about the 
necessity of unity, and suppression of diversity. The movement keeps till the moment making 
use of the legacy of solidarity and conspiracy theory against its reform program. For instance, 
one of the articles in Ikhwan On Line described other opinions that contradict with MB’s 
decisions as deadly poison, and asked MB’s members to listen only to their leaders.288Despite the 
ambiguity of goals and strong loyalty to MB’s leadership, the wide popular base was not usually 
in its interest. The movement failed in making political risks, and its influence was less 
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compared with other loose small active groups like Masr al Fata (1940s), or Kifya Movement 
(2000s).
289
 
The framing process within MB is another aspect of disagreement between generational 
units. The movement failed to draw lines between religion as a sacred source of knowledge and 
human interpretations to organizational issues and politics. Organizational decisions were 
perceived as religious orders that must be obeyed. Members who violate these orders share the 
feeling of being sinful. This discourse was justified through the presence of religious figures, or 
members with a religious educational background in high administrative ranks.
290
Religion has 
been instrumentally used to justify certain actions, for instance, the use of prophet traditions 
about allegiance to justify obedience, and deplore any rebellious actions against leadership’s 
decisions.
291
A parochial emotional discourse divides the world, in the mind of followers, into 
two mutually exclusive dichotomies: black and white, betrayers and patriotic, respectively. This 
process is scholarly coined as “Boundary Framing”.292This put the movement in confrontations 
with other political partners and absorbed much of the energy of its members.
293
The MB’s 
discourse gives priority to loyalty to the movement; when the MB and the state’s interest 
conflicts members’ preference should be to the movement and not to the state. It is expected; if 
the movement is the guardian of Islam and its survival is the only way of reform in members’ 
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consciousness. This discourse entails how the MB identifies the We and Adversaries, and it also 
creates another dilemma regarding how MB would design a separate discourse for political 
indoctrination within the FJP, and how is it going to handle political diversity within its party? 
Socioeconomic and political revolutionary tendencies within MB are among salient 
issues that increased the gap between reformist and conservative members on the eve of the 
revolution. Historically, Al Banna had lenient stances on some pro western governments, and he 
expressed an acceptance for cooperation in order to introduce partial reforms at the moral 
level.
294In this sense, the movement’s discourse did not strongly reject cooperation with the 
political regime for the sake of partial gains. This can be the historical explanatory framework to 
understand MB’s arrangements with Mubarak’s regime over the 2005 parliamentary election, 
meeting with Omar Sulieman during the revolution, and soft stances on SCAF violations. Such 
positions are justified to rank and files by the negative consequences of revolutions, and the 
appropriateness of gradual empowerment and change. The MB’s political performance and 
stance on the military institution in Egypt is in harmony with the political discourse of other 
branches of the movement in Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and Algeria. The MB in Iraq did not continue 
resistance against US forces and accepted being part of the political game that was designed by 
occupation. In other words, MB’s strategy started to focus on coexisting with existing political 
regime, competing over power distribution, rather than leading a change. This political position 
does not meet MB young revolutionary members’ inspirations and ambitions. 
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Furthermore, the MB’s current socioeconomic discourse does not provide any clear 
standpoints regarding economic independence and capitalism. Ironically, the movement that used 
to criticize capitalism, and global injustices is run by wealthy businessmen who have interest in 
privatization and scorn any active role by labor unions. This contradicts with the economic 
interest of poor MB’s conservative followers. Khairt al Shater, one of the keys Egyptian 
businessmen, is currently designing the MB’s socioeconomic and political program. Hasan 
Malik another MB’s influential business cadre described Mubarak’s economic policies as good 
ones except for high levels of corruption associated with them. Like any conservative European 
parties, the FJP economic program points out eradicating corruption, and balanced, sustainable 
and comprehensive economic development. The first principle in Al Shater’s program for 
presidency supports privatization and attracting foreign direct investments.
295
Nothing is 
mentioned about anti- monopoly measures, national safety networks, and nationalization 
procedures. MB’s businessmen and especially Kharit al Shater reflect an ideological mix of 
capitalism, religious conservatism, and political pragmatism. Al Shater had a Marxist 
background and his cognitive map was shaped by the secrecy and the teachings of the 1965 
group. His strong personality, charisma, economic activities, and the diversified sources that 
shaped his consciousness allowed him to spread his dominance and establish a strong bond with 
MB’s hard-line figures. Al Shater, before his nomination to presidency, was responsible for most 
critical files in the MB. He was in charge of preparing the MB’s reform plan, and the 
government’s program, managing MB’s financial resources, and following up MB’s 
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international organization’s activities and financial resources.296The mixed ideology of MB’s 
businessmen is not expected to lead revolutionary changes at the socioeconomic and political 
level. It has an interest in maintaining good terms with major international markets and assuring 
moderate political position for Egypt in the Arab region. In an interview with CNN, two FJP 
spokesmen who are close to the circle of Khairt al Shater concluded that the MB is fully 
committed to respect all treaties, and not preoccupied to be in confrontations with the outside 
world.
297
The interview was after meetings with White House Officials, and US policy experts in 
which FJP representatives depicted the MB as a moderate Islamic group.  
The gender ideology of MB is another reflection for the gap between conservative hard-
line members and reformists that involves an overlap between religious and cultural elements. 
Despite strong demands for women participation and involvement in the administrative make up 
of the movement, few steps were taken since the eruption of the revolution. The security 
allegations are no more present, and sisters are deeply involved in MB’s street politics without 
adequate presentation, and suitable socialization curriculums. 
Generational Continuity and Discontinuity 
The 1970s generation and young Brothers, the current generation's relationship with 
some of the 1970s members reflects a type of age accumulation. They share together the same 
critique of the culture of obedience, secrecy, the necessity of legal status for the movement, and 
criteria of promotion. The young generation expresses new ideas like dissolving the movement, 
turning its hierarchy into networks of pressure groups, and critically revisiting the MB’s 
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intellectual heritage. Unlike the 1970s members, some young members split quickly from the 
movement and expressed their impatient with MB’s discourse. It took decades from some 1970s 
figures to resign from the movement. These two different positions can be intellectually and 
historically interpreted, as follows: 
The 1970s members joined the movement with conservative religious discourse; they did 
not feel any kind of emotional detachment with conservative Qutbist elder members. They were 
totally absorbed in the task of restructuring the movement and writing its bylaws for at least 10 
to 15 years, which let them enjoy the feeling of ownership, compared with other young members 
whose early consciousness was shaped by other political and cultural spaces, and excluded to an 
extent from major decision-making positions. Omar al Talmasany’s personality was a major 
element in bridging the gap between old conservative members and the 1970s calibers; he 
listened to their demands and opened channels for them within MB’s structure; he shaped the 
emotional tie between them and the movement. This element is absent in the case of young MB’s 
members; old major calibers failed in understanding the rationale beyond youth arguments and 
suggestions; even open minded 1970s members became isolated and channels of dialogues 
between them and MB youth were deliberately narrowed via unwritten orders from hard-line 
calibers. The religious, intellectual, and spiritual needs of the young rebellious generation are 
satisfied by other channels; no more MB is the only resort for the majority of them; the political 
and social scenes in Egypt since late 1990s witnessed the emergence of many initiatives and 
grass roots movements that absorbed some young members’ anxiety, and dissatisfaction with the 
slow reformist approach and rigid MB’s administrative style. In this sense, the young generation 
shared the attitudes of multiple organizational and intellectual affiliations, motivations, and 
commitments, hybrid political ideology, culture of street collaborator politics, and ideological 
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toleration. This was clear the Al Tayar al Masry’s call for dialogue between some left calibers, 
The Justice Party, the Youth Revolution Coalition, Al Wasat Party, Al Nahda Party, and other 
intellectuals to prepare for one strong electoral coalition, harmony of political positions with 
other revolutionary groups, the diverse ideological backgrounds of calibers in the Revolution 
Continues Coalition. Young Brothers created their own political platforms and refused to join Al 
Nahda or Al Wasat Party due to different reasons including the ambiguous Islamic ideological 
background, and the bureaucratic style of management. The Al Tayar al Masry’s political project 
provides a different discourse than those two preceding parties. It does not adopt Islam as an 
ideological reference of its activities. Their project is still not yet drafted and its influence on 
large segments of Egyptians cannot be evaluated at this stage, though it is salient to keep an eye 
on its development. The internal administrative structure of the party is still unfinished, and its 
decentralized- democratic nature cannot be compared with other organizational experiences like 
Al Wasat or FJP. The relationship between the Egyptian Current party and other growing newly 
established grass roots movements like A’skar Kazboon, Hazmoon, Makamleen, Ultras Football 
Groups may influence the political discourse of the party, providing it with flexible 
organizational culture, creative tools of mobilization, more revolutionary ideas about political 
presence in the public sphere, and socio political injustices. 
Furthermore, the revolution has a key impact on the exclusion of young politicized 
members. Apparently, MB’s conservative leaders recognized that those members represent a 
threat to the movement’s coherence, and their rebellious tendencies cannot be contained within 
the existing administrative structure. They preferred excluding them quickly before attracting 
other members and forming strong oppositional front; this expressed out in the way of dismissing 
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some members (Al Tayer al Masry’s group) without conducting investigation, or sending 
warnings. 
In both generational subsequent waves the MB’s leadership failed in responding to new 
demands and creative proposals; active rebellious members were either contained or dismissed. 
Tools of resolving generational disputes ranged from dismissal (with or without fair 
investigations), suspension, and defamation campaigns against certain calibers; rather than 
opening channels of dialogue, and developing clear mechanisms for resolving disputes.    
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Table 2. A Comparison Between MB, Al Wasat Party, and Egyptian Current Party 
 Muslim Brotherhood Al Wasat The Egyptian Current 
Party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Internal 
Level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
Organizational 
Level 
Design 1.Pyramided centralized 
structure. 
2.Exclusive decision 
making process (major 
decisions only by the 
Shura and Guidance 
Council. 
1.Classical Centralized 
Party’s structure. 
2. Internal democratic 
voting mechanisms.  
1.Tendencies towards de-
centralized structure. 
2.Unfinished 
Administrative design.  
Disciplinary, 
and promotion 
Measures and 
Exit-Entry 
Criteria. 
1.Strict gradual 
disciplinary measures 
from warning, 
suspension, to dismissal. 
2.Joining other political 
parties is not allowed. 
3.Strcit exit and entry 
criteria (religiosity, 
reputation, commitment, 
loyalty).  
4.Promotion is based on 
loyalty to leadership, 
seniority, religiosity, and 
obedience. Election is 
conducted for the heads 
of all administrative 
levels since 2005, due to 
external pressures.  
1.Dismissal for non 
disciplined members 
based on a) written 
report about violations, 
b)Conducting an 
investigation, c)Final 
decision by the 
Membership Committee 
which includes (the 
President Deputy, 
Secretary General, and 
five members from the 
Higher Executive 
Committee). 
2.Dismissal for 
members who would 
join other parties. 
3.Election for 
1.Unfinished internal 
bylaws. 
2. Flexiable exit-entry 
criteria. 
2.Non refusal for multiple 
political affiliations. 
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administrative positions. 
4.Classical entry criteria 
(application, paying 
fees, and participation 
in Party’s activities). 
5.Stopping paying 
membership fees 
constitutes a reason for 
member dismissal. 
Leadership 
Style 
The Great Man Style 
(seniority, normative 
spiritual qualifications, 
loyality, has close 
relation to the leaders 
and mentors) 
Seniority, and 
functional 
qualifications, with the 
presence of clique 
politics. 
Functional, rotational 
Leadership Style. 
Its Philosophy Intellectual 
Foundation 
Strong presence for 
Qutbism and Salafism. 
The Azharite school, 
and  intellectual 
contributions of 
contemporary Muslim 
Scholars (Selim al 
A’wa, Tarik al Bishry, 
Fahmy Huwaidy, 
Ahmed Kamal Abou al 
Magd, and Yusuf al 
Karadawy). 
Multiple ideological 
references: Socialism, 
Liberal ideas, and the 
Azharite school.  
Religion/Politics 1.Religion is used for 
external socio-political 
mobilization. 
2.Religious traditions are 
1. Emphasis on the 
religious intellectual 
background of the party. 
2.Religious discourse is 
1.Refusal for using 
religion in mobilization, or 
being the exclusive source 
of reference. 
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used to justify 
organizational decisions, 
and political stances. 
not used in propaganda, 
and mobilization.  
Socialization 
Values 
Discipline, commitment, 
and obedience.  
Party discipline, and 
clique culture. 
Flexible networking 
culture, and shared 
sentiments of dissent,  
 
 
 
 
Interactional 
level with 
the external 
environment  
The nature of political stances Risk- Aversion. A selectivity nature 
based on political 
Rational Calculations 
with moderate risk –
taking stances, in a 
middle ground between 
revolutionary and 
conservative trends. 
Risk- Taking. 
The Relationship with Non-state 
Actors 
Skeptical-antagonistic. Refusal for political 
coalition with liberal 
and leftist groups; 
however, supporting 
certain demands by 
other political groups 
that are in harmony with 
the party’s positions. 
Co-existence, and 
harmony with grass root 
revolutionary groups. 
The Relationship with the State  Antagonistic with a 
tendency for political 
compromises. 
Skeptical- the classical 
functions of political 
opposition.  
Rejection for the state 
ideology, and institutional 
dynamics. Direct 
confrontation with state 
coercion via strikes, 
demonstrations, and civil 
disobedience. 
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In conclusion, the Muslim Brotherhood seems to be in urgent need for intellectual 
renewal. The movement did not benefit from the jurisprudential contributions of Azharite 
Sheikhs and other Muslim intellectuals. The last intellectual contribution of the movement was 
Al Houdaiby’s book “Preachers not Judges” and was mainly a reaction to Qutb’s writings.298The 
complexity of the book and its legal language does not encourage many members to review it. 
The rising Salafist tidal moved MB’s focus on faith, personal behavior, and piety, with parochial 
conservative understanding on social and political problems. Rank and file members follow up 
the movement’s statements and news more than following intellectual, and jurisprudential new 
ideas. Until now, the MB’s structure does not include religious and political committee that 
would act as consultancy bodies for leadership. The political Educational Committee relies on 
disqualified superficial books written by MB’s members about MB’s history, reform project, and 
other political conceptions.
299
The Muslim Brotherhood needs to provide a clear political theory 
of governance, solid interpretations to notions of Shura, citizenship, and human rights, and a 
detailed socioeconomic program. A renewal intellectual movement requires internal channels of 
dialogue and sharing ideas. The MB’s culture should appreciate and encourage self-critique. This 
does not seem possible in the short run. The movement applies strict disciplinary measures to 
suppress diversity, and market a number of statements to maintain unity and solidarity, such as 
“1) An MB’s member should accept orders and advices of his mentors like a dead man in the 
hands of the priest. 2) Give up your opinion, even if your mentor committed a mistake it is better 
than your right argument. 3) The MB alienates its bad members. 4) The MB will go on its way 
with the support of its followers or not, and No one did a favor to its mission. 5) Preserving the 
MB’s organization is preservation to Islam itself. 6) An MB’s member is merely a cog in the 
                                                          
298 Khalil al A’nani, “ Theoritical Deficits”, Al Ahram Weekly, July 4, 2007.  
299 Al Malegy, 254.  
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MB’s machine, and the movement chooses for him”. With such shared narratives, changes are 
not expected to happen. Innovative individual contributions are not appreciated or at least 
contested throughout dialogues. The current administrative structure, also, does not provide 
mechanisms for sharing ideas and monitoring leaders’ decisions; the Shura Council has limited 
authorities, and there are rarely conferences for discussions and performance evaluation. There 
should be bottom-up mechanisms to allow for active rank and files members’ participation in the 
decision making process. 
The future discourse and trajectory of Muslim Brotherhood might rely heavily on its 
ability to provide creative solutions to its political role, political indoctrination tools, and the 
organizational relationship with the FJP. The movement’s stance on the military presence in the 
political formula would be a decisive factor in maintaining its solidarity, public appeal, and 
survival among other Islamist discourses. Arrangements between the Supreme Armed Forces and 
Islamists, specifically MB and Salafists, would draw the map for a new Egypt. The Muslim 
Brotherhood is truly at a crossroad, future decisions will not only affect the movement’s 
solidarity and internal coherence but also the framework of Islamist political discourse. The 
coherence and solidarity of the MB would not be assured, in the long run by maneuvering and 
surrendering unappealing contradicting statements. The MB should reconsider its promotion 
criteria and adopt flexible discourse that absorbs self- critique, and a participatory approach with 
other political forces.  
To end up, I should admit the limitations of this study that would provide a direction for 
further research. The study elides in-depth analysis to MB’s intellectual heritage. It does not 
critically address intellectual contributions of Al Banna, Qutb, Rashid al Ghanoushy, and S’aid 
Hawy. In this sense, the study draws a dizzy picture for MB’s political theory, and how it 
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developed along its history. Muslim Brothers need a modern reading for Al Banna’s literature 
and ideas. Al Banna’s ideas have been distorted, or reinterpreted differently. The oath of 
allegiance, for instance, was only for the secret apparatus leaders, but it was used for the d’awa 
section as well. Recently, a new diary for Al Banna entitled “Al Manhaj” explains the 
philosophy behind the secret apparatus was added, though there is still little attention to 
that.
300
Hence, the movement needs an intellectual renewal movement that would combine 
different elements from critical writings about political Islam, MB’s members’ autobiographies 
and written resignations. It seems that the current leadership and educational section’s mentors 
are disqualified for this task. Most of them do not have a social science background, and are less 
open to accept strong critical ideas. The change would be possible if it is either from outside, or 
through a strong internal schism or a revolution for change. A comparative reading to the 
discourse of MB in other countries, and how the movement managed its relation with the 
political regime and secular political forces is salient to enrich the experience of Brothers in 
Egypt, and introduce new paths for reform.   
The study also overlooks international dynamics and their influence on political Islam in 
Egypt. The international dimension is dismissed regarding the Egyptian Brothers’ organizational 
relation with the International Organization of Muslim Brotherhood, and the future trajectory of 
this relationship if the MB would turn into a political party, or refrain from political activities. 
Thus, I consider this study as a preliminary step to navigate history, internal dynamics, and 
current challenges of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
 
 
                                                          
300 An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 7, 2012.  
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